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INTRODUCTION

The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) 1 was
developed in consultation with leading scholars, and, from its
inception, has been hailed as the solution to one of this century's
celebrated dilemmas of federalism, the so-called "problem of the
interstate child. " 2 This is the conundrum presented by those for
mally adjudicated child custody disputes in which the child or the
contestants have contacts with more than one state: Which, if any,
custody decisions will be enforced outside the state where they
were made?
The UCCJA's drafters. believed that the existing patchwork of
state jurisdictional rules, by their very multiplicity, encouraged
contestants to relocate in order to relitigate child custody cases.
Through the UCCJA, the drafters intended to substitute a single
enforceable and orderly regime; they believed such a regime
would "remedy th[e] intolerable state of affairs where self-help
and the rule of 'seize-and-run' prevail rather than the orderly
processes of the law," 3 and ensure that custody decisions were
heard "in the most convenient and proper place from the point of
view of gathering evidence." 4 Early scholarly writing about the
Act reflected the drafters' optimism, which most later assessments
of the Act's operation have maintained. 5 Nevertheless, as frusI 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 115-331 (1988). The National Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws originally promulgated the Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) in 1968.
2 Albert Ehrenzweig coined the phrase "interstate child." See Albert A.
Ehrenzweig, The Interstate Child and Uniform Legislation: A Plea for Extralitigious
Proceedings, 64 MICH. L. REv. 1, 1 (1965) [hereafter Ehrenzweig, Uniform
Legislation]. For a full exposition of the problem, see generally Albert A.
Ehrenzweig, Interstate Recognition of Custody Decrees, 51 MICH. L. REV. 345
(1953) [hereafter Ehrenzweig, Interstate Recognition]; Leonard G. Ratner,
Child Custody in a Federal System, 62 MICH. L. REv. 795 (1964) [hereafter
Ratner, Federal System].
3 UCCJA Prefatory Note, 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 117.
4 Proceedings [of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws] in Committee of the Whole, Uniform Child Custody Act 17
(Aug. 3, 1966) (statement of W J. Brockelbank, Chairman, Special
Committee on Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act).
5 See, e.g., LEA BRILMAYER, CoNFLICT OF LAws 163-67, 178 (1991); Edward
E. Bates, Jr. & James E. Holmes, The Uniform Child Custody jurisdiction Act:
Progress and Pitfalls, 17 GA. ST. BJ. 72 (1981); Brigitte M. Bodenheimer,

Interstate Custody: Initial jurisdiction and Continuing jurisdiction Under the UCCJA,
14 FAM. L.Q 203 (1980) [hereafter Bodenheimer, Interstate Custody]; Brigitte
M. Bodenheimer, Progress Under the Uniform Child Custody jurisdiction Act and
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trated practitioners and judges by now suspect, 6 the UCCJA has
not provided a consistently reliable solution to the problem of the
interstate child.
Remaining Problems: Punitive Decrees, joint Custody, and Excessive Modifications, 65
CAL. L. REv. 978 (1977) [hereafter Bodenheimer, Progress Under the UCCJA];
Brigitte M. Bodenheimer, The Rights of Children and the Crisis in Custody
Litigation: Modification of Custody In and Out of State, 46 U. CoLO. L. REv. 495
(1975) [hereafter Bodenheimer, Rights of Children]; Brigitte M. Bodenheimer,
The Uniform Child Custody jurisdiction Act: A Legislative Remedy for Children Caught
in the Conflict of Laws, 22 VAND. L. REv. 1207 (1969) [hereafter Bodenheimer,
Legislative Remedy]; Brigitte M. Bodenheimer & Janet Neeley-Kvarme,
jurisdiction Over Child Custody and Adoption After Shaffer and Kulko, 12 U.C.
DAVIS L. REv. 229 (1979); William V. Dorsaneo III, Due Process, Full Faith and
Credit and Family Law Litigation, 36 Sw. LJ. 1085 (1983); Henry H. Foster &
Doris J. Freed, Child Snatching and Custodial Fights: The Case for the Uniform
Child Custody jurisdiction Act, 28 HASTINGS LJ. 1011 (1977); Friedrich K.
Juenger, Forum Shopping, Domestic and International, 63 TuL. L. REv. 553
(1989); Barry Kuten & Roberta Fox, Closing the Custody Floodgate: Florida
Adopts the Uniform Child Custody jurisdiction Act, 6 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 409
(1978); Lucy S. McGough & Anne R. Hughes, Charted Territory: The Louisiana
Experience with the UCCJA, 44 LA. L. REv. 19 (1983);Johnj. Sampson & Harry
L. Tindall, The Uniform Child Custody jurisdiction Act Comes to Texas-As
Amended, Integrated and Improved, 46 TEx. BJ. 1096 (1983); Eric Stein,
Uniformity and Diversity in a Divided-Power System: The United States' Experience,
61 WASH. L. REv. 1081 (1986); Kathleen M. Duncan, Note, Children: Child
Custody: The Case for Enactment of the Uniform Child Custody jurisdiction Act in
Oklahoma, 33 OKLA. L. REv. 107 (1980); Evelyn L. Kosicki, Note, Child
Custody jurisdiction in Ohio-Implementing the Uniform Child Custody jurisdiction
Act, 12 AKRON L. REV. 121 (1978); Gail F. Moulds, Note, The Uniform Child
Custody jurisdiction Act: Is It Working in Florida?, 13 STETSON L. REv. 431
( 1984); Elizabeth C. Shuff, Comment, The Uniform Child Custody jurisdiction Act
in Virginia, 14 U. RICH. L. REV. 435 (1980).
But see Russell M. Coombs, Interstate Child Custody: jurisdiction, Recognition
and Enforcement, 66 MINN. L. REV. 711 (1982) (criticizing parts of UCCJA as
ineffective and unconstitutional); Leonard G. Ratner, Procedural Due Process
and jurisdiction to Adjudicate: (a) Effective-Litigation Values vs. the Territorial
Imperative (b) The Uniform Child Custody jurisdiction Act, 75 Nw. U. L. REv. 363
(1980) [hereafter Ratner, Procedural Due Process] (suggesting, in the
alternative, amending or reinterpreting certain provisions of UCCJA);
Family Law: Courts Adoption of the Uniform Child Custody jurisdiction Act Offers
Little Hope of Resolving Child Custody Conflicts, 60 MINN. L. REV. 820 (1976)
(noting that most important issues are committed to courts' discretion).
6 See, e.g., Emanuel A. Bertin, Relocation: No Common Ground; All States Agree
That What s Good for the Child Is What Counts-but That s All They Agree On, FAM.
Anvoc., Winter 1989, at 6; Dennis J. Jacobsen, A Judge Looks at Relocation:
What Works in Court?, FAM. Anvoc., Winter 1989, at 30; Peter M. Walzer,
jurisdiction: Maneuvering Through Complex Rules, FAM. Anvoc., Winter 1990, at
16.
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The UCCJA is a success in the sense that every state has
adopted it without substantial alteration. 7 It now applies to all
child custody litigation with interstate features. In too many
7 See ALA. CoDE §§ 30-3-20 to -44 (1989 & Supp. 1991); ALASKA STAT.
§§ 25.30.010 to .910 (1991); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.§§ 8-401 to -424 (1989
& Supp. 1991); ARK. CooE ANN. §§ 9-13-201 to -228 (Michie 1991); CAL.
Civ. CooE §§ 5150-5174 (West 1983 & Supp. 1991); Cow. REv. STAT. ANN.
§§ 14-13-101 to -126 (West 1989 & Supp. 1991); CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 46b-90 to -114 (West 1986 & Supp. 1991); DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 13,
§§ 1901-1925 (1981 & Supp. 1991); D.C. CooE ANN. §§ 16-4501 to -4524
(1989 & Supp. 1991); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 61.1302 to .1348 (West 1985 &
Supp. 1992); GA. CoDE ANN. §§ 74-501 to -525 (Harrison 1981 & Supp.
1989); HAW. REV. STAT.§§ 583-1 to -26 (1985); IDAHO CoDE§§ 32-1101 to1126 (1983 & Supp. 1991); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, n 2101-2126 (Smith
Hurd 1980 & Supp. 1991); IND. CoDE ANN. §§ 31-1-11.6-1 to -24 (West
1979 & Supp. 1991); IowA CooE ANN.§§ 598A.1 to .25 (West 1981 & Supp.
1991); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 38-1301 to -1326 (1986); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 403.400 to .620 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1984 & Supp. 1990); LA. REv.
STAT. ANN.§§ 13:1700 to :1724 (West 1983 & Supp. 1991); ME. REv. STAT.
ANN. tit. 19, §§ 801-825 (West 1981 & Supp. 1991); Mo. FAM. LAw CooE
ANN. §§ 9-201 to -224 (1984 & Supp. 1991); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch.
209B, §§ 1-14 (West 1987 & Supp. 1991); MICH. STAT. ANN.§§ 27A.651 to
.673 (Callaghan 1986 & Supp. 1991); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 518A.01 to .25
(West 1990 & Supp. 1991); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 93-23-1 to -47 (1972 &
Supp. 1991); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 452.440 to .550 (Vernon 1986 & Supp.
1992); MoNT. CooE ANN. §§ 40-7-101 to -125 (1991); NEB. REv. STAT.
§§ 43-1201 to -1225 (1988); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 125A.010 to .250 (1979);
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 458-A:1 to :25 (1983 & Supp. 1991); N.J. STAT.
ANN.§§ 2A:34-28 to -52 (West 1987 & Supp. 1991); N.M. STAT. ANN.§§ 4010-1 to -24 (Michie 1978 & Supp. 1991); N.Y. DoM. REL. LAw§§ 75-a to -z
(McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1992); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 50A-1 to -25 (1989);
N.D. CENT. CoDE §§ 14-14-01 to -26 (1981); OHIO REv. CooE ANN.
§§ 3109.21 to .37 (Anderson 1989 & Supp. 1991); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43,
§§ 501-527 (West 1987 & Supp. 1992); OR. REv. STAT. §§ 109.700 to .930
(1989); 42 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. §§ 5341-5366 (1981 & Supp. 1991); R.I.
GEN. LAws§§ 15-14-1 to -26 (1988 & Supp. 1991); S.C. CoDE ANN.§§ 20-7782 to -830 (Law. Co-op. 1985 & Supp. 1991); S.D. CoDIFIED LAws ANN.
§§ 26-5A-1 to -26 (1984 & Supp. 1991); TENN. CoDE ANN.§§ 36-6-201 to225 (1991); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 11.51 to .75 (1986 & Supp. 1991);
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-45c-1 to -26 (1987 & Supp. 1991); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 15, §§ 1031-1051 (1989); VA. CooE ANN. §§ 20-125 to -146 (Michie
1990); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 26.27.010 to .910 (West 1986 & Supp.
1991); W. VA. CooE §§ 48-10-1 to -26 (1986 & Supp. 1991); Wis. STAT.
ANN. §§ 822.01 to .25 (West 1977 & Supp. 1991); WYo. STAT.§§ 20-5-101
to -125 (1987 & Supp. 1991).
For a partial catalog of state variations from the text of the UCCJA, see
Christopher L. Blakesley, Child Custody-jurisdiction and Procedure, 35 EMORY
L.J. 291, 316-25 (1986).
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cases, however, it has merely added a layer of formal complexity
(and, consequently, of uncertainty and expense) to interstate cus
tody disputes, without producing either predictability or repose. 8
It has neither standardized state jurisdictional decisions nor dis
couraged (and penalized) self-help. Litigants not subject to direct
coercion by the court that rendered a custody decision can still
evade an unwelcome decision with judicial assistance from
another state's courts.
Any assessment of the UCCJA is complicated by the Parental
Kidnaping Prevention Act of 1980 (PKPA), 9 a federal statute that
addresses precisely the same problem. Notwithstanding its popu
lar name, the PKPA's most important provisions implement the
Full Faith and Credit Clause. The PKPA requires states to defer
to one another's custody decrees when specific criteria (derived
from the UCCJA in most respects) are met. 10 At least forty-three
states had adopted the UCCJA by the time the PKPA became
effective. 11 The PKPA's sponsors hoped the legislation would
force states that had not yet adopted the UCCJA to reach the
same results as states that had, and would plug what they pers In this article, I use the term "repose" to refer to a forum's refusal even
to consider a request to modify a custody decision, whether the decision is
made by the forum or a foreign court. In the intrastate context, repose is
often considered important to the best interests of the child. In the
interstate context, repose is thought to discourage parents from moving
from state to state with their children in search of more favorable custody
decisions.
9 Pub. L. No. 96-611 §§ 6-10, 94 Stat. 3568 (1980) (codified in scattered
sections of 28 and 42 U.S.C. (1988 & Supp. I 1989)).
10 See Parental Kidnaping Prevention Act of 1980 (PKPA) § 8(a), 94 Stat.
3569-71 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1988)). In addition to these
provisions and a general statement of purposes in § 7, 94 Stat. 3568, the
PKPA amends 42 U.S.C. § 663 to make the Parent Locator Service available
for tracing an absent parent or child in connection with state or federal
parental kidnaping prosecutions and with the making or enforcing of
custody orders. See PKPA § 9, 94 Stat. 3571 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 663). It also "interprets" 18 U.S.C. § 1073, the crime oflnterstate
Flight to Avoid Prosecution, to apply to parents subject to state felony
prosecution for kidnaping their children. See PKPA § 10, 94 Stat. 3573.
11 The latest date that the PKPA could have become effective was July 1,
1981, the effective date specified in Pub. L. No. 96-611 § 2, 94 Stat. 3567.
Because Pub. L. No. 96-611 also contains technical amendments to the
Social Security Act entirely unrelated to the PKPA, see Pub. L. No. 96-611
§§ 1-5, 11,94 Stat. 3566-68,3573-74 (codified in scattered sections of26
and 42 U.S.C.), however, some courts have concluded that the PKPA
became effective on December 28, 1980, its enactment date. See, e.g.,
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ceived as loopholes in the UCCJA! 2 Unfortunately, the sponsors'
critique of the UCCJA was inadequate. The PKPA replicates
some of the UCCJA's defects, and its attempts to improve on the
UCCJA create additional problemsY Although the PKPA raises
new issues of statutory interpretation and interstate deference
(adding further to the complexity and expense of multistate cus
tody litigation), it has not solved the problem of the interstate
child any more than the UCCJA did.
This article's thesis is that the UCCJA and PKPA have not elim
inated jurisdictional competition because a federal system such as
ours cannot achieve both of the Acts' two main instrumental
goals-preventing or punishing "child-snatching" and promoting
well-infon:ned decisions. Our system commits custody decisions
to sovereign states, which make and modify the decisions accord
ing to indeterminate precepts. Such a system will inevitably cre
ate some version of the problem of the interstate child; so long as
these features of our system persist, legislation cannot solve the
problem. Therefore, although this article proposes amendments
to the UCCJA designed to increase its effectiveness, in the alter
native, it urges legislatures to repeal both the UCCJA and the
PKPA, in order to eliminate the superfluous delays and transac
tion costs that impede the courts' search for justice in individual
child custody cases.
This article begins by examining the fundamental nature of the
problem that these statutes were intended to remedy. 14 It then
reviews the history of our understanding of the problem 15 and
traces the development of reforming legislation, paying particular
attention to the courts' interpretations of the statutes. 16 The artiThompson v. Thompson, 798 F.2d 1547, 1550-51 (9th Cir. 1986), aff'd, 484
u.s. 174 (1988).
Forty-three states had adopted the UCCJA by 1980. HANDBOOK OF THE
NATIONAL CoNFERENCE OF CoMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAws AND
PROCEEDINGS 523 (1980). By 1981, all United States jurisdictions had
adopted the UCCJA except Massachusetts, Mississippi, Texas, the District of
Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. HANDBOOK OF THE
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAws AND
PROCEEDINGS 4 70 ( 1981).
12 See Henry H. Foster, Child Custody jurisdiction: UCCJA and PKPA, 27
N.Y.L. Sen. L. REv. 297, 300-04 (1981).
13 See infra part IV.
14 See infra part lA.
15 See infra part lB.
16 See infra parts II-IV.
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de concludes with proposals for further reform. 17
I.

THE "PROBLEM OF THE INTERSTATE CHILD"

The "problem of the interstate child" is the jurisdictional
conundrum presented by formally adjudicated child custody 18
disputes in which the child or the contestants have contact with
more than one state: When, if at all, will a custody decision made
in one state be enforced in another? This question arises when
more than one forum seeks to adjudicate a dispute concerning
the same child, and it raises four distinct jurisdictional issues.
Two of these issues, "initial" and "continuing" jurisdiction, con
cern the jurisdiction of the first state to consider the case. The
other two, "enforcement" and "modification" jurisdiction, con
cern the jurisdiction of another, subsequent, state.
The first time a parent 19 seeks judicial resolution of his or her
child's custody, the issues raised by this implicit assertion that the
chosen forum has "initial jurisdiction" are relatively simple. In
broad terms, the court must decide whether the forum has suffi
cient connection with the parents and the child to render a deci
sion. After the initial custody decree has been made, the decree
court may adjudicate any subsequent custody disputes only if it
has "continuing jurisdiction." 20 If a court in another state is
asked to enforce the first state's decree, this raises both the issue
17

See infra part V.

"Custody" encompasses the entire bundle of non-economic parental
rights: living with the child, visiting with the child, and making decisions
about the child's education, medical care, discipline, associations, religious
training, and so forth. Custody rights are commonly allocated between a
child's parents when they divorce; these rights may also be altered by
guardianship proceedings, abuse and neglect proceedings, adoption
proceedings, see Robert H. Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial
Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy, LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1975,
at 226, and juvenile delinquency proceedings. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 17
(1966).
19 This discussion assumes that the only possible child custody litigants
are the child's parents, though solely for rhetorical ease. In fact, the child
custody contest may be waged between a parent and some other natural
person, between two non-parents, or between the state and one or more
natural persons. The jurisdictional issues remain the same whether or not
the contestants are parents. Both the UCCJA and the PKPA apply to all
child custody litigation. See PKPA § 8(a), 94 Stat. 3471 (codified at 28
U.S.C. § l738A(b)); UCCJA § 2 & cmt., 9 U.L.A. pt. I, at 133.
20 See Dale F. Stansbury, Custody and Maintenance Law Across State Lines, 10
LAw & CoNTEMP. PRoBs. 819, 825 (1944).
18
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of the first state's jurisdiction to make the disputed order and the
issue of the second state's "enforcement jurisdiction. " 21 Finally,
if a second state is asked to modify, rather than enforce, a custody
decree made in another state, this raises the issue of the second
state's "modification jurisdiction. " 22 All of these jurisdictional
issues may be litigated in the court whose jurisdiction is chal
lenged, or collaterally in some other court.
The most troublesome aspect of the problem is that, because
courts sitting in different states may resolve the question of their
own, or another state's, jurisdiction in each of these situations dif
ferently, parties who are unsuccessful in one forum may be
rewarded for relitigating in another; worse still, to the extent that
a litigant's chance of success is improved if she brings the child
with her when she moves, the law tends to undermine the stability
of families as well as of judicial decisions. The problem was first
named and studied in the middle years of this century (as soon as
custody litigation became common in the United States). 23
Although this was not explicitly recognized then, the problem
arises from fundamental features of our legal system rather than
from particular laws. The next section describes this core of the
problem.
A.

1.

The Core of the Problem

The Limits of Federalism

Although the problem is usually analyzed as if it were produced
by particular laws, in fact the problem is imbedded in the very
structure of our legal system. When the problem is stripped of
technical details, it is easy to understand why it has been so intrac
table. Some form of the problem is inherent in a federal system
like ours, which allocates child custody adjudication to autono-·
mous state tribunals, 24 so long as custody litigants, like other citi21 A court has enforcement jurisdiction if it may enforce a custody order.
This question is now governed by the UCCJA.
22 A court has modification jurisdiction if it may modify a custody order.
This question is also now governed by the UCCJA.
23 Ehrenzweig, Uniform Legislation, supra note 2, at l.
Perhaps not
coincidentally, the automobile began to make interstate migration cheaper
and easier beginning in the 1920s. See FRANK DoNOVAN, WHEELS FOR A
NATION 162-63 (1965). For an early scholarly description of the problem of
the interstate child, see generally Herbert F. Goodrich, Custody of Children in
Divorce Suits: The Conflict of Laws Problem, 7 CoRNELL L. REv. l (1921).
24 This would be true whether the tribunal were a court, a master, a
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zens, may move freely from state to state, and our courts continue
to use the best interests of the child-or any other indeterminate
test-to reach custody decisions that are modifiable during the
child's minority.
In such a system, whenever one parent moves away from the
other, with or without the children, the move itself may be seen as
changing circumstances sufficiently to justify a modification. The
move also ensures that more than one forum will have at least a
colorable interest in resolving any ensuing dispute over custody
or visitation. With each interstate move, a new state becomes
interested in the child's welfare or in the parent's custodial rights,
yet the interests of states already concerned with the dispute, the
child, or the litigants, do not necessarily diminish.
Before the UCCJA and PKPA, the states subscribed to a variety
of jurisdictional theories, in effect giving any forum with an inter
est in an interstate custody dispute a rationale for seeking to
resolve it. 25 Moreover, under applicable Supreme Court prece
dents, no state was bound to enforce another state's prior custody
decision. 26 Leonard Ratner, who first proposed a uniform law to
reform the problem of the interstate child, believed that this radi
cal jurisdictional indeterminacy, and the litigants' consequent
uncertainty about the proper forum, caused litigants and their
children to move in search of a more favorable forum. 27 He con
cluded, therefore, that if all the states adopted uniform jurisdic
tional rules and cooperated in requiring their courts to defer to
custody determinations made in states with proper jurisdiction
under such uniform rules, both the uncertainty and the jockeying
for a better forum would end. 28
Both the UCCJA and the PKPA follow Ratner's model. The
accumulating decisions under these statutes demonstrate, how
ever, that the problem of the interstate child has not been solved.
States following these statutes' commands still render custody
decisions to which other states, also relying on these statutes,
family service agency, a court clinic, or an individual expert in children's
needs, so long as each state's tribunal were independent of tribunals in
other states.
25 See infra part IB 1.
26 See infra part IB2.
27 See Leonard G. Ratner, Legislative Resolution of the Interstate Child Custody
Problem: A Reply to Professor Currie and A Proposed Uniform Act, 38 S. CAL. L.
REV. 183, 196-205 (1965) [hereafter Ratner, Legislative Resolution].
28 /d. at 183.
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refuse to defer. Courts continue to review custody decisions'
merits before deciding whether to enforce or modify the deci
sions. Litigants may therefore still improve their positions by
moving away from a state of adverse decision. Most distressingly,
competent attorneys (even after thorough research) remain
unable either to predict whether a court will deem itself jurisdic
tionally empowered to decide a custody matter, or to advise their
clients whether a custody decision will be binding in states other
than the one where it was made. Although faulty design and poor
drafting contribute to these statutes' failure, such flaws are not
the fundamental cause of their ineffectiveness. The problem of
the interstate child was never resolvable by Ratner's model.
There are two paramount constraints on any solution to the
problem of the interstate child. First, each state's courts are sov
ereign within state boundaries and powerless outside them.
Therefore, any state's judgment will have extraterritorial effect
only if another independent sovereign gives it that effect. That is,
another state's courts must subordinate the local interests in the
dispute to the interests of a foreign state. 29 Second, any solution
must balance two important and incompatible objectives derived
from modem substantive custody law: flexibility, and certainty in
the dual senses of predictability and repose.
The incompatibility of flexibility with certainty is an important
tension in the internal law of the several states, but so long as a
custody dispute is before a single sovereign the two objectives can
be balanced and the tension resolved in each particular case.
When a party's interstate move brings a custody case before the
courts of a second sovereign, however, the competing needs of
each jurisdiction may predude a solution. The next section
shows how this works. First, it shows how substantive custody law
tends to subvert predictability and repose even in intrastate cases;
second, it shows how this tendency is magnified to unmanageable
proportions in interstate cases.
2.

Substantive Custody Law

a.

Single-State Custody Cases

In the middle years of this century, when scholars first noticed
29 Although a forum's own interest in federalism, as expressed by the
Full Faith and Credit Clause, might have been interpreted to mandate such
cooperation, the law developed otherwise. See infra note 68 and
accompanying text.
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the problem of the interstate child, some states had substantive
custody rules that favored one party over the other. 30 With a few
notable exceptions, this is no longer the case. 31 We have by now
evolved what is in effect a uniform substantive child custody law:
30 During this period the courts were shifting from paternal preference to
the tender years doctrine to the search for the best interests of the child. See
infra note 32. Nevertheless, in 1944 Professor Stansbury asserted that "the
applicable internal laws of the several states ... do not differ enough to
create problems of choice of law." Stansbury, supra note 20, at 819.
31 The most striking exceptions concern the effect on custody of a
parent's extra-marital sexual encounters. In some states, a custodial parent
who has a lover may lose custody solely on that basis. See, e.g., Jarrett v.
Jarrett, 400 N.E.2d 421, 423-426 (Ill. 1979) (mother's open cohabitation
with man makes award of custody to her improper), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 927
(1980); Beck v. Beck, 341 So. 2d 580, 582 (La. Ct. App. 1977) (mother's
"open and public adultery with her paramour" renders her unfit for
custody); Parker v. Parker, 158 A.2d 607, 610 (Md. 1960) (mother's adultery
raises strong presumption against her fitness for custody); Boykin v. Boykin,
370 S.E.2d 884, 886 (S.C. Ct. App. 1988) (citing mother's "flagrant"
promiscuity as reason to award custody to father); cf. Primm v. Primm, 409
So. 2d 1288, 1290 (La. Ct. App. 1982) (court may require mother to keep
her lover and her children apart as condition of custody); In re G.B.S. &
A.L.S., 641 S.W.2d 776, 777-78 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (not error to condition
custody on father's not cohabiting with woman); Hanson v. Hanson, 187
N.W.2d 647, 648-49 (Neb. 1971) (court may give legal custody to state,
physical custody to mother, to ensure mother desists from post-divorce
affairs). But see Helgenberger v. Helgenberger, 306 N.W.2d 867, 869 (Neb.
1981) (sexual conduct determinative only when it affects children's welfare);
Whaley v. Whaley, 399 N.E.2d 1270, 1275 (Ohio Ct. App. 1978) (requiring
proof of causal connection between parent's sexual conduct and harm to
child); In re Walter, 557 P.2d 57, 57 (Or. Ct. App. 1976) (improper to
condition custody on mother's not cohabiting with a man);J.B. v. A.B., 242
S.E.2d 248,256 (W.Va. 1978) (if sexual misconduct is not "outrageous," it
is not relevant).
Similarly, although some states will never give custody to a homosexual
parent, see, e.g.,Jacobson v.Jacobson, 314 N.W.2d 78 (N.D. 1981) (custody
changed because mother is lesbian); Roe v. Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691 (Va. 1985)
(award of custody to actively homosexual father error of law), others have
held that a parent's sexual orientation is relevant to a custody determination
only if it is adversely affecting the child. See, e.g., Birdsall v. Birdsall, 243
Cal. Rptr. 287 (Ct. App. 1988) (parental homosexuality no bar to visitation);
Bezio v. Patenaude, 410 N.E.2d 1207 (Mass. 1980) (mother's lesbianism
alone insufficient to deny her return of custody); In re Cabalquinto, 669 P.2d
886 (Wash. 1983) (en bane) (parental homosexuality no bar to visitation);
Schuster v. Schuster, 585 P.2d 130 (Wash. 1978) (en bane) (lesbian
cohabitation in violation of prior custody decrees insufficient to warrant
change of custody). See generally Developments in the Law-Sexual Orientation
and the Law, 102 HARV. L. REv. 1508, 1630-40 (1989) (examining factors,
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the courts must try to achieve the best interests of the child. Liti
gants do not travel from state to state in search of more favorable
substantive law. Formally, the law is the same everywhere. Why,
then, do litigants continue moving to other states to avoid
adverse custody decisions? Because substantive custody law does
not decide cases, and all custody decisions are modifiable. Liti
gants move to get yet another day in court, lured by the indeter
minacy of substantive custody law's best interests ideal into
believing that a different tribunal will reach a more favorable
result.
Modem child custody law is characterized by a tension between
certainty and flexibility. The tension is clearly evident in the
modem goal of making custody decisions "in the best interests of
the child." That phrase heralded the nineteenth-century shift
from the feudal rule, which required courts to place a child in her
father's custody, to our present child-centered inquiry. 32 The
feudal rule exalted certainty over flexibility. It was, if nothing
else, easy to understand and apply. "The best interests of the
child" is neither. There is no consensus-legal, scientific, or soci
etal-·as to either the "best" outcome for children or even as to
including sexual orientation, that influence courts in . resolving custody
disputes).
32 Early American cases echoed their English models in treating the
father as the natural guardian of his child who had an alienable property
right in the child's custody as well as in any income from the child's work.
See, e.g., Bermudez v. Bermudez, 2 Mart. 180 (La. 1812) (awarding custody
to father after mother left); State v. Barney, 14 R.I. 62 (1883) (holding that
father may assign infant's custody to paternal grandmother over mother's
objections). But cf. State ex rei. Neider v. Reuff, 2 S.E. 801, 803 (W. Va.
1887) (noting father's unalienable right to custody and control of minor
child). Beginning in the mid-1800s, however, some courts conditioned the
father's rights on the child's well-being. See, e.g., State ex rei. Paine v. Paine,
23 Tenn. (4 Hum.) 523 (1843) (denying custody to morally unfit father). But
see, e.g., Ely v. Gammel, 52 Ala. 584 (1875) (granting custody to adulterous
father). At approximately the same time, concern for very young children's
welfare led some courts to place them with their mothers. See, e.g., State v.
Stigall, 22 NJ.L. 286 (1849) (awarding custody of one- and three-year-old
children to mother, but custody of five-year-old to father). These doctrines
gradually evolved into a more general concern for the child's "best
interests." See, e.g., State ex rei. Neider v. Reuff, 2 S.E. 801, 802-06 (W.Va.
1887) (noting general rule that father is entitled to custody of minor
children, but awarding custody to mother under developing best interests
standard) .. See generally MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GovERNING THE HEARTH 23442 (1985) (discussing shift from father-oriented, property-based custody
standards to standards that emphasize child's best interest).
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the conditions most likely to produce any desired result. Rather,
in our pluralistic society many different, conflicting, strongly-held
opinions exist on both those questions.
Given this plurality of opinion, the litigants in every case may
dispute both what outcome would be "best" for a particular child
and what means are most likely to achieve any desired outcome. 33
Using whatever facts and arguments seem appropriate in a partic
ular case, judges must develop a case-specific standard for each
custody decision, and then must apply this standard to the very
facts that were used to generate it. 34 The "best interests of the
child" is therefore, at best, an ideal rather than either "a rule" 35
or "a standard. " 36 A court can neither reach nor rationally
approach "the best interests of the child." In virtually any case,
another equally diligent tribunal might reach a different
decision. 37
Moreover, in most states custody decisions are freely modifia
ble whenever a judge determines that the child's welfare requires
a change of custody. Evaluating whether a second judge has
made a wiser decision than the first is at least as difficult as evalu
ating the result in the first instance. Modem custody litigation is
therefore characterized by great discretion for judges and corre
spondingly great uncertainty for litigants. It exalts flexibility over
predictability to an extreme degree on the assumption that super
ficially similar cases need not be decided alike because no two
cases can be meaningfully similar.
Reformers dissatisfied with this system have often focused on
making the flexibility of the best interests ideal fulfill its promise
of individual justice. This motivation underlies attempts to
increase the sophistication of case-specific standards by educating
and supporting the decision-makers. Many states now give
33

See Mnookin, supra note 18, at 232-37.

34

/d. at 231.

See Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law AdJudication, 89
L. REv. 1685, 1687-88 (1976) (defining rule as "a directive to an
official that requires him to respond to the presence together of each of a
list of easily distinguishable factual aspects of a situation by intervening in a
determinate way"); Mnookin, supra note 18, at 231 n.21 (stating that the
"best interests of the child" is neither a rule nor determinative of a rule).
36 See Kennedy, supra note 35, at 1688 ("A standard refers directly to one
of the substantive objectives of the legal order.").
37 Because of the standard's indeterminacy, this would be true whether
the tribunal were a court, a master, a family service agency, a court clinic, or
an individual expert in children's needs.
35

HARV.
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judges who make custody decisions institutionalized access to
advice from professionals staffing court clinics and probation
departments. 38 Some also give judges ample opportunity to
develop wisdom in specialized family courts. 39
Unfortunately, even wise and sophisticated flexibility can be
systemically destabilizing. However well the best interests ideal's
flexibility may serve the goal of justice in the individual case, it
endangers the entire system's legitimacy. Every custody decision
based on a case-specific standard is vulnerable to the charge that
it represents merely one judge's personal predilections rather
than the rule of law. 40 Litigants and counsel are chronically dis
satisfied with such flexibility. This dissatisfaction is reflected in
the latter's perennial attempts to identify common patterns in
custody decisions, 41 in settlements based on the parties' risk-tak
ing preferences rather than on "the law," 42 and in the increasing
use of nonjudicial decision-making processes. 43
The system's need for legitimacy in the face of the substantive
standard's radical indeterminacy therefore creates a counter
vailing need for certainty-for predictability or, at a minimum, for
repose. Because the best interests ideal renders custody results
unavoidably unpredictable, the system's need for legitimacy has
become focused on the goal of repose. Explicit pleas for repose
are made by those who advocate limiting the courts' power to
modify existing custody orders. 44 Some child psychologists agree
38

See Robert J. Levy, Custody Investigations in Divorce Cases, 1985 AM. B.

FouND. REs. J. 713, 714.

!d.
Jeff Atkinson, Criteria for Deciding Child Custody in the Trial and Appellate
Courts, 18 FAM. L.Q 1, 3 (1984).
41 See generally, e.g., id. (identifying common patterns in 241 reported
1982 appellate custody decisions nationwide).
42 See Mnookin, supra note 18, at 230-37. But see Sally B. Sharp,
Modification of Agreement Based Custody Decrees: Unitary or Dual Standard, 68 VA.
L. REv. 1263 (1982) (arguing that custodial arrangements reached by
parental agreement are wiser and better-informed than judicial
determinations or expert opinions).
43 See Martha Fineman, Dominant Discourse, Professional Language, and Legal
Change in Child Custody Decisionmaking, 101 HARV. L. REv. 727, 728 (1988).
44 Although the modem trend is toward requiring a "substantial" or
"material" change of circumstances for modification, see Uniform Marriage
and Divorce Act§ 409, 9A U.L.A. 628 (1987); Atkinson, supra note 40, at 5,
some states require much less, see, e.g., Parten v. Parten, 351 So. 2d 613, 615
(Ala. Civ. App. 1977) (modifying custody order on basis of facts unknown to
judge at first trial); accord Hill v. Hill, 620 P.2d 1114, 1119 (Kan. 1980);
39

40
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with the often-heard argument that, because stability is in chil
dren's best interest, modifications should be difficult to obtain. 45
Nevertheless, the best interests ideal undermines the goal of
repose by requiring that, to protect the child from unforseen and
unforeseeable dangers, custodial decrees must remain perpetu
ally modifiable. 46 Thus, the ordinary tendency of custody law,
even when litigation takes place entirely within one state, is
towards flexibility even at the cost of systemic legitimacy. This
tendency is greatly magnified in multistate litigation.
b.

Special Characteristics of Multistate Custody Cases

Multistate child custody cases are very often true conflicts, 47 in
which two or more states have a genuine interest in resolving
matters, each in its own way. All true conflicts are notoriously
and inherently difficult, but child custody conflicts are especially
so. A court must decide not which state's law to apply but
whether to hear the case at all. In this context, flexibility means
holding another hearing; certainty means enforcing an existing
order or deferring to a proceeding that is pending elsewhere.
In principle, every state court has an interest both in flexibility
(to respond to the forum's interest in the dispute by doing justice
in the particular case) and in certainty (to protect the legitimacy
of the court and of the system of justice generally). In any partic
ular multistate case, however, the need for flexibility will seem
most urgent to the court with a local child before it exhibiting all
Dailey v. Dailey, 635 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981); In re Potts,
699 P.2d 799, 800 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985).
45 Indeed, perpetual uncertainty in custodial arrangements may be more
dangerous for children than judicial inflexibility is, because" 'poor parental
models are easier to adapt to than ever shifting ones.'" Bodenheimer,
Legislative Remedy, supra note 5, at 1209 (quoting ANDREW S. WATSON,
PsYCHIATRY FOR LAWYERS 197 (1968)); accord May v. Anderson, 345 U.S.
528, 541-42 ( 1953) (stating that children need to be free of "incessant tug
of war between squabbling parents"); JosEPH GoLDSTEIN, ANNA FREUD, &
ALBERT j. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 31-39 (1973).
46 See, e.g., Kovacs v. Brewer, 356 U.S. 604, 612 (1958) (Frankfurter,].,
dissenting).
47 A state is "interested" in having its law applied if doing so would
advance the state's policy. If more than one state has an interest, there is a
"true conflict." See generally BRAINERD CURRIE, Notes on Methods and Objectives
in the Conflict of Laws, in SELECTED EssAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws 177,
183-84 (1963);john H. Ely, Choice of Law and the State's Interest In Protecting Its
Own, 23 WM. & MARY L. REv. 173 (l98l);joseph Singer, Real Conflicts, 69
B.U. L. REV. I (1989).
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the compelling particularity of its needs and vulnerabilities. That
court will want to make a new inquiry (and perhaps a new order)
instead of blindly enforcing a foreign decree. Indeed, the inter
state move itself may seem a "change of circumstances" sufficient
to warrant at least a new hearing and perhaps a change of custody
as well.
Conversely, the need for certainty will seem most urgent to the
court that lacks the power to enforce its own orders and that must
rely on another state's court to do so. Such a court will not want
to allow a litigant to evade an unfavorable ruling merely by cross
ing a state border. In multistate, as in single-state, custody cases,
the legal system's need for legitimacy in the face of apparent inde
terminacy translates into a need for certainty. In the context of a
request to modify a custody order, certainty would mean repose,
that is, refusing even to consider the request.
In a single-state case, a single tribunal must balance the interest
in certainty with the interest in flexibility inherent in the best
interests ideal. 48 In a multistate case, however, no one court can
comprehend the competing forces. "The legal system" becomes
a term with uncertain meaning. Meeting the system's need for
legitimacy in multistate cases would require cooperation of a kind
that the situation itself undermines.
Although motivated by concern for children, a court's willing
ness to retry custody in multistate cases can be especially trouble
some both to the litigants and to the system ofjustice. Most child
custody disputes reach negotiated, not litigated, solutions. 49
Only the most recalcitrant disputes are fully litigated. The legal
system's ability to impose a resolution on such disputes depends
heavily on the litigants' perceptions of its legitimacy. A child cus
tody decision will seem legitimate only to the extent that it seems
to be the product of serious and thoughtful attention to the par
ticular children's needs and to the parents' competing claims of
ability to meet those needs. The best interests ideal's inherent
flexibility presents some risk to the law's legitimacy even when a
child custody dispute is conducted entirely in the courts of one
48 See Carl E. Schneider, Discretion, Rules, and Law: Child Custody and the
UMDA's Best-Interest Standard, 89 MicH. L. REv. 2215, 2288-97 (1991)
(defending best interests ideal for enabling judicial discretion where it is
needed).
49 Cj Mnookin, supra note 18, at 288 ("Divorcing parents often negotiate
and agree about child custody while simultaneously settling other issues
such as visitation, child support, and marital property division.").
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state, but the risk is greatly magnified in multistate cases. If a
decision seems to reflect only the personal values of the new
judge-or the parochial values of the new forum-it will not be
respected.
When a litigant doubts a custody decision's legitimacy and
believes she can improve her position by taking the dispute to
another forum, she may be strongly tempted to do just that. 50 If
this tactic proves successful, and particularly if the mere change of
forum seems to have contributed to the change in result, the
other party will, in tum, be tempted to continue the cycle by tak
ing the child somewhere else. Iflarge numbers oflitigants "seize
and run," 51 the legal system as a whole will be perceived as pow
erless to decide custody questions without the parties' consent;
this, in tum, will likely encourage further self-help.
That some custody litigants will respond to an unfavorable cus
tody order not by complying but by moving away with the child
and relitigating in a new forum should come as no surprise.
Indeed, the wonder is that so many parents acquiesce in adverse
custody decisions. Parents are likely to have deeply-held beliefs
about their children's needs. An unsuccessful custody litigant
may fervently believe that the trial court wrongly assessed the
child's needs, the parents' respective fitness to meet those needs,
or both. The litigant may conclude that the court's erroneous
decision puts the child in grave danger, from which the original
state's legal system provides no protection. If another jurisdic
tion seems likely to take a fresh look at the custody question, the
losing litigant will thus be strongly tempted to go there. Our cul
ture's high valuation of a parent's willingness to make sacrifices
and take risks for his or her child will, in such circumstances, sup
port any parental inclination toward self-help. Even a parent who
customarily is a Good Citizen (obeying the law because it is a
source of moral guidance) may therefore become a Bad Man (or
Woman) when he or she loses a custody dispute (merely asking
what consequences will follow disobedience). 52
50 At one time, counsel may have even advised her to follow this course.
See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., May v. Anderson: Preamble to Family Law Chaos, 45
VA. L. REV. 379, 393 (1959).
51 May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 542 (1953) (Jackson,J., dissenting).
52 See Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 459
(1897) (stating that to know law, one must "look at it as a bad man, who
cares only for the material consequences which such knowledge enable him
to predict"); William Twining, The Bad Man Revisited, 58 CoRNELL L. REv.
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The radical indeterminacy of the best interests ideal, and the
advantages that a local litigant has over a party who lives far from
the tribunal, also combine to encourage such a step. Courts han
dling custody matters are typically local courts. The judge may
know local witnesses in person or by reputation; their lifestyles,
values, and even their accents will be familiar. A local litigant
seeking to evade a foreign custody order will likely be supported
by such local witnesses: the opposing party will be trying to pre
vent those witnesses from being heard in the local court. Under
standably, courts are reluctant to close their doors to custody
disputes in which their state has some interest, or to accept any
other state's custody determination as final whenever a local peti
tioner can make a colorable claim that custody should be reexam
ined. 53 Courts appear particularly reluctant to defer to an out-of
state tribunal when the dispute involves a local family or there is
an abundance of local evidence.
Moreover, a foreign decision may well reflect unfamiliar-per
haps even actively disliked-cultural values. The evidence on
which the foreign tribunal relied will probably be represented, at
best, by a relatively unpersuasive cold transcript. 54 The foreign
expert witnesses were likely affiliated with unfamiliar institutions.
The foreign fact witnesses may well have displayed unfamiliar val
ues and life experiences. Such evidence is harder for a court to
assess (and therefore perhaps inevitably less persuasive) than evi
dence from local witnesses.
The distant party relying on a foreign decree has additional dis
advantages. She must somehow find and communicate with
forum counsel. She must contend with regional chauvinism. If
the forum orders a hearing, she must bear the costs of transport
ing and housing witnesses or forgo their testimony. The party
seeking a modification need only convince a court that a local
275, 279 (1973) ("[W]hile the Good Citizen asks 'How should I behave?,"
the Bad Man inquires 'What will happen to me if I embark on this course of
action?' ").
53 Before the UCCJA, most courts disregarded other states' custody
decisions, at least in reported cases. Ehrenzweig, Interstate Recognition, supra
note 2, at 34 7; Stansbury, supra note 20, at 828-29. Although both the
UCCJA and the PKPA were designed to alleviate the problem, it persists
nonetheless.
54 In Massachusetts, for example, there may be no transcript at all. See
MASS. GEN. R. PRoB. CT. 18 (party wishing stenographic record must
request it 48 hours before hearing).
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child's welfare should be determined locally, and that the local
parent is fit. Taken together, these factors account for the local
party's "home court advantage." The prospect of enjoying such
an advantage, in tum, furnishes yet another incentive for a disap
pointed custody litigant to seize and run.
In short, multistate custody cases have a structural tendency
toward flexibility that permits them to be relitigated virtually
indefinitely, until the parties' energies flag or the child reaches
majority. This tendency made the problem of the interstate child
notorious in the middle years of the century. It continues to
undermine the legislative "solutions" of the UCCJA and the
PKPA.
B.

The Traditional Understanding of the Problem

The scholars who identified the problem of the interstate child
analyzed it on a different level. They agreed generally on its
causes. A given interstate custody dispute could be brought in
the courts of more than one state. The states frequently ignored
one another's custody decisions. Thus, custody litigants, by mov
ing from state to state, could avoid unfavorable orders. The
traditional understanding was that this problem resulted because
there were too many interested forums and they granted too little
interstate deference.
1.

Too Many Interested Forums

Before the UCCJA, interstate custody disputes were clothed in
judicially-developed doctrines of jurisdiction, comity, and full
faith and credit. Courts and commentators used these traditional
doctrines to express the interests at play in child custody disputes.
Because many legitimate interests compete in such disputes,
these traditional doctrines generated many potentially inconsis
tent bases for jurisdiction.
Litigation about child custody, like other family litigation, ordi
narily takes place in state court because the underlying values are
thought to be peculiarly suited to local determination and con
trol.55 Children's welfare, if endangered, is of the same parens
55 See In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593-94 (1890) (dictum) (stating that
domestic relations exception applies to custody); Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S.
(21 How.) 582 (1859) (creating domestic relations exception to federal
jurisdiction). But cf. Spindel v. Spindel, 283 F. Supp. 797 (E.D.N.Y. 1968)
(criticizing domestic relations exception); Sharon E. Rush, Domestic Relations
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patriae interest to the state where the children are found, 56 as it is

of urgent practical interest to their parents. Even if a child is not
in danger, a state has at least the same interest in the family con
nections of a child domiciled 57 or resident 58 there, perhaps mag
nified by the child's youthful vulnerability, as it has in those of any
citizen. Traditionally, these interests were described, by analogy
to the state's interest in its citizens' marriages and divorces, as
jurisdiction over the child's "status." 59
Unless the child is also physically present there, however, the
state of the child's domicile or residence may be unable to
enforce its custody decision because the child is not within its
power. In contrast, no matter how tenuous its interest in the
child, the state in which the child is physically present has the
power to enforce its custody order. Thus, a court's jurisdiction
might be premised on the child's mere presence within the state.
Courts articulated this by saying that the child was the res in
dispute. 60
Finally, a plurality of the Supreme Court gave jurisdictional rec
ognition to the parents' strong interest in their child's custody in
May v. Anderson. 61 In May, the court that made the custody order
had personal jurisdiction over one parent and in rem jurisdiction
over the children. 62 The Court held that the absent parent could
relitigate custody in another state because the decree court lacked
Law: Federaljurisdiction and State Sovereignty in Perspective, 60 NoTRE DAME L.

REv. 1, 30 (1984) (arguing that federal courts should narrow domestic
relations exception by entertaining domestic relations cases "unless
abstention ... principles warrant judicial restraint").
56 See 43 CJ.S. Infants § 5 (1978 & Supp. 1991).
57 Because a child cannot establish her own domicile, determining a
child's domicile is even more difficult than determining an adult's. See
Stansbury, supra note 20, at 821-22.
58 The difficulties of determining a child's domicile, and practical
concerns for the child's welfare, led many courts to substitute residence,
overtly or covertly, for domicile. See Ehrenzweig, Interstate Recognition, supra
note 2, at 351.
59 See May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 536-42 (1953) Uackson, J.,
dissenting); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CoNFLICT OF LAws§§ 144-155 (1934);
Goodrich, supra note 23, at 2-3; Stansbury, supra note 20, at 820-24.
60 See Ehrenzweig, Interstate Recognition, supra note 2, at 347; Ratner,
Federal System, supra note 2, at 797.
61 345 u.s. 528 (1953).
62 /d. at 530; see id. at 534 & n. 7. The court appeared to exercise in rem
jurisdiction over the children based on their status as domiciliaries of the
state, rather than based on their physical presence in the state. See id.
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personal jurisdiction over her. 63
Unless both parents and all of the children were domiciled and
physically present in the state of the children's birth, interests in
the children and parents were likely to be scattered among several
states. Believing that a search for the one state with the best
claim to jurisdiction would be futile except when those interests
coalesced in a single state, some authorities recognized concur
rentjurisdiction in several states over the same custody dispute. 64
However, even if it had "concurrent jurisdiction" under this anal
ysis, a state court with power over neither the child nor the losing
party remained unable to enforce its custody decisions. 65 In
other civil matters, if the court deciding a case lacked direct con
trol over both the losing party and the res, the winner could still
enforce her judgment in some other appropriate state, provided
that she could show that the first court had jurisdiction, because
the Full Faith and Credit Clause required the states to respect and
enforce one another's decisions. 66 Unfortunately, in custody liti
gation, a winning litigant was often unable to enforce ajudgment
rendered by a court with power over neither the loser nor the
child.
63 !d. at 534. The plurality opinion seems to be based on the parent's
due process interest in the custody of her child, a right "far more precious
... than property rights." !d. at 533. Justice Frankfurter's concurring view
was that although custody determinations are never entitled to full faith and
credit because they are modifiable, the parents nevertheless have no due
process rights that would prevent a state from enforcing a foreign custody
decision through comity. See id. at 535-36 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
Frankfurter's rationale has been influential. See infra notes 165-72 and
accompanying text (discussing UCCJA's drafters' reliance on Frankfurter's
concurrence in May).
64 See Sampsell v. Superior Court, 197 P.2d 739 (Cal. 1948) (Traynor,].);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 79 (1971); Ehrenzweig,
Uniform Legislation, supra note 2, at 3; Ratner, Legislative Resolution, supra note
27, at 195; Stansbury, supra note 20, at 831-32.
65 See Sampsell, 197 P.2d at 756 (Schauer,]., dissenting).
66 See U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 1. The Full Faith and Credit Clause requires
the states to enforce one another's judgments in most, but not all, cases.
Full faith and credit is not required if the state rendering the decision lacked
personal jurisdiction, see, e.g., Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1957)
(holding that Delaware had no obligation to grant full faith and credit to
Florida judgment where Florida court lacked personal jurisdiction), or
subject matter jurisdiction, see, e.g., Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. I ( 1909) (holding
direct order to transfer land located in another state not entitled to full faith
and credit).
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Too Little Interstate Deference

Before the UCCJA and the PKPA, two special features of cus
tody law made enforcing in one state a custody order that had
been made in another an often insurmountable obstacle for a cus
tody litigant. First, because of the unsettled and varying theories
about custody jurisdiction, a second state's court could refuse to
enforce a custody decree on the ground that the first court's juris
diction was inadequate. 67 Second, the Supreme Court had held
that if the court that rendered a custody decision may modify it,
other courts may also modify it because they need give the deci
sion no greater deference. 68 Therefore, a second state's court
might refuse to enforce even a jurisdictionally unassailable deci
sion because it could have been modified where made and, due to
changed circumstances, it had become unwise on the merits. 69
Moreover, some states held custody decisions to be inherently
modifiable, even if circumstances remained unchanged. 70 Those
states' custody decisions were never entitled to full faith and
credit elsewhere.
Because of these doctrines, jurisdiction to make a custody deci
sion was often the subject of dispute, and no custody decision was
clearly entitled to enforcement outside the state in which it was
made. Hence, disappointed litigants sometimes perceived that
they had nothing to lose by taking the child, and the dispute, to a
new forum for further litigation. 71 Because the states only
deferred to one another's custody decisions as a matter of com
ity-that is, after a hearing had convinced the local judge that she
would have reached the same result anyway-before the UCCJA
67 See, e.g., May, 345 U.S. at 534 (holding that Ohio need not give full
faith and credit to custody order made by a Wisconsin court that lacked
personal jurisdiction over one parent).
68 See, e.g., Kovacs v. Brewer, 356 U.S. 604 (1958); New York ex rei. Halvey
v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610 (1947).
69 Ehrenzweig, Interstate Recognition, supra note 2, at 352.
7 0 See, e.g., In re Bort, 25 Kan. 215 (1881); see also Ehrenzweig, Interstate
Recognition, supra note 2, at 352-55 (discussing Kansas rule); cf. Kovacs, 356
U.S. at 609-16 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (arguing that child's welfare is
paramount consideration and adherence to Full Faith and Credit Clause
must yield if enforcing another state's order would adversely affect child's
welfare); May, 345 U.S. at 535-36 (Frankfurter,]., concurring) (stating that a
prior decree "reflecting another state's discharge of its responsibility at
another time" did not affect forum state's responsibility for child's welfare).
7l Justice Jackson named this third feature "a rule of seize-and-run."
May, 345 U.S. at 542 Uackson, J., dissenting).
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and the PKPA, only extrajudicial logistics would deter a Bad Man
(or Woman) who had just lost a custody dispute from seizing the
child and running to a new forum.
This, then, was the traditional understanding of the problem of
the interstate child. Parents, having many reasons to be dissatis
fied with and disrespectful of adverse custody decisions, could
move freely from state to state with their children; state courts
were able, and usually willing, to consider custody anew regard
less of the determination made by a different state's court. This
way of understanding the problem was fairly generally established
by mid-century. The next sections trace the development of the
idea that reform was possible and desirable, and sketch the evolu
tion of the reforming legislation, the Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction Act and the Parental Kidnaping Prevention Act.
II.

THE IDEA OF REFORM

The scholars who studied the problem of the interstate child
agreed generally on its characteristics. They disagreed, however,
about whether reform was desirable. The most important schol
ars studying the problem were Albert Ehrenzweig, Brainerd Cur
rie, and Leonard Ratner. Of those three, only Professor Ratner
found comprehensive reform attractive.
When Professor Ehrenzweig studied interstate custody deci
sions in the early 1950s, 72 he was primarily concerned with cor
rectly describing what courts actually were doing. He identified
two principles, which, he claimed, correctly predicted court
behavior in such cases. 73 First, Ehrenzweig said that courts sel
dom enforced foreign custody awards 74 for three reasons: (1) they
believed that the court making the award had lacked jurisdiction
to do so; 75 (2) they found that there had been an intervening
change of circumstances; 76 or (3) they felt a duty to make an
independent inquiry into the welfare and needs of any child
brought before them. 77 Second, he said that when courts did
respect foreign custody awards they usually did so because, after
72 See generally Ehrenzweig, Interstate Recognition, supra note 2.
7 3 See id. at 349-57. These differed from the result required by the 1934
Restatement of Conflict of Laws. See REsTATEMENT OF CoNFLICT oF LAws
§§ 144-47 (1934).
74 See Ehrenzweig, Interstate Recognition, supra note 2, at 348.
75 /d. at 349-52.
76 /d. at 352.
77 /d. at 352-55.
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inqumng into the facts, they found no material change of
circumstances. 78
Ehrenzweig found only one exception to the pattern of disre
garding prior foreign custody decrees. 79 He found that courts
usually did enforce foreign orders against a party who had
brought a minor child into the jurisdiction either " 'in defiance of
a decree of a court of competent jurisdiction of a sister state,' " 80
or " 'wrongfully . . . for the purpose of avoiding and circum
venting' " 81 a foreign order. He called this the "clean hands doc
trine. " 82 According to Ehrenzweig, courts failed to apply the
clean hands doctrine in only two situations: when the opposing
party "had not claimed his rights for a period and had himself
violated the prior decree,'' 83 and when the foreign decree seemed
punitive because it deprived the now-local party of previously
granted custody "on the mere ground of his disobedience." 84
Although Ehrenzweig was principally interested in description
rather than prescription, he did suggest that a "fully satisfactory
solution" might be possible if the states decided child custody
"without regard to the cooperation or resistance of the feuding
parties," that is, if a system of public regulation were substituted
for private litigation over child custody. 85
In contrast, Professor Ratner deplored the existing law, and
made the first systematic proposal for improving interstate child
custody jurisdiction. 86 After studying state decisions and the
Supreme Court's evolving constitutional doctrines, 87 Ratner
selected four goals for reform: ( 1) to hold the trial at a place fair
to the parties; (2) to have the decision made by a court with maxi
mal access to the evidence; (3) to discourage multiple litigation;
and (4) to discourage "abduction, removal, retention, or concealSee id. at 356-5 7.
See id. at 357-60.
80 !d. at 362 (quoting Ex parte Memmi, 181 P.2d 885, 888 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1947)).
81 !d. (quoting Koebrich v. Simpson, 197 P.2d 820, 821 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1948)).
82 /d. at 360.
83 !d. at 369 (citing Cook v. Cook, 135 F.2d 945 (D.C. Cir. 1943)).
84 /d. at 370.
85 !d. at 372.
86 See Ratner, Federal System, supra note 2, at 815.
8 7 See id. at 798 (discussing Supreme Court decisions involving full faith
and credit in custody cases).
78

79
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ment of a child in disregard of the reasonable claims of others. " 88
He found the existing law seriously deficient in meeting these
goals because the "amorphous concepts of comity and concurrent
jurisdiction" depended heavily on the state courts' "unpredict
able discretion" and therefore promoted "continuing uncertainty
in the resolution of custody disputes, continuing insecurity in the
relationship of the child to its parents, and continuing expense to
the individuals and the community." 89
Ratner proposed that the states adopt the goals he identified,
and he suggested firstjudicial 90 and then legislative91 methods by
which they could do so. He believed the states could accomplish
all four goals by abolishing concurrent jurisdiction over child cus
tody disputes and instead reposing exclusive jurisdiction in a sin
gle forum, the state of the child's "established home." 92 If the
child had no established home, the appropriate forum would be
the "state of the last non-transient family abode," 93 or the "forum
selected by one parent and accepted by the other without objec
tion."94 After the initial decree had been made, Ratner would
88 Ratner, Legislative Resolution, supra note 27, at 183. Professor Ratner
had initially identified eleven objectives. See Ratner, Federal System, supra
note 2, at 808-10. He later boiled these down to four. See Ratner, Legislative
Resolution, supra note 27, at 183.
89 Ratner, Federal System, supra note 2, at 815.
90 See id. at 815-16.
91 See Ratner, Legislative Resolution, supra note 27, at 196-205.
92 See Ratner, Federal System, supra note 2, at 815-16; Ratner, Legislative
Resolution, supra note 27, at 200 (§ 4(1) of Proposed Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction Act). Somewhat arbitrarily, Professor Ratner defined the child's
established home as the community where a child had been living for at
least six months. Ratner, Federal System, supra note 2, at 818. He believed
that the states could adopt this standard through uniform legislation or
court decisions, or Congress could impose it by implementing the Due
Process or Full Faith and Credit Clauses. /d. at 827 & n.l53. When
Professor Ratner developed a proposed act implementing his ideas,
however, he did not give the "established home" exclusive jurisdiction to
decide custody. See generally Ratner, Legislative Resolution, supra note 27.
93 Ratner, Federal System, supra note 2, at 818; see Ratner, Legislative
Resolution, supra note 27, at 200 (§ 4(l)(b) of proposed uniform act).
94 Ratner, Federal System, supra note 2, at 819; see Ratner, Legislative
Resolution, supra note 27, at 200 (§ 4(l)(c) of proposed uniform act).
Similarly, Ratner's proposed act permitted a state where the child was "a
resident" to exercise jurisdiction if "the child resides with a defendant
whose interest is substantially adverse to a parent petitioner." /d. (§ 4(2)(b)
of proposed uniform act).
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have limited other states to enforcing (rather than modifying) it, 95
so long as the state of initial decree remained the child's estab
lished home. 96 If the child acquired a new "established home," 97
a court there would have jurisdiction to modify custody; 98 if not,
the proper forum would be the last established home if a contest
ant continued to reside there, 99 or otherwise the child's new
residence. 100
Underlying the doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction had been a
recognition that several states may have legitimate interests in a
child's welfare. Ratner shared that recognition, but for him state
interests derived from the parties' interests; he thought states
permitted relitigation because a local party had not received a fair
opportunity to be heard elsewhere. 101 This perspective led him
to respond in a new way.
Rather than permitting serial proceedings, each with a claim to
legitimacy based on local interests, Ratner's statute attempted to
involve all potentially interested persons in one action. To give
everyone with a claim to the child's custody an opportunity to be
heard, and to bind each one personally, 102 Ratner's statute
95 See Ratner, Federal System, supra note 2, at 832-33. Ratner codified this
idea, with some difficulty, in §§ 5 and 9(2) of his proposed act. See Ratner,
Legislative Resolution, supra note 27, at 201-03.
96 See Ratner, Federal System, supra note 2, at 822; Ratner, Legislative
Resolution, supra note 27, at 203 (§ 9(2) of proposed uniform act).
97 Although Ratner initially said this could only occur with court approval
or by parental consent, see Ratner, Federal System, supra note 2, at 820, his
proposed act permitted either parent to create a new established home
unilaterally simply by moving with the child and waiting, see Ratner,
Legislative Resolution, supra note 27, at 199 (§ 2(20) of proposed uniform act).
98 See Ratner, Federal System, supra note 2, at 820-21. However, Ratner's
proposed act permitted a state where the child had acquired a new
established home to dismiss a petition to modify "without prejudice" if
jurisdiction had been obtained in violation of another state's decree. See
Ratner, Legislative Resolution, supra note 27, at 202 (§ 7(2) of proposed
uniform act).
99 Ratner, Federal System, supra note 2, at 820-22; Ratner, Legislative
Resolution, supra note 27, at 201 (§ 5(2) of proposed uniform act).
10o Ratner, Federal System, supra note 27, at 821; Ratner, Legislative
Resolution, supra note 27, at 201 (§ 5(3) of proposed uniform act).
101 See Ratner, Legislative Resolution, supra note 27, at 184-88.
102 Under the plurality opinion in May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953),
the forum court could bind only those contestants within its personal
jurisdiction to its child custody determination. See id. at 533-34.
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required custody pleadings to identify all interested persons, 103
made all interested persons necessary parties to the custody
action, 104 and permitted long-arm notice. 105 To enhance the
legitimacy and accuracy of this one action, the statute also tried to
give the court access to reliable and current information about
the child 106 by ordinarily making the child's "established home"
the forum, 107 by permitting a court to dismiss custody proceed
ings if it determined that another state would be a more appropri
ate forum, 108 and by providing that all custody orders should be
modifiable if circumstances changed. 109 Finally, Ratner tried to
promote cooperation among courts by encouraging interstate
investigations 110 and by permitting a court to take jurisdiction of
a custody dispute solely to enforce another state's order. 111
Ratner's act also codified Ehrenzweig's "clean hands doctrine" by
prohibiting the forum from modifying another state's custody
order if the forum's jurisdiction derived from an interstate move
that violated the other state's order. 112
Professor Ratner's proposed act rejected the doctrine of con
current jurisdiction in order to achieve stability, which he envi
sioned in terms of the twin goals of discouraging multiple
litigation and deterring the abduction, removal, retention, or con
cealment of a child in disregard of the reasonable claims of
others. To achieve this stability, Ratner's act reposed initialjuris103 See Ratner, Legislative Resolution, supra note 27, at 203-04 (§ 10 of
proposed uniform act).
104 See id. at 199-200 (§ 3 of proposed uniform act).
105 See id. at 204-05 (§ 13 of proposed uniform act).
106 Note Ratner's aspirational statement in§ 1(2) ofhis proposed act. See
id. at 197 (setting forth objective to "[p]ermit the determination of a child's
custody by the court most likely to decide correctly, that is, by the court
having maximum access to the relevant evidence").
107 Ratner, Federal System, supra note 2, at 815-17. Although Ratner
thought that where a child's established home was would ordinarily be
obvious, he said that in doubtful cases it should be where the child had
resided for at least six months, because "[m]ost American children are
integrated into an American community after living there six months." !d.
at 818. He implemented this in§§ 4 and 5 of his proposed uniform act. See
Ratner, Legislative Resolution, supra note 27, at 200-02.
108 Ratner, Legislative Resolution, supra note 27, at 202 (§ 7(1) of proposed
uniform act).
109 /d. at 202-03 (§§ 6, 8 of proposed uniform act).
I 10 /d. at 204 ( § 12 of proposed uniform act).
III /d. at 203 (§ 9(1) of proposed uniform act).
112 !d. at 202 (§ 7(2) of proposed uniform act).
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diction ·in a single forum and forbade simultaneous proceed
ings.113 Moreover, Ratner's act gave the forum with initial
jurisdiction-the "decree state"-continuing jurisdiction over
any subsequent custody disputes, at least while the child
remained in that state. 114 So long as the decree state had contin
uing jurisdiction, other states were required to enforce, and for
bidden to modify, its decrees. 11.5
Brainerd Currie and Albert Ehrenzweig both wrote in response
to Ratner's proposal. While agreeing with Ratner generally about
how the existing law functioned, both scholars disagreed with him
about the desirability of reform. Professor Currie rejected
Ratner's suggestion that jurisdiction be limited to the child's
"established home," because he considered the child's physical
presence necessary both to a determination of thtj child's best
interests 116 and to the enforcement of any custody order. 117
Moreover, his own examination of four contemporary deci
sions 118 led Currie to conclude that the Supreme Court would
never hold that custody decrees were entitled to full faith and
credit. 119 Consistent with these preferences and predictions,
Currie proposed that Congress implement the Full Faith and
Credit Clause in accord with the Court's apparent preference that
"no judgment shall preclude the courts of a state having a legiti
mate interest in the matter from making whatever custodial
decree is required, in their judgment and discretion, for the wel
fare of the child." 12° Currie proposed, in effect, to clarify and
reinforce existing law.
Like Currie, Ehrenzweig believed that the Full Faith and Credit
113 /d. at 201-02 (§§ 4 and 5 of proposed uniform act) ("if ... no custody
proceeding is pending in a court of another state having jurisdiction
substantially in accordance with this Act").
114 /d. at 201 (§ 5(1) of proposed uniform act). Even afterwards, if the
child had departed the decree state without express court authorization, the
decree state retained continuing jurisdiction as long as another party
continued to live there. /d.
115 !d. at 203 (§ 9(2) of proposed uniform act).
116 See Brainerd Currie, Full Faith and Credit, Chiefly to judgments: A Role for
Congress, 1964 SuP. CT. REv. 89, 117.
117 !d. at 117-18.
118 See id. at 109-18 (discussing Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187 (1962);
Kovacs v. Brewer, 356 U.S. 604 (1958); May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528
(1953); New York ex rel Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610 (1947)).
119 /d. at 115.
120 /d.
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Clause did not, and should not, apply to custody decisions. 121
However, he agreed with Ratner that Currie's proposed legisla
tion would encourage unilateral removal of the child, resolution
of custody by a forum unfairly inconvenient to one party, and
relitigation. 122 To combat these tendencies, he proposed a uni
form state act much simpler than Ratner's, providing for "perma
nent jurisdiction" in a "guardianship court" situated in the state
where the child "has his permanent abode and has been present
for at least six months." 123 By itself, this proposal might have
accomplished Ratner's third and fourth goals of discouraging
multiple litigation and the abduction of children, if in draconian
fashion, by reducing the plethora of possible forums to one.
However, Ehrenzweig's act also responded to Ratner's other two
goals, that the forum be fair to all parties and have maximal
access to evidence, by providing for "temporary jurisdiction" in
any state where the child was present, or where proceedings for
her parents' divorce, annulment or separation had been com
menced.124 Because Ehrenzweig's act permitted any court with
either temporary or permanent jurisdiction to "rescind or mod
ify"125 any previous custody order, his proposal, like Currie's,
essentially codified existing law. Its main innovation was a
requirement that no court modify a previous order until the court
had "secured such records, transcripts and other information as
may be available in the court which has made such decree or
elsewhere.'' 126
Thus, although these three scholars all agreed that existing law
encouraged abductions by permitting relitigation, two of them
also believed this to be the unfortunate but inevitable conse
quence of the parties' due process right to a fair forum and the
overridingly important goal of protecting children's welfare.
Ehrenzweig's proposal would have permitted successive modifica
tions in courts of different states while improving the information
available to each court; Currie's proposal would have merely clar
ified existing law. Only Ratner proposed comprehensive reform
aimed at changing both parental and judicial behavior.
121 See Ehrenzweig, Uniform Legislation, supra note 2, at 4.
122 See id. at 3-4 (citing Ratner, Procedural Due Process, supra note 5, at 193).
123 /d. at 10-11 (Article I of Counter-Proposal for a Uniform Interstate
Custody Act).
124 /d. at II (Article 2 of counter-proposal).
125 /d. (Article 3 of counter-proposal).
126 /d. (Article 3 of counter-proposal).
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It was at this juncture, with three distinct and competing visions
of law reform in recently-published law review articles, that the
discussion shifted from scholarly to practical venues. The next
section sketches the process of drafting and compromise that
eventually produced the UCCJA, and examines interpretations of
the statute that undermine the reformers' goals.

III.

THE UNIFORM CHILD CusTODY juRISDICTION AcT

A.

The Development of the UCCJA .

The problem of the interstate child was of considerable con
cern to practitioners as well as scholars in the mid-1960s. Ratner
had drafted his statute at the request of the Committee on Child
Custody of the American Bar Association's Family Law Sec
tion. 127 At its midyear meeting in February, 1965, the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL)
voted to appoint a Special Committee to draft a Child Custody
Jurisdiction Act. 128 Shortly thereafter, in March, 1965, Professor
Henry Foster circulated a revision of the jurisdictional sections of
Ratner's act. 129 During that summer's ABA meeting, the various
proposals were discussed, and at least one other proposal was
generated and shared with the Chairman of the NCCUSL Special
Committee. Professor John Bradway proposed interstate cooperRatner, Legislative Resolution, supra note 27, at 196 n.5l.
HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON
UNIFORM STATE LAws AND PROCEEDINGS 80-81 (1965).
129 See Memorandum from Henry H. Foster, Jr., Professor of Law, New
York University, to American Bar Association Family Law Section,
Committee on Child Custody (March 25, 1965) (on file with the U.C. Davis
Law Review). Ratner's jurisdictional scheme had required a forum state to
have at least six months' recent contact with the child and to be the
residence of either the child or a parent, and required notice to all
nonresident interested parties. See Ratner, Legislative Resolution, supra note
27, at 200-01 (§ 4 of proposed uniform act). Foster rejected this. Instead,
for initial jurisdiction, Foster would have relied on personal jurisdiction
over the child combined with what he hoped would be constitutionally
adequate contacts with the parents. See Foster, supra, § 1. To bolster the
adequacy of these contacts, Foster's draft provided that a court might order
the petitioner to "pay necessary travel expenses for the respondent to
appear and defend." /d. § 1(5); see id. § 2(3). Foster would have permitted
any court to modify a custody order, provided the petitioner was in
substantial compliance with the original order and had either served the
respondent in the forum state or paid his or her travel expenses; if the child
was "found to be dependent or neglected," even these requirements were
waived. /d. § 2.
127
128
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ation among all interested states in both information-gathering
and decision-making, culminating in a ''joint decree which can be
entered on the record in both states." 130 All of these proposals
shared Ratner's overall aspiration of requiring the states to
enforce foreign custody decisions.
A year later, the Special Committee presented a "First Tenta
tive Draft of the Uniform Child Custody Act" to the NCCUSL. 131
Although the Ehrenzweig and Foster proposals influenced this
draft, 132 it differed significantly from them and indeed from all
other previous proposals. Instead of focusing exclusively on the
jurisdictional conundrum, it contained hortatory provisions relat
ing to substantive custody law; 133 moreover, its jurisdictional
scheme would have encouraged courts to issue custody decrees
that other states would have been unlikely to enforce. 134
130 Letter from John S. Bradway to WJ. Brockelbank, Chairman of
NCCUSL Special Committee on Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act 3
(Aug. 18, 1965) (from the papers of John Wade, Vanderbilt University)
(copy on file with the U.C. Davis Law Review). Professor Bodenheimer listed
this memo as one of the UCCJA's sources. See Bodenheimer, Legislative
Remedy, supra note 5, at 1217.
131 Uniform Child Custody Act (Tentative Draft No. 1, July 1, 1966)
(from the papers ofJohn Wade, Vanderbilt University) (copy on file with the
U.C. Davis Law Review) [hereafter First Tentative Draft].
132 Like Ehrenzweig's proposal, this draft suggested the compilation of a
dossier to be used by all interested courts throughout a child's minority, id.
§§ 4.3, 4.5-.7, and recommended that the same judge continue to handle
the case if possible, id. § 4.12. The jurisdictional section, id. § 2.1, derives
from Foster's § 1. See Foster, supra note 129, § 1.
133 These provisions included a statement that "[c]ustody shall be
awarded according to the best interests of the child," First Tentative Draft,
supra note 131, § 4.8; a list of factors to be considered, id. § 4.9; and
presumptions in favor of stability, id. § 4.11, and visitation, id. § 4.13. All of
these substantive standards, however, were undercut by a provision stating
that they were "meant to be guidelines to be adapted by the circumstances
of the particular case. The failure of the trial court to observe them, may be
ground for reversal on appeal only if there has been a substantial failure of
justice." /d. § 4.15.
134 The central provision permitted a court to make a custody decree if it
has jurisdiction of the persons of the parties named in the suit, and the
custody decree is effective only as to such persons, subject to limitations on
simultaneous and geographically inconvenient proceedings. See id.
§§ 2.2(a), 3.1, 7. However, the draft also permitted a court lacking personal
jurisdiction over the defendant to make a custody decree ancillary to a
decree of divorce, annulment, legal separation or termination of parental
rights, id. § 6.1, although such a decree was to be "effective only as to the
party over whom the court has jurisdiction of the person," id. § 6.2, and
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The First Tentative Draft and the Ratner, Foster, and Bradbury
proposals all took an activist stance to the problem of the inter
state child. They attempted to solve the problem by changing the
law in order to motivate or coerce courts to respect one another's
custody decisions. An activist stance naturally appealed to practi
tioners eager to respond to their clients' distress. In contrast,
Ehrenzweig's and Currie's belief that the existing law should be
accepted and codified must have seemed at best irrelevant, the
product of ivory tower isolation from the pain and strife of actual
practice.
The activist proposals used four main strategies, each based on
a different analysis of the problem's underlying dynamics. The
first strategy was based on an assumption that courts permitted
the parties to relitigate custody in a new forum because they were
unsure that the first forum had reached a wise result. Two pro
posals therefore attempted to assure courts that foreign decrees
would be made carefully, in order to make enforcement of foreign
decrees more acceptable. Ratner designed his jurisdictional
scheme to give decision-making power to the single court with the
best access to current information about the child. Similarly, the
custody law reforms of the First Tentative Draft responded to a
concern that decrees based solely on lay testimony might reason
ably be denied recognition in states where courts habitually relied
on professional home studies and other sorts of expert evidence.
The First Tentative Draft therefore required courts to appoint a
guardian ad litem for the child, and to compile, maintain and use
a complete "dossier" 135 before rendering a decree that addressed
the child's "physical, mental, spiritual, economic, social and
familial welfare." 136 Ratner's act and the First Tentative Draft
differed, however, on whether merely motivating courts to enforce
foreign custody orders would be sufficient. Ratner's act required
courts to enforce properly-made foreign custody decrees; the
First Tentative Draft did not. 137
"subordinate to any prior custody decree," id. § 6.3. These provisions
invited courts to issue decrees of dubious extraterritorial validity or
usefulness.
1 35 The dossier would include investigative reports and stenographic
transcripts of all hearings. !d. § 4.3.
136 /d. § 4.9.
137 See Brigitte Bodenheimer, Prefatory Note, Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction Act 2 (Tentative Draft No. 2, April 25, 1968). Professor
Bodenheimer stated:

HeinOnline -- 25 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 877 1991-1992

878

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 25:845

The second activist strategy was based on an assumption that
the second forum permitted relitigation out of concern for a party
whose due process rights had been violated in the first forum.
That is, this strategy focused on the possibility that courts might
be constitutionally precluded from respecting one another's deci
sions, even if they would prefer to do so. Ratner's proposed act,
according to this view, could not always produce enforceable
orders. To preclude collateral challenges to a custody decree,
Ratner's act gave the forum power to bind every person known to
be likely to assert a custodial claim, whether or not that person
had any contact with the forum. 138 Foster feared, however, that
asserting jurisdiction over persons with no connection to the
forum might be so unfair as to be unconstitutional. Foster's solu
tion was to underwrite these litigants' access to the decision
maker. He thought that any forum would be fair enough if local
litigants could be ordered to pay their distant opponents' travel
expenses, and he proposed that provisions to that effect be added
to Ratner's act. 139
The third activist strategy was based on an assumption that
autonomous state courts that were presented with custody ques
tions serially would each inevitably find it necessary to re-examine
the evidence in order to fulfill a duty to protect the now-local
child. Thus, two proposals attempted to transcend the problem
of getting a local court to defer to a previously-made foreign child
custody decision by radically restructuring the decision making
process. Ehrenzweig's suggestion was utopian. He would have
substituted a system of public regulation for the adversary system,
In view of these wide discrepancies in the caliber of custody
decrees it is understandable that the draftsmen of the First
Tentative Draft felt compelled to add provisions as to the
standards for custody determinations, the preparation of social
studies, and so forth, and that they ended up with a Child
Custody Act rather than a Child Custody Jurisdiction Act.

!d.
138

See Ratner, Legislative Resolution, supra note 27, at 199-202, 204-05

(§§ 3, 4, 5, and 13 of proposed uniform act). Professor Ratner based these

provisions on his "effective litigation" conception of due process, which
valued optimal access to evidence and avoidance of multiple trials over
adherence to the traditional "territorial" requirements that a state have
personal jurisdiction over each claimant (based upon residence, domicile, or
personal service) in order to adjudicate his or her rights to custody of a
child. See Ratner, Procedural Due Process, supra note 5, at 366-88.
139 See Foster, supra note 129, at 2; supra note 129 (comparing Ratner's
proposed uniform act with Foster's proposed revisions).
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with one "guardianship court" maintaining jurisdiction over a
custody dispute during the child's entire minority. This court
would lose control of the case only when the court itself decided
that transfer of jurisdiction to .another forum wouid serve the
child's welfare. 140 Bradway's proposal shared a similar impulse,
but relied on combining existing structures in new ways rather
than on creating entirely new systems, with all interested states
cooperating in reaching and enforcing a single decision. 141
Finally, the fourth activist strategy was based on an assumption
that if courts had the appropriate goals clearly stated for them
and were reminded of their prudential power to refuse to provide
a forum on the grounds of forum non conveniens or
Ehrenzweig's "clean hands doctrine," they would do the right
thing. 142 Ratner's proposed act thus contained a lengthy list of
purposes, 143 and expressly permitted dismissal if "another state is
the fairest place for the trial." 144 To emphasize a court's duty not
to reward a party for flouting a foreign decree, Ratner's act also
required dismissal of an otherwise proper modification if the peti
tioner was holding the child in violation of a foreign decree, pro
vided that the opposing party had exercised reasonable diligence
and another fair forum was available. 145
At their 1966 Annual Meeting, the NCCUSL Commissioners
discussed several sections of the First Tentative Draft and sent the
project back to committee. 146 When the Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction Act next emerged, in 1968, it was in substantially final
Ehrenzweig, Uniform Legislation, supra note 2, at 6.
See Bradway, supra note 130, at 2-3 ("The facts in the case may be
collected separately in [state] A and in [state] B as in interstate support
cases; and then each jurisdiction will have a full story. Then the court in the
state in which [the child] is present may draft a tentative decree and refer it
to the corresponding court in A where [the wife] remains. The court in A in
all probability will reach a conclusion similar to that reached by the B court.
If so, then we have a joint decree which can be entered on the record in both
states . . . . But suppose [the courts disagree. The solution] has already
been worked out in Congress . . . . [A] conference committee resolves the
dispute in many instances.").
142 Ratner, Legislative Resolution, supra note 27, at 202 (§ 7 of proposed
uniform act).
143 See id. at 196-97 (§ 1 of proposed uniform act).
144 See id. at 202 (§ 7(l)(a) of proposed uniform act).
145 See id. (§ 7(2) of proposed uniform act).
140
141

146 HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON
UNIFORM STATE

LAws

AND PRocEEDINGS

94 (1966).
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form, and the NCCUSL approved it. 147 The intervening two
years contained a great deal of hard work, much of it by the Spe
cial Committee's Reporter, Professor Brigitte M. Bodenheimer,
who was undoubtedly responsible both for the UCCJA's specific
form and for its adoption by state after state. 148 Due to her draft
ing and lobbying skills, the Uniform Act that emerged from this
process was greeted with widespread support and enthusiasm.
Bodenheimer used a method that has been called "interest
group liberalism." Optimistic about the potential of law to do
good and to solve any problem presented, she incorporated ideas
from all of the existing proposals. 149 On the level of goals, the
UCCJA, like the proposals on which it was based, sought to
achieve both stability and flexibility. On the level of method,
because the UCCJA adopted and elaborated on all four of the
activist strategies that had been proposed for dealing with courts'
reluctance to enforce foreign custody decisions, it approached
every problem both with rules constraining court discretion and
with principles inviting free exercise of discretion. This openness
to all the previous drafters' principal ideas undoubtedly helped
secure support for the Act. Unfortunately, some of these ideas
are mutually incompatible.
First, the UCCJA attempted to make custody decisions more
acceptable to foreign courts by giving jurisdiction to the forum
most likely to have access to current and complete information
about the child and the family. 150 To further this project, the
UCCJA sets out two main grounds for jurisdiction, "home state"
147 HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON
UNIFORM STATE LAws AND PROCEEDINGS 112, 198 (1968).
148 See UCCJA: A Monument to Brigitte Bodenheimer, UNIFORM L. MEMO,
Winter 1981-1982, at 8-9.
149 See THEODORE J. Lowi, THE END OF LIBERALISM 51 (2d ed. 1979)
(discussing "interest-group liberalism," which "defines the public interest
as a result of the amalgamation of various claims"). For Bodenheimer's
acknowledgment of her debt to these various sources, see Bodenheimer,
Legislative Remedy, supra note 5, at 1217-18.
150 Section 3 governs all assertions of "jurisdiction to make a custody
determination by initial or modification decree." 9 U.L.A. pt. I, at 143-44.
Bodenheimer hoped that decisions "rendered in states in which as much as
possible of the essential information about the child and his potential
custodians is available will be considered trustworthy enough to command
respect and recognition in other states." Bodenheimer, Legislative Remedy,
supra note 5, at 1221 (footnote omitted).
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and "significant connection," 151 whereas Ratner's act had only
one, "established home." 152 Under the UCCJA, a forum may
exercise jurisdiction when it is the child's "home state" 153 at the
time the custody proceeding is commenced. 154 Or, to protect the
home state's jurisdiction when one parent has recently absconded
with the child, 155 a forum may exercise jurisdiction when it has
been the child's home state within six months of the proceedings'
commencement and "the child is absent from this state because
of his removal or retention by a person claiming his custody or
for other reasons, and a parent or person acting as parent 156 con
tinues to live in this State." 157 In addition, a forum to which the
child and at least one parent 158 have a "significant connection"
and where "substantial evidence concerning the child's present or
future care, protection, training, and personal relationships" is
located may also take jurisdiction provided that "it is in the best
interests of the child" to do so. 159 The drafters added this "sig
nificant connection" provision because of their concern that the
UCCJA § 3, 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 143.
152 See Ratner, Legislative Resolution, supra note 27, at 199-201 (§§ 2(20), 45 of proposed uniform act).
153 This concept is defined in UCCJA § 2(5) as follows:
"[H]ome state" means the state in which the child immediately
preceding the time involved lived with his parents, a parent, or a
person acting as a parent, for at least 6 consecutive months, and
in the case of a child less than 6 months old the state in which the
child lived from birth with any of the persons mentioned.
Periods of temporary absence of any of the named persons are
counted as part of the 6-month or other period.
9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 133. This concept derives from Ratner's "established
home" concept. See Ratner, Legislative Resolution, supra note 27, at 199
(§ 2(20) of proposed uniform act); supra notes 92-100 and accompanying
text.
154 UCCJA § 3(a)(1)(i), 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 143; cJ. Ratner, Legislative
Resolution, supra note 27, at 200 (§ 4(l)(a) of proposed uniform act).
155 See Bodenheimer, Legislative Remedy, supra note 5, at 1225.
156 This ungainly phrase identifies non-parents who either have or seek
custody of a child. UCCJA § 2(9), 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 134.
157 UCCJA § 3(a)(1)(ii), 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 143 (footnote added); cf.
Ratner, Legislative Resolution, supra note 27, at 200 (§ 4(a)(b) of proposed
uniform act).
158 The statute also applies when the child and one "contestant" have a
significant connection with the jurisdiction. UCCJA § 3(a)(2)(i), 9 U.L.A. pt.
1, at 143. A "contestant" is a person, including a parent, who claims a right
to custody or visitation of a child. UCCJA § 2(1), 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 133.
159 UCCJA § 3(a)(2), 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 143.
151
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home state might not always have the best access to relevant
information. 160 Like Ratner's act, the UCCJA requires enforce
ment, 161 and limits modification, 162 of properly-made foreign cus
tody decrees. Further, the UCCJA also has two minor
jurisdictional provisions with roots in Ratner's proposed act:
emergency jurisdiction, 163 and vacuum jurisdiction. 164
Second, the UCCJA implemented Ratner's strategy of protect
ing the parties' due process interests. It did so by borrowing
Ratner's broad assertion of power to bind every interested person
whether or not she has had any connection with the forum. 165 As
160 See Bodenheimer, Legislative Remedy, supra note 5, at 1227. In that
article, written shortly after the UCCJA was promulgated, she hypothesized
a case in which a married couple who had lived in state A for some years left
their children with friends in state B while they obtained a divorce, and then
moved separately to different cities in state C. See id. at 1221. There,
although state A might arguably be the home state, or have been the home
state within six months, state C would seem to be a more appropriate forum.
She also referred to the notorious case Painter v. Bannister, implying that
under the UCCJA, the father would have had an easier time getting his son
back because the child had significant connections with the father's home
state. /d. at 1227 (citing Painter v. Bannister, 140 N.W.2d 152 (Iowa)
(awarding custody to deceased mother's parents after father had asked them
to care for child), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 949 (1966)).
161 UCCJA §§ 13, 15, 9 U.L.A. pt. l, at 276, 311.
162 UCCJA § 14, 9 U.L.A. pt. l, at 292.
163 Emergency jurisdiction is available to a state exercising parens patriae
jurisdiction to protect a child if she is present in the state and either
abandoned or in need of emergency protection because she "has been
subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse or is otherwise
neglected." UCCJA § 3(a)(3)(ii) & cmt., 9 U.L.A. pt. l, at 144-45. This
provision was consistent with Ratner's proposal. See Ratner, Legislative
Resolution, supra note 27, at 203 (§ 9(3) of proposed uniform act).
164 Vacuumjurisdiction is available when "it appears that no other state
would have jurisdiction under prerequisites substantially in accordance with
[the UCCJA]," or when another state has declined jurisdiction because it
viewed the present forum as more appropriate. UCCJA § 3(a)(4), 9 U.L.A.
pt. l, at 144. The suggestion that another state might decline jurisdiction in
favor of the forum derives from Ratner's § 4(3). See Ratner, Legi_slative
Resolution, supra note 27, at 200.
165 Notice and an opportunity to be heard must be given to "the
contestants, any person whose parental rights have not been previously
terminated, and any person who has physical custody of the child." UCCJA
§ 4, 9 U.L.A. pt. l, at 208. In addition, any other person who "claims to
have custody or visitation rights with respect to the child" must be made a
party. UCCJA § 10, 9 U.L.A. pt. l, at 269-70.
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Bodenheimer explicitly acknowledged, 166 this choice was based
on the assumption that Frankfurter's concurrence, rather than the
plurality opinion, states the rule of May v. Anderson. 167 Frank
furter thought no litigant-not even a parent-has a due process
right to insist that the forum deciding a child's custody have per
sonal jurisdiction over the adult litigants. 168 Under this reading
of May, properly notified parties may be bound even if they have
no contact with the forum. 169 Nevertheless, the UCCJA also
adopted a version of Foster's solution to any resulting constitu
tional defect. Under the UCCJA, a decision binds "all parties who
have been served in this state or notified in accordance with section 5
or who have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court, and who
have been given an opportunity to be heard." 170 Section 5 per
mits notice by "any form of mail ... requesting a receipt." 171
166 See Bodenheimer, Legislative Remedy, supra note 5, at 1232; accord
UCCJA § 13 cmt., 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 277.
167 345 U.S. 528 (1953); see supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text
(discussing May).
168 See 345 U.S. at 535-36 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Justice
Frankfurter stated that a court may recognize a custody decree made by a
sister state lacking personal jurisdiction over a parent without offending the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, but no prior custody
decree is entitled to full faith and credit because "the child's welfare ... has
such a claim upon the State that its responsibility is obviously not to be
foreclosed by a prior adjudication." /d.
169 State courts interpreting the UCCJA are split on whether they really
possess this statutorily-asserted power to bind a party with no connection to
the forum. Compare In re Leonard, 17 5 Cal. Rptr. 903 (Ct. App. 1981)
(relying on May and distinguishing Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84
( 1978) (holding presence of children insufficient to give state power to
order non-resident parent to pay child support)) and Hudson v. Hudson,
670 P.2d 287 (Wash. Ct. App. 1983) (relying on Frankfurter's concurrence
in May) with Ex parte Dean, 447 So. 2d 733 (Ala. 1984) (relying on May
plurality and holding that Florida custody judgment was not entitled to full
faith and credit although it complied with the UCCJA and the PKPA,
because, in the absence of long-arm statute, Florida lacked personal
jurisdiction over defendant mother) and Mitchell v. Mitchell, 458 N.Y.S.2d
807 (Sup. Ct. 1982) (holding that state with minimal contact with one party
defers to parties' former home state).
Professor Coombs has suggested that some "extreme applications" of the
UCCJA would unconstitutionally deprive defendants of due process. See
Coombs, supra note 5, at 762-65. A full discussion of this issue is beyond the
scope of this article.
170 UCCJA § 12, 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 274 (emphasis added).
171 UCCJA § 5, 9 U.L.A. pt. I, at 212-13. According to the Comment,
the mail need not reach the addressee for service to be accomplished: "If at
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Persons who have physical custody of the child outside the forum
state may be ordered to appear, and, whether they appear volun
tarily or not, their expenses may be shifted to another party or
otherwise provided for. 172
Third, although the UCCJA neither created federal guardian
ship courts nor permitted two states to enter joint orders, it
adopted a number of provisions inspired by Ehrenzweig's pro
posed act and Bradway's letter that require or encourage inter
state cooperation. 173 The UCCJA requires each state to preserve
its child custody records until the child's majority and to certify
the records, upon request, to another state's court. 174 Each state
can request court records from other states, 175 and must have a
place to file certified copies of decrees and other materials relat
ing to foreign custody proceedings. 176 The UCCJA also permits
courts to authorize out-of-state depositions, 177 to request assist
ance from another state's courts, 178 and to conduct hearings and
studies to assist another state's court, 179 and it encourages local
judges to speak with judges in other possible forums before
deciding whether to exercise jurisdiction. 180
Finally, the UCCJA adopted the hortatory strategy: like
Ratner's act, the UCCJA contains a long list of purposes embody
ing both stability and flexibility goals 181 and codifies both forum
all possible, actual notice should be received by the affected persons; but
efforts to impart notice in a manner reasonably calculated to give actual
notice are sufficient when a person who may perhaps conceal his
whereabouts, cannot be reached." UCCJA § 5 cmt., 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 213
(citations omitted).
172 UCCJA §§ 19(b), 20(c), 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 319, 322.
173 UCCJA §§ 18-20,9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 318-22, seem closest to Bradway's
suggestions, but all probably derive from his vision of interstate
cooperation. See Bradway, supra note 130, at 3 (proposing that courts
cooperate in issuing custody decrees-even to the point of issuing joint
decrees). Article 3 of Ehrenzweig's proposed act, providing that before a
court could modify a foreign custody order it should be required to obtain
information from the foreign court, was probably also influential. See
Ehrenzweig, Uniform Legislation, supra note 2, at 11.
174 UCCJA § 21, 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 324.
175 UCCJA § 22, 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 325-26.
176 UCCJA § 16, 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 316.
177 UCCJA § 18, 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 318.
178 UCCJA § 19, 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 319.
179 UCCJA § 20, 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 322.
180 UCCJA § 7(d), 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 233.
181 See UCCJA § 1, 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 123-24.

HeinOnline -- 25 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 884 1991-1992

1992]

Tragedy of the Interstate Child

885

non conveniens 182 and Ehrenzweig's "clean hands doctrine." 183
The latter two provisions rely heavily on the local judge's discre
tion. The UCCJA mandates dismissal of an otherwise proper cus
tody proceeding in only one circumstance: if the modification
petitioner "has improperly removed the child from the physical
custody of the person entitled to custody or has improperly
retained the child after a visit or other temporary relinquishment
of physical custody." 184 Even then, a court may still exercise
jurisdiction ifto do so is "required in the interest of the child." 185
In addition, the UCCJA permits dismissal of a custody proceeding
in three circumstances: first, if the forum is "inconvenient ... and
... a court of another state is a more appropriate forum"; 186 sec
ond, if a modification petitioner "has violated any ... provision of
a custody decree of another state"; 187 and third, if a petitioner in
an initial proceeding "has wrongfully taken the child from
another state or has engaged m similar reprehensible
conduct." 188
The UCCJA thus employs some version of all four of the
activist strategies that had been proposed, without attempting to
reconcile their inconsistencies. Faced with an incoherent statute,
the courts have had predictable difficulty with the cases coming
before them. Often, although the UCCJA seems to have dictated
a case's rationale, its result seems better explained by
Ehrenzweig's two principles. 189 The next section illustrates this
observation by examining state courts' interpretations of the
UCCJA's most crucial provisions, showing how they expose the
Act's incoherence and its consequent failure to resolve the prob
lem of the interstate child.
B.

The Crucial Indeterminacies of the UCCJA

Beginning in the late 1940s, some courts and commentators
embraced the doctrine of "concurrent jurisdiction" in response
to the jurisdictional tangle enmeshing interstate custody cases.
Under this doctrine, several states' courts might legitimately
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189

See UCCJA § 7, 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 233-34.
See UCCJA § 8, 9 U .L.A. pt. 1, at 251.
UCCJA § 8(b), 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 251.
Id.
UCCJA § 7(a), 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 233.
UCCJA § 8(b), 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 251.
UCCJA § 8(a), 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 251.
See supra notes 72-85 and accompanying text.
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assert jurisdiction over the same custody dispute at approximately
the same time, and none of their decisions was entitled to
enforcement in another forum. 190 To achieve Ratner's goals of
discouraging multiple litigation and deterring the abduction,
retention, or concealment of a child in disregard of the reason
able claims of others, Ratner's proposed act had sharply limited
concurrent jurisdiction. 191 The drafters of the UCCJA embraced
Ratner's stability goals, 192 but, apparently disagreeing amongst
themselves over whether to authorize continuing and concurrent
jurisdiction, employed ambiguous language to implement
them. 193 This drafting strategy reified the disagreement: it has
consequently been reenacted in case after case as the courts
struggle to understand and apply the UCCJA's compromise
language.
The central question for interpreting the UCCJA is, "When
may a court make a custody order?" The Act's concurrent juris
diction compromises frequently deny this question either a single
or a certain answer. For expository purposes, the central ques
tion may usefully be broken down into four subsidiary questions:
(1) When may a court make an initial custody order?; (2) When
must a court enforce a foreign custody order instead of making an
independent inquiry into the situation?; (3) When may a court,
after an independent inquiry, modify a foreign custody order?;
and (4) When should a court refuse to inquire into the merits of a
custody matter because its order would not be respected by a for
eign court, or for other reasons? This section examines the state
courts' interpretations of the UCCJA's answers to these four
questions. As the courts' interpretations reveal, the UCCJA's
answers do not advance the reformers' stability goals.
Courts interpreting the UCCJA have often permitted a litigant
to evade an adverse decision in one state by recourse to the courts
of another state. They have done so, in most instances, because
of their concern for justice in the particular case-a concern
Ratner shared, and one embodied in the UCCJA both as principle
190 See Sampsell v. Superior Court,
197 P.2d 739 (Cal. 1948);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 79 (1971); Ehrenzweig,
Uniform Litigation, supra note 2, at 3, Ratner, Legislative Resolution, supra note
27, at 195; Stansbury, supra note 20, at 831-32.
191 See supra notes 86-115 and accompanying text.
192 See UCCJA § 1(a)(1), (4)-(7), 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 123-24.
193 See Foster, supra note 12, at 303-04, 307-08.
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and as rule. 194 As will become clear, whatever their doctrinal
rhetoric, state courts have not abandoned the practice of concur
rent jurisdiction.
1.

When May a Court Make an Initial Custody Order?
(Sections 3 and 6)

The UCCJA provides an apparently straightforward standard
for determining when a court may make an initial custody order.
Section 3 establishes four alternate grounds for taking jurisdic
tion: (1) the forum is the child's "home state" (or has been within
the last six months); (2) the child and at least one contestant have
a "significant connection" to the forum; (3) the child is physically
present in the jurisdiction and an emergency necessitates resolv
ing the child's custody; and (4) no other state- has jurisdiction
under the Act. 195 Courts most often use the first two of these
grounds to resolve jurisdiction between competing parents; the
other two grounds are not much used in this context. 196
The existence of four alternate jurisdictional grounds suggests
that the UCCJA did adopt the doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction,
and that therefore two or even more states might potentially have
jurisdiction over the same matter at the same time-one as the
"home state" and others as "significant connection" states. The
UCCJA does, however, have a mechanism explicitly designed to
See UCCJA §§ 1(a)(2)-(3), 3(a)(2), 7(c)(2)-(3), 8, 14(a), 9 U.L.A. pt. 1,
at 123, 143, 233, 251, 292.
195 UCCJA § 3, 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 143-44; see supra notes 150-64 and
accompanying text (discussing UCCJA's jurisdictional provisions in greater
detail).
196 With the exception of child protection actions filed by a public entity
and alleging abuse and neglect, emergency jurisdiction is primarily used in
actions for modification rather than for initial custody. See, e.g., Stuart v.
Stuart, 516 So. 2d 1277 (La. Ct. App. 1987) (affirming emergency transfer
of custody of child in Louisiana for visit on basis of allegations that custodial
mother became intoxicated daily and was unable to care for child, although
Washington had become home state); Marcrum v. Marcrum, 437 A.2d 725
(NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1981) (ordering hearing where abducting father
alleged that custodial mother was an alcoholic). Even in this context, courts
are reluctant to exercise emergency jurisdiction if the emergency can
adequately be dealt with in the child's home state. See, e.g., Nelson v.
Nelson, 433 So. 2d 1015 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (refusing to exercise
emergency jurisdiction when emergency was not in Florida); cJ. Dillon v.
Medellin, 409 So. 2d 570 (La. 1982) (refusing to enforce another state's
emergency modification because to do so would encourage an abduction).
Vacuum jurisdiction is rarely used in any context.
194
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prevent this. Like Ratner's act, and adopting its exact lan
guage, 197 the UCCJA forbids simultaneous proceedings. Section
6 prohibits courts from exercising jurisdiction while another pro
ceeding concerning the same child is "pending" in a forum that is
"exercising jurisdiction substantially in conformity with this
Act."l98

In practice, however, although courts sometimes defer to other
states' pending proceedings, 199 when they consider it appropriate
they have easily been able to find statutory grounds for asserting
jurisdiction and resolving a custody matter that another court is
currently considering. 200 The courts do this in two main ways: by
197 Compare VCCJA § 6(a), 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 219-20 with Ratner,
Legislative Resolution, supra note 27, at 200-01 (§§ 4-5 of proposed uniform
act).
198 UCCJA § 6, 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 219-20. Section 9 requires the parties,
in their first pleadings, to disclose all interested persons and all other
litigation concerning the child. 9 U .L.A. pt. 1, at 266. Some courts have
treated this requirement as jurisdictional, see, e.g., Brewington v. Serrato,
336 S.E.2d 444 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985); others have held that any defect is
curable by amendment, see, e.g., Gambrell v. Gambrell, 272 S.E.2d 70 (Ga.
1980).
199 See, e.g., Rector v. Rector, 565 P.2d 950 (Colo. Ct. App. 1977)
(holding court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because another
proceeding was pending in Kansas); Mainster v. Mainster, 466 So. 2d 1228,
1229 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (holding Florida should have declined to
exercise jurisdiction "because the Virginia proceeding was pending at the
time the mother filed her Florida action"); Steele v. Steele, 296 S.E.2d 570
(Ga. 1982) (reversing trial court to require deference to former home state's
pending proceeding); Cunningham v. Cunningham, 719 S.W.2d 224 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1986) (requiring enforcement of North Carolina custody decree
rendered in case pending when Texas began proceedings).
200 In so doing, courts are sometimes aided by the statute's amorphous
policy pronouncements. For example, the statute's general purposes, set
out in § 1, include "discourag[ing] continuing controversies," "deter[ring]
abductions" and "avoid[ing] re-litigation of custody decisions," but also
ensuring that "a custody decree is rendered in that state which can best
decide the case in the interest of the child," and that "litigation concerning
the custody of a child take place ordinarily in the state with which the child
and his family have the closest connection and where significant evidence
concerning his care, protection, training and personal relationships is most
readily available." UCCJA § 1, 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 124. The official Comment
to § 3 emphasizes the act's purpose "to limit jurisdiction rather than
proliferate it .... UJurisdiction exists only if it is in the child's interest, not
merely the interest or convenience of the feuding parties .... There must
be maximum rather than minimum contact with the state." UCCJA § 3 cmt.,
9 U.L.A. pt. I, at 145 (emphasis in original).
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determining that the case is not "pending" in the other state, and
by determining that the other state did not exercise jurisdiction in
·~substantial conformity" with the UCCJA.
The Rhode Island case Houtchens v. Houtchens 201 is a good
example of the first interpretive strategy for evading section 6. 202
The parties married in Rhode Island and then moved to Texas.
Their two children were born in Texas, and the family lived
together there for some years. Then, one day, the father moved
back to Rhode Island with the children. The mother immediately
commenced a proceeding in Texas seeking divorce and cus
tody. 203 Two weeks after arriving in Rhode Island, the father also
sought custody of the children, in a Rhode Island court.
In response, the mother objected that UCCJA section 6 pre
cluded Rhode Island from taking jurisdiction of the case because
Texas custody proceedings were already pending when the father
filed his action in Rhode Island. Nevertheless, the Rhode Island
trial court held a hearing and granted the father temporary cus
tody of the children. Meanwhile, the earlier-begun Texas action
continued, and, about two months after the Rhode Island tempo
rary order was entered, the Texas court granted the mother a
divorce and custody of the children. She accordingly removed
the children from Rhode Island and returned with them to Texas.
The Rhode Island court decided that, by taking her children to
Texas, the mother had acted in contempt of its temporary custody
order; it ordered her to return the children to their father. On
the strength of this Rhode Island order, the father went to Texas,
got the children, and brought them back to Rhode Island.
488 A.2d 726 (R.I. 1985).
202 See id.; see also Fuge v. Uiterwyk, 542 So. 2d 726, 728-29 (La. Ct. App.
1989) (holding that rule for contempt, filed in Florida to enforce Florida
custody order, is not a pending "proceeding to determine custody" and
therefore § 6 does not require Louisiana to defer to it); In re Brandon L.E.,
551 N.E.2d 506, 510 (Mass. 1990) (holding that although Mississippi is
attempting to enforce its prior custody order by finding the mother in
contempt, this does not mean that a custody proceeding is still "pending" in
Mississippi, and therefore does not preclude Massachusetts from assuming
jurisdiction).
203 Under UCCJA § 3(a)(1)(ii), Texas would seem to have had
jurisdiction: the children had lived with their parents in Texas "within 6
months before the commencement of the proceeding," the children were
only absent from Texas because of their "removal or retention by a person
claiming [their] custody," and their mother continued to live in Texas. See 9
U.L.A. pt. I, at 143.
201
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The mother followed her children back to Rhode Island and
appealed the temporary custody order and the judgment of con
tempt to the Rhode Island Supreme Court, renewing her argu
ment that section 6 required Rhode Island to defer to Texas. The
Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's exercise of
jurisdiction. Although acknowledging that Texas had been the
children's home state within six months of the time the mother
initiated her claim for custody there, and thus that Texas had
jurisdiction under the UCCJA, 204 the supreme court held that sec
tion 6 did not require the trial court to defer to the pending
Texas custody proceeding.
The court reasoned that because the father had not received
actual notice of the Texas proceeding at the time he filed his
Rhode Island action, the Texas proceeding was not yet really
"pending," and therefore Rhode Island should not be precluded
from exercising its "significant connection" jurisdiction. 205 The
Rhode Island court made no inquiry as to when a custody pro
ceeding is "pending" under Texas law. The question was instead
seen as one of Rhode Island law, to be decided with reference to
the children's best interests. The children's best interests, in
turn, were seen through the lens of the Rhode Island trial court's
factual determinations: that exercising jurisdiction206 and award
ing custody to their father 207 would be in their best interests.
The North Carolina case Davis v. Davis 208 is a good example of
the second interpretive strategy for evading section 6, that is,
determining that the foreign state did not exercise jurisdiction in
"substantial conformity" with the UCCJA. 209 In Davis, the par488 A.2d at 730.
!d. at 731-32; cJ. Lopez v. District Court, 606 P.2d 853 (Colo. 1980)
(en bane) (holding that under California law, a custody action is "pending"
as soon as filed).
206 Assumption of jurisdiction under UCCJA § 3(a)(2) requires a
determination that this is in the child's best interests. 9 U.L.A. pt. I, at 143.
207 The determination that awarding custody to the father was in the
children's best interests is implicit in the award.
208 281 S.E.2d 411 (N.C. Ct. App. 1981).
209 At least four other states' courts have used this mechanism to avoid
deferring to an ongoing, earlier-begun, custody proceeding in another state.
See Norsworthy v. Norsworthy, 713 S.W.2d 451 (Ark. 1986) (holding that
Arkansas need not defer to Texas custody proceeding begun two weeks
earlier because Texas's exercise of jurisdiction seems to conflict with
purposes ofUCCJA as set out in§ 1); Bull v. Bull, 311 N.W.2d 768 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1981) (holding that Michigan need not defer to pending Georgia
204

205
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ties' North Carolina marriage was punctuated by several separa
tions during which the mother took the children to California.
Eventually, the father filed an action in North Carolina seeking
"permanent and exclusive" custody of the children. 210 In
response, the mother pled that a custody proceeding that ante
dated the father's North Carolina action was pending in Califor
nia, and that a California court had granted her temporary
custody of the children. Both California and North Carolina had
adopted the UCCJA. 211 Following the procedure mandated by
UCCJA section 6(c), 212 the North Carolina trialjudge telephoned
the Californiajudge, was told that California would not relinquish
its jurisdiction, and accordingly dismissed the father's action. 213
On the father's appeal, the North Carolina Court of Appeals
reversed. It is clear from the opinion that the Court of Appeals
thought the mother should not have custody. 214 (The court's
recital of the facts paints the mother as impulsive and unreliable,
repeatedly leaving the father for no apparent reason and then
begging him to take her and the children back. The court also
proceeding because Georgia did not consider best interests of child in
changing custody and thus did not act in conformity with the UCCJA); Swire
v. Swire, 494 A.2d 1035 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985) (holding that New
Jersey need not defer to proceeding pending in former home state where
father still resided because the "vast preponderance" of evidence was in
New Jersey, where children had been living for six years); In re Fenn, 664
P.2d 1143 (Or. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that Oregon was not required to
defer to Texas proceeding begun two weeks earlier because Oregon had
better access to evidence about children and family); see also Mainster v.
Mainster, 466 So. 2d 1228 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (interpreting section 6
to permit or require an inquiry into correctness of other state's
determination of its own jurisdiction, but agreeing that other state had
jurisdiction); Bowden v. Bowden, 440 A.2d 1160 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1982) (remanding for factual hearing to decide if Nebraska's pending
proceedings were "substantially in conformity" with UCCJA).
21o 281 S.E.2d at 412.
211 !d. at 413,416.
212 Section 6(c) reads:
If the court is informed during the course of the proceeding that
a proceeding concerning the custody of the child was pending in
another state before the court assumed jurisdiction it shall stay
the proceeding and communicate with the court in which the
other proceeding is pending to the end that the issue may be
litigated in the more appropriate forum ....
9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 220.
213 281 S.E.2d at 412.
214 /d. at 411-12.
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recounts several occasions when the mother allegedly deceived
the father so she could leave North Carolina with the children. 215 )
It accordingly read UCCJA section 6 as permitting North Carolina
to determine for itself whether California was "exercising juris
diction substantially in conformity with this Act." 216
The children appear to have been in California from approxi
mately March, 1978, to January, 1979, and again from February,
1979 to June, 1979, both times probably living with their mother
and maternal grandmother. 217 While in California, the mother
and children received public assistance. 218 Although the Califor
nia court might well have determined, therefore, that during their
visits to California the mother and children established "signifi
cant connections" with the state, supporting California jurisdic
tion under UCCJA section 3(a)(2), the North Carolina court
redetermined the facts and disagreed. That court focused on the
brevity of the mother's most recent stay in California before she
filed her custody action: "We do not believe that, by this brief
interlude (one month) in California, California obtained jurisdic
tion in conformity with [N.C. Gen. Stat. section] 50A-3." 219
These two strategies for interpreting section 6, that is, deter
mining that a case is not "pending" or that an exercise ofjurisdic
tion is not in "substantial conformity with this Act," have a
common thread. In both, the second forum, motivated by con
cerns for a child's welfare to disregard an earlier-begun foreign
proceeding, exploits the statutory direction to evaluate foreign
jurisdiction under forum law in order to justify taking jurisdiction
over the case. Section 6 directs the second court to test both pen
dency and substantial conformity with respect to "this Act," 220
that is, the law of the state making the inquiry, rather than the law
of the state where the other proceeding was begun. Even when
both states have adopted the UCCJA without change, so that the
language of the two state laws is identical, directing a court to
look at its own, rather than foreign, law seems to increase the lati
tude of its interpretations. The UCCJA does not direct the sec
ond court to consider the decisional law that guided the first court
215

See id.

216

/d.

217
218

See id.
See id.

219

/d.

22o

at

411-12, 417.
416.
at

at 412.
416.
9 U.L.A. pt. I, at 219 (emphasis added).
at
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in its own interpretation of the UCCJA. 221 As a result, even when
the first court's proceeding is both pending and proper under its
own interpretation of the UCCJA, the present forum is able to
construe the foreign proceeding as not "pending" under local
law, or as not in "substantial conformity" with the requirements
of local law, and to take jurisdiction.
State courts do not always exploit these opportunities; in many
cases they instead dismiss in deference to a pending foreign pro
ceeding. But whenever the now-local child seems to have needs
that the forum fears a foreign proceeding will disregard, section 6
provides the means for a concerned court to take jurisdiction over
the dispute. In such cases, however, the forum's eventual child
custody order will be particularly vulnerable to attack in other
states, and especially so in the state whose pending proceeding
was disregarded. 222
2.

When Must a Court Enforce a Foreign Order Instead of
Making an Independent Inquiry Into the Situation?
(Sections 12, 13, and 15)

Section 6 requires courts to defer only to pending cases, not to
final decisions. Similarly, the provisions requiring deference to
foreign decrees are couched in terms that make it possible to
interpret the UCCJA as requiring the forum to defer to a foreign
proceeding only as long as the case is actually pending in a for
eign court. 223 Under this interpretation, once the foreign custody
221 This was a deliberate drafting choice, the result of Bodenheimer's
decision to make the act "uniform" but not "reciprocal." Bodenheimer
wanted every state that adopted the UCCJA to be bound by its provisions
whether or not other interested states had also adopted it. See UCCJA
Prefatory Note, 9 U:L.A. pt. I, at 118.
222 See infra notes 233-38 and accompanying text (discussing In re
Hopson, 168 Cal. Rptr. 345 (Ct. App. 1980)).
223 See UCCJA §§ 12, 13, 15, 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 274, 276, 311. Several
years after the UCCJA was promulgated, when it became apparent that
courts were sometimes interpreting the act in this way, Professor
Bodenheimer wrote that the UCCJA both forbade concurrent jurisdiction
and implicitly required other states to defer to the decree state's jurisdiction
even after the child has left the decree state:
When a child stays in a state for six months or more as a visitor
or a victim of abduction, the question arises whether the new
state has power to modify the custody decree. The answer is that
the Act does not permit the second state to take jurisdiction
because the paramount jurisdiction of the prior state continues.
Section 3 of the Act, the basic provision on subject matter
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case reaches final judgment, another forum may immediately
exercise its own jurisdiction by re-determining custody. 224
The UCCJA does contain two provisions that seemingly require
courts to enforce foreign decrees. Both of them, however, direct
the forum to inquire into the foreign court's jurisdiction before
enforcing its order. Because the foreign court's jurisdiction is to
be tested according to the law of the forum rather than the law of
the court rendering the decision, both provisions permit the same
sorts of interpretive strategies as are sometimes used under sec
tion 6.
One of the two provisions requiring deference to foreign
decrees is in UCCJA section 13. Section 13 requires the forum to
"recognize and enforce" foreign custody decrees made by a court
that had "assumed jurisdiction under statutory provisions sub
stantially in accordance with this Act or [if the decree] was made
under factual circumstances meeting the jurisdictional standards
of the Act." 225 The most common way for a court to honor sec
tion 13's strictures without enforcing the foreign decision is to
jurisdiction, must be read in corUunction with section 14, which
does not permit modifications by another state as long as the
prior state's exclusive jurisdiction continues. This is true
whether or not another state has technically become the child's
home state.
Bodenheimer, Progress Under the UCCJA, supra note 5, at 988 (footnotes omit
ted). As authority for this assertion, Bodenheimer relied on the Commis
sioner's Note to Section 14 rather than on the text of the statute itself. See
id. at 988 n.67; see also Bodenheimer, Interstate Custody, supra note 5, at 20405.
In response, Professor Foster made a textual analysis of the UCCJA that
supports his conclusion that the decree state does not retain continuing
jurisdiction for more than six months after the child has left it. See Foster,
supra note 12, at 303-10.
224 See, e.g., Gordon v. Gordon, 363 S.E.2d 353 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987)
(reversing trial court's order because entered while custody proceeding was
pending in another state, but remanding for a hearing on whether the other
state has jurisdiction "now," and for possible modification of the order if it
does not).
225 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 276. Section 13 also conditions its requirement of
enforcement on the foreign decree not having been modified "in
accordance with jurisdictional standards substantially similar to those of this
Act." So far as I am aware, no court has based a decision on a distinction
between the slightly different standards applied to the foreign state's
assumption of jurisdiction ("substantially in accordance with this Act") and
its exercise of jurisdiction by modification ("substantially similar to those of
this Act").
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determine that the foreign court did not assume jurisdiction
"substantially in accordance with this Act." 226
Courts have applied fairly technical local rules to foreign deci
sions under this rubric, as in Brewington v. Serrato. 227 In Brewington,
the North Carolina Court of Appeals held that a Texas court's
jurisdiction was defective because its (final and unappealed) deci
sion had not complied with North Carolina's requirement that
custody decisions contain explicit and specific findings of jurisdic
tional facts. 228 Both Texas and North Carolina had adopted the
UCCJA. Although the North Carolina court did not acknowledge
it, Texas certainly had "significant contacts" jurisdiction, and may
have been the "home state" as well. 229 When the Texas court
gave the mother custody, the father neither appealed nor obeyed
the order; instea<i, he filed for custody in North Carolina. The
North Carolina court's determination that Texas lacked jurisdic
tion seems to have been driven by its view of the merits, based at
least in part on evidence of post-abduction father-son fishing
trips. 230
The other provision governing deference to foreign decrees is
found in UCCJA section 15 when it is read together with section
226 The other possibility, a determination that the factual circumstances
do not meet the Act's jurisdictional standards, seems mostly to have been
used in reviewing the work of courts not subject to the UCCJA. See, e.g.,
Mace v. Mace, 341 N.W.2d 307 (Neb. 1983) (determining that Mississippi,
which had not yet adopted UCCJA, lacked significant contacts with child
who had regularly visited father there).
227 336 S.E.2d 444 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985); see also Dillon v. Medelin, 409
So. 2d 570 (La. 1982) (refusing to defer to Texas's § 3(a)(4) "emergency"
jurisdiction, which was based on allegations that custodial mother and
stepfather sexually abused child and used drugs, because alleged actions
occurred in Louisiana rather than in Texas).
228 See 336 S.E.2d at 447; cf. Walt v. Walt, 574 So. 2d 205 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1991) (reversing trial court's enforcement of Mississippi custody
decree because of Mississippi's procedural lapses, as assessed under
Florida's verbatim enactment of UCCJA § 9).
229 See UCCJA § 3(a)(1)(i), (2), 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 143. The child was born
in Texas and lived there with his parents for a year, until the family moved
to North Carolina. About six months after the move, however, the mother
returned to Texas with the child, first saying that she was visiting a sick
relative and then that she did not want to go on living with her husband.
Approximately six months after the mother and child returned to Texas, the
father fetched the child back to North Carolina over the mother's protest.
She immediately filed a custody action in Texas; the father was served, and
he filed responsive pleadings. 336 S.E.2d at 446.
230 See 336 S.E.2d at 448.
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12. Section 15 permits a party to file a foreign custody decree
with a forum court, and requires the forum to enforce such a
decree "in like manner as a custody decree rendered by a court of
this State." 231 By itself, this provision seems simple and auto
matic; it apparently gives the forum no opportunity to inquire
into the bona fides of a facially-valid foreign custody order. Such
an opportunity, however, is latent in the direction to treat the for
eign decree "in like manner" to a local decree. Section 12 defines
a local custody decree's effect. According to section 12, a local
decree is binding as to "all issues of law and fact decided and as
to the custody determination made unless and until that determi
nation is modified pursuant to law," provided that the court that
rendered it has "jurisdiction under section 3," that is, under
forum law. 232
The California case In re Hopson 233 provides a striking example
of the sort of interpretation a court that does not wish to enforce
a recent foreign decree can give section 15. In Hopson, both par
ties presented the California court with facially-valid foreign cus
tody decrees. The Arizona decree gave custody to the mother.
She asked the California court to enforce the Arizona decree
under California's enactment of UCCJA section 15. Arizona had
been the children's home state at the time the action was origi
nally filed there. The later Tennessee decree transferred custody
to the father. Arguably, Tennessee had jurisdiction at the time it
made its decision. 234 Rather than enforcing either foreign
9 U .L.A. pt. 1, at 311.
UCCJA § 12, 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 274. Section 12 also specifies that the
decree is binding only on all properly-served parties "who have been given
an opportunity to be heard."
233 168 Cal. Rptr. 345 (Ct. App. 1980).
234 The parties had lived in Arizona for two years when they divorced; an
Arizona decree gave the mother custody. Although the Arizona decree
prohibited both parents from removing the children from the state without
court permission, the mother moved with them to California shortly after
the father moved, alone, to Tennessee. Thereafter, the father sought a
change of custody in the Arizona court; while his request was pending, he
took the children from California to his home in Tennessee and filed for
custody there. After a hearing, Arizona continued the mother's custody and
gave her permission to take the children to California or anywhere else. !d.
at 349-50.
Shortly thereafter, a Tennessee court took jurisdiction of the father's
action for custody, over the mother's objection. After a contested hearing,
the Tennessee court gave the father custody because it considered the
children's best interests more important than punishing the father for child231

232
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decree, the California court assumedjurisdiction over the dispute
itself, reasoning that California had jurisdiction because it had
been the children's home state at the time the father abducted
them to Tennessee, more than two years previously. 235 The Cali
fornia Court of Appeal reviewed the Tennessee decision as if an
inferior local court had made it, and found it to be in "error." 236
According to the California court, Tennessee should have
deferred to the then-pending Arizona proceeding, should have
weighed the father's misconduct more heavily, and should have
applied a different substantive standard to the question of modifi
cation.237 Had the case been in fact appealed from Tennessee to
California, a remand to the Tennessee courts would have been
proper; under the circumstances, committing the question to a
California trial court approximated this result as closely as possi
ble. Of course, since Tennessee is in fact an independent sover
eign state, California's determination of the custody issue in
Hopson was not respected in the one place it could have been
enforced-Tennessee, where the children stayed during the Cali
fornia litigation, and where they remained afterwards. 238

3.

When May a Court, After an Independent Inquiry,
Modify a Foreign Custody Order? (Sections 3 and
14)

Under the UCCJA, deciding that a foreign child custody decree
is not entitled to be "recognized and enforced" is only one way
for a court to avoid enforcing it. Even a concededly valid decree
may onen be modified. Sections 3 and 14 govern such
modifications.
By prohibiting simultaneous proceedings, section 6 implicitly
prohibits a forum from modifying foreign orders in pending
cases. However, the UCCJA treats final decrees differently; sec
tions 12, 13, and 15 all contemplate modification of final foreign
snatching. /d. at 350. The children had been living in Tennessee for
seventeen months at the time of this decision. !d. at 353.
235 /d. at 359.
236 /d. at 356.
237 /d. at 353-56.
238 The mother was unable to enforce Califomia's decision in Tennessee.
Interestingly, about four years after the Hopson decision, when the children
were approximately 14 and 17, both ran away from their father to live with
their mother. The parties were then able to agree on visitation. Telephone
Interview with William Hinton (Aug. 21, 1991) (attomey for mother).
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custody decrees under certain circumstances. Section 14 specifies
these circumstances. The forum may modify a foreign decree if
"(1) it appears to the court of this State that the court which ren
dered the decree does not now have jurisdiction under jurisdic
tional prerequisites substantially in accordance with this Act or
has declined to assume jurisdiction to modify the decree and (2)
the court of this State has jurisdiction. " 239 There are three
important points to note about this language.
First, while sections 12, 13 and 15 tested foreignjurisdiction at
the time the decree court assumed it, section 14 tests it "now."
Second, even if the forum concludes that the decree court both
assumedjurisdiction legitimately and still has jurisdiction "now,"
the forum may nevertheless modify the decree if it determines
that the decree court has "declined to assume" its jurisdiction.
Third, these assessments, like the forum's evaluation of its own
jurisdiction, are to be made on the basis of the forum's view of
both facts 240 and law. 241 The first two of these points merit
extended discussion.
a.

Does the Decree Court Have jurisdiction "Now"?

Even the decree of a court that, under section 13, concededly
"assumed jurisdiction under statutory provisions substantially in
accordance with this Act"-a decree that the forum court must
therefore "recognize and enforce" 242-may nevertheless be mod
ified by a forum that decides that the decree state does not have
jurisdiction "now," if the forum also believes that it itself does
have jurisdiction. The new state's assessment of the situation may
well differ from the decree state's assessment. Indeed, decree
states often think they may retain "significant contact" jurisdic
tion long after the child has left the state. 243 The statute can, with
UCCJA § 14, 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 292.
/d. ("it appears to the court of this State").
241 /d. ("under jurisdictional prerequisites substantially in accordance
with this Act" (emphasis added)).
242 UCCJA § 13, 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 276.
243 See, e.g., Smith v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. Rptr. 348 (Ct. App. 1977)
239

240

(holding it proper to exercise "significant contacts" jurisdiction nine years
after child's departure); Barden v. Blau, 712 P.2d 481 (Colo. 1986) (en
bane) (remanding to determine whether, seven years after leaving state, the
children still have "significant contacts" that would support Colorado
jurisdiction); Kioukis v. Kioukis, 440 A.2d 894 (Conn. 1981) (remanding to
determine if Connecticut has "significant contacts" jurisdiction three years
after child's departure from state); Yurgel v. Yurgel, 572 So. 2d 1327 (Fla.
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some difficulty, be read to support this position. 244 Usually it is
1990) (holding that Florida retains jurisdiction four years after children
moved away); Harris v. Melnick, 552 A.2d 38 (Md. 1989) (holding it proper
to exercise "significant contacts" jurisdiction seven years after children
moved away); Range v. Range, 440 N.W.2d 691 (Neb. 1989) (holding it
proper to exercise "significant contacts" jurisdiction three years after
children moved away); People ex ret. Throneberg v. Butcher, 479 N.Y.S.2d
762 (App. Div. 1984) (holding that New York has "significant contacts"
jurisdiction seventeen months after child left state because child was
wrongfully retained in Oklahoma after a visit there); G.S. v. Ewing, 786 P.2d
65 (Okla. 1990) (holding it proper to exercise "significant contacts"
jurisdiction four years after children's departure); see also Dennis v. Dennis,
387 N.W.2d 234 (N.D. 1986) (holding that trial court did not abuse
discretion by dismissing for forum non conveniens reasons a case that had
been remanded for determination of whether, three years after child left
North Dakota, there was still "significant contacts" jurisdiction); cf.
Schlumpf v. Superior Court, 145 Cal. Rptr. 190 (Ct. App. 1978) (holding
that although California retained "significant contacts" jurisdiction nine
years after child's departure, UCCJA § 7, forum non conveniens, required
court to stay proceedings in favor of those in child's present home state).
244 UCCJA § 3(c) makes it clear that the "[p]hysical presence of the child,
while desirable, is not a prerequisite for jurisdiction to determine his
custody." 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 144. That being the case, it is possible to
interpret§ 3(a)(2)'s requirement that "the child and his parents, or the child
and at least one contestant, have a significant connection with this State," id.
at 143, as being satisfied long after the child has departed with one parent
for a new home, so long as the child visits the local parent occasionally.
Section 3(a)(2)'s other requirement, that "there [be] available in this State
substantial evidence concerning the child's present or future care,
protection, training, and personal relationships," id. at 143, is either
ignored, e.g., Kendall v. Whalen, 526 A.2d 588, 590 (Me. 1987) (relying
entirely on Bodenheimer's writings and "the purpose of the UCCJA" to
affirm decree state's continuing jurisdiction to modify custody twenty-one
months after child left Maine with custodial parent), or considered to be
satisfied by regular visitation, e.g., Yurgel v. Yurgel, 572 So. 2d 1327, 1331
(Fla. 1990) (finding that children's annual visits establish significant
contacts; holding that UCCJA does not divest decree court of continuing
jurisdiction "unless virtually all contacts [with decree state] have been
lost"), or even by the possibility that a change in custody would make
evidence about the decree state relevant to the child's future care, protection,
training, and personal relationships, e.g., Biggers v. Biggers, 650 P.2d 692,
696 (Idaho 1982) (permitting decree state to modify custody although
children live in new state with custodial parent because evidence of
children's pre-move contacts in Idaho bears on their "present and future
care").
In some states, courts may also rely on a statutory preference for
continuing jurisdiction. See, e.g., Levy v. Levy, 434 N.E.2d 400, 404 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1982) (relying, in part, on Illinois amendment to UCCJA § 3
specifying that "a court, once having obtained jurisdiction over a child, shall
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only when an appellate court in the decree state wishes to punish
parental wrongdoing that it concludes that time must have viti
ated the child's connections with the decree state. 245 In contrast,
when the question of "significant contact" jurisdiction arises in
the new (or "asylum") state, the forum often concludes that the
decree state lost jurisdiction almost as soon as the new state
became the "home state"-potentially little more than six months
after the move. 246
retain such jurisdiction"); Larsen v. Larsen, 615 P.2d 806 (Kan. Ct. App.
1980) (relying, in part, on KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1610(a) (1979) (amended
repeatedly through 1988) to find continuing jurisdiction to modify custody
five years after child and custodial parent moved away from Kansas).
245 See, e.g., Hafer v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. Rptr. 132 (Ct. App. 1981)
(finding error to assert continuing jurisdiction over custody matter three
years after child left California for Idaho; mother's abduction of children
influenced court); Hegler v. Hegler, 383 So. 2d 1134 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1980) (holding that Florida lacked "significant contacts" jurisdiction over
children who left state four years before, although one was abducted back to
Florida two years later and thus had been in Florida for two years, and
remanding to determine if emergency jurisdiction existed); State ex rei.
Murphy v. Boudreau, 653 P.2d 531 (Okla. 1982) (affirming trial court's
finding that Oklahoma lost jurisdiction over children five years after their
move, in part because father abducted child); cf. In re Lance, 690 P.2d 979
(Mont. 1984) (per curiam) (affirming dismissal of modification filed seven
months after child left state with custodial mother because petitioning father
was prose, incarcerated, and had attempted to bribe Wyoming trial judge).
But see L.F. v. G.W.F., 443 A.2d 751 (NJ. Super. App. Div. 1982) (finding
New Jersey's jurisdiction vitiated 4 112 years after child's departure).
246 See, e.g., In re Leonard, 175 Cal. Rptr. 903 (Ct. App. 1981) (fourteen
months; held-over visit); Fuge v. Uiterwyk, 542 So. 2d 726 (La. Ct. App.
1989) (twelve months); Olson v. Olson, 494 A.2d 737 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1985) (five years); Mace v. Mace, 341 N.W.2d 307 (Neb. 1983) (eighteen
months); In re Reynolds, 441 N.E.2d 1141 (Ohio Ct. App. 1982) (two years);
Ellis v. Nickerson, 604 P.2d 518 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979) (five years).
Even when doing so permits an abduction to mature into the basis for
home state jurisdiction in six months, many asylum courts test the decree
state's jurisdiction not at the time the proceeding was commenced or even
at the time the decision was rendered, but at the time the modification
proceeding was filed in the new state, or even later. See, e.g., Pierce v. Pierce,
287 N.W.2d 879 (Iowa 1980) (testing decree state's jurisdiction at time of
filing in Iowa); Bull v. Bull, 3ll N.W.2d 768 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981) (testing
Georgia's jurisdiction at time abducting mother filed pleadings in Michigan
in response to father's attempt to enforce Georgia decree there); Ellis v.
Nickerson, 604 P.2d 518 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979) (refusing to enforce
Missouri decree issued in 1977, two years after mother left state, because by
1979 Missouri lacked "significant contacts" with the children; forum,
children's home since 1977, asserts jurisdiction); In re Brandon L.E., 394
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When the decree and asylum states' assessments ofjurisdiction
differ in this way, each forum usually follows its own determina
tion.247 It is important to understand that, because any given
forum may be an asylum state in one case and a decree state in
another, jurisdiction is typically analyzed as a question "of fact"
that may be resolved differently in superficially similar cases on
the basis of assertedly important factual distinctions. 248
Occasionally a court will address the underlying policy ques
tions rather than the technical details of a modification issue. The
Oregon Supreme Court's epic struggles with the proper interpre
tation of section 14 are particularly illuminating. The court con
fronted the problem in two cases, each of which arose when a
party took a child into Oregon from the state ofinitialjurisdiction
before an initial order had been made. As the court recognized,
the policy question was whether an abduction should ever mature
into such settled residency as would support an exercise of child
S.E.2d 515 (W. Va. 1990) (testing Florida's jurisdiction at time of appeal
from West Virginia's custody decision); Rosics v. Heath, 746 P.2d 1284
(Wyo. 1987) (testing Texas's jurisdiction at time of initial modification
hearing in Wyoming).
Slidell v. Valentine, 298 N.W.2d 599 (Iowa 1980), is a similar case. There,
the Iowa Supreme Court refused to enforce a Florida custody order in favor
of the father by applying its own law to the question of when a Florida
custody proceeding had been commenced. The Iowa court held that
custody proceedings the father had commenced in Florida shortly before
the mother left the state (in defiance of an order to produce the child in
court) were abandoned by him because he did not search for her vigorously
enough, although Florida itself later consolidated the earlier proceedings
with those the father brought when he finally located the mother in Iowa,
three years later. !d. at 602.
247 See, e.g., McCarron v. District Court, 671 P.2d 953 (Colo. 1983) (en
bane) (issuing mandamus to require Colorado court to exercise jurisdiction
over custody dispute although decree state had asserted its continuing
jurisdiction).
248 Compare Harris v. Melnick, 552 A.2d 38 (Md. 1989) (Maryland, as
decree state, asserts exclusive continuing jurisdiction although child has
lived in Colorado for seven years) with Olson v. Olson, 494 A.2d 737 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 1985) (Maryland, as asylum state, asserts home state
jurisdiction five years after child's arrival from Rhode Island) and Howard v.
Gish, 373 A.2d 1280 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1977) (Maryland, as asylum state,
asserts jurisdiction after eleven months); also compare Mace v. Mace, 341
N.W.2d 307 (Neb. 1983) (Nebraska, as asylum state, decides that decree
state lost jurisdiction after children were absent for eighteen months) with
Range v. Range, 440 N.W.2d 691 (Neb. 1989) (Nebraska, as decree state,
asserts jurisdiction over children absent for three years and distinguishes
Mace on basis of children's ages).
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custody jurisdiction by the asylum state. Answering this question
"no" subordinates the UCCJA's goals of flexibility and of having
the custody decision made by a court with maximum access to
current information; answering it "yes" subordinates the
UCCJA's goals of preventing and deterring abductions. The
question therefore exposes the heart of the UCCJA's
indeterminacy.
The first such case to command the Oregon Supreme Court's
attention was In re Settle. 249 In Settle, the mother fled with the chil
dren to Oregon in order to evade the father's custodial claims
while the case was pending in an Indiana court with personal
jurisdiction over both parents and the children. 250 In the
mother's absence, Indiana granted the father custody. When the
father located the children in Oregon and attempted to enforce
the Indiana custody order, however, the Oregon trial court con
solidated the father's habeas corpus action with the mother's peti
tion for modification, heard testimony on the merits, and granted
custody to the mother. 251 The Oregon Court of Appeals
reversed, holding that the mother was not entitled to an Oregon
forum because she had violated an Indiana court order by leaving
the state with the children, 252 but on further appeal the Oregon
Supreme Court vindicated both the trial court's assertion ofjuris
diction and its award of custody. By the time of the Oregon hear
ing, the children had been away from both Indiana and their
father for twenty months. 253 The supreme court reasoned that
UCCJA section 14 permitted Oregon to modify the Indiana
decree because Indiana was neither the home state nor a state
with "significant connection" to the children at the time the Ore
gon action was filed, 254 and because Oregon had by then become
the children's "home state." 255
From the first, the Oregon Supreme Court recognized that the
249 556 P.2d 962 (Or. 1976) (in bane), overruled by In re Ross, 630 P.2d
353 (Or. 1981) (in bane).
250 The Oregon Supreme Court explicitly acknowledged the mother's
scofflaw motivations. See id. at 963-64.
251 The court thought the children's welfare would be best served by
stability-continued custody with the mother-in the absence of
"affirmative reasons to award custody to either parent." !d. at 965.
252 In re Settle, 550 P.2d 445 (Or. Ct. App.), rev 'd, 556 P.2d 962 (Or.
1976) (in bane), overruled by In re Ross, 630 P.2d 353 (Or. 1981) (in bane).
253 556 P.2d at 964.
254 !d. at 966.
255 !d. at 965.
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UCCJA attempts to achieve both of two incompatible goals, flexi
bility and repose. In Settle, after carefully considering the
UCCJA's language and official Comments, the Oregon Supreme
Court chose flexibility. It read the statute itself as choosing flexi
bility over repose, in order to achieve the best interests of the
child, whenever the two "schizophrenic" goals presented "an
irreconcilable conflict. " 256
A few years later, in In re Ross, 257 the Oregon Supreme Court
overruled Settle. The facts of Ross were similar to those of Settle.
Two days after parents who had married and lived together in
Montana separated, the father took their child to Oregon. In his
absence, and on the basis of service by publication, the Montana
court awarded the mother both a divorce and custody of the child.
It took the mother twenty months to locate the father and child in
Oregon. Relying on Settle, the lower Oregon courts tookjurisdic
tion over the father's modification petition, held a hearing, and
awarded him custody. 258 On further appeal, the Supreme Court
of Oregon reversed, holding that because the child retained "sig
nificant connections" with Montana, Oregon could not take
jurisdiction. 259
The factual basis for this holding was not strong. The trial
court had found that the only "'significant connection' the child
now has with [Montana] is the October, 1977, decree." 260 To
conclude that the child still had a significant connection with
Montana at the time the father sought modification in Oregon,
the Oregon Supreme Court had to transform the mother's con
nections with Montana into the child's:
The mother still lived [in Montana], and the relationship
between mother and child is itself a significant one. Beyond that,
although the child was forcibly removed at [age nineteen
months], the child had other significant connections with the
state. Her older sister continued to reside in the family home
with the mother, and other friends and neighbors, who had also
been involved in the child's upbringing also continued to live
256 !d. at 968 ("A close reading of the Act discloses a schizophrenic
attempt to bring about an orderly system of decision and at the same time to
protect the best interests of the children who may be immediately before the
court. ") .
257 630 P.2d 353 (Or. 1981) (in bane).
258 In re Ross, 614 P.2d 1225 (Or. Ct. App. 1980), rev'd, 630 P.2d 353
(Or. 1981) (in bane).
259 630 P.2d at 360-61.
260 /d. at 359 (quoting trial court).
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nearby. 261

As the court forthrightly acknowledged, its decision in Ross was
based on a deliberate change in policy, in an attempt to deter
"abductions. " 262 The court abandoned the policy it had chosen
in Settle, although it still thought that "the purpose which per
vades the Act is to provide that child custody determinations will
be made in the state where there is optimum access to evi
dence,"263 and it still read sections 3 and 14 as giving a new state
jurisdiction after "successful long-term concealment following an
abduction. " 264 Contrary to its own careful analysis of the specifi
cally-applicable sections, 265 the Oregon Supreme Court in Ross
relied on the UCCJA's stated general purpose of "deterring
abductions and other unilateral removals of children undertaken
to obtain custody awards." 266
Why? The most influential factor seems to have been Professor
Bodenheimer's published criticism of the Settle decision. 267
Bodenheimer had left no doubt that she viewed Settle as based on
"an interpretation [of the UCCJA] which would encourage the
very evils the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws intended to
eradicate." 268 In response, the Oregon court held that, at least
on Ross's facts, "[a]n abduction and concealment of but 21
months does not divest the decree state of jurisdiction. " 269
A close reading of the two cases could support the conclusion
that the Oregon Supreme Court was wrong in both Settle and Ross.
To shift custody to a parent who had deliberately flouted the
authority of a foreign court, in Settle the supreme court ignored
261 /d. at 361. In evaluating this recital, it must be remembered that the
child had been taken from the mother, and remained concealed from her,
from August 28, 1977, when the child was nineteen months old, until at
least May 15, 1979, when the child was three years and four months old. /d.
at 354-55.
262 /d. at 361. One problem with this policy is distinguishing
"abductions," or wrongful interstate moves with a child, from their non
wrongful cousins.
263 /d. at 357.
264 /d. at 358.
265 See In re Settle, 556 P.2d 962 (Or. 1976) (in bane), overruled by In re
Ross, 630 P.2d 353 (Or. 1981) (in bane).
266 UCCJA § 1(5), 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 124; see Ross, 630 P.2d at 357, 361.
267 See 630 P.2d at 362-63 (quoting Bodenheimer, Progress Under the
UCCJA, supra note 5, at 988-89).
268 Bodenheimer, Progress Under the UCCJA, supra note 5, at 988.
269 630 P.2d at 363.
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strong arguments for deferring to the decree state: both language
in section 8 that would have supported dismissing the modifica
tion,270 and Oregon's own pre-UCCJA cases, which, ironically,
had helped Ehrenzweig to formulate the "clean hands doc
trine."271 In Ross, however, the Oregon court took his child from
a father who had never violated any order of which he had actual
notice. His departure with the child in the company of his eight
een-year-old girlfriend may well have startled and enraged the
mother, but it was not legally "wrongful," because prior to a cus
tody order both parents are the natural guardians of their
child. 272 But such criticism would entirely miss a much more
important point. Oregon's high court twice grappled with the
problem sections 3 and 14 pose, both times taking serious and
careful note of the statute's language and the scholarly commen
tary. It reached two contradictory, but equally well-documented
and well-thought-out conclusions, because the UCCJA supports
them both. Tellingly, other jurisdictions continued to cite Settle
approvingly even after Oregon overruled it. 273
270 Section 8(b) permits dismissal of a modification "[i]f the petitioner
has violated any ... provision of a custody decree of another state" and
dismissal is 'just and proper under the circumstances." 9 U .L.A. pt. 1, at
251. The mother had violated a court order by leaving Indiana.
Dismissal was not mandated in Settle, however, because the UCCJA only
requires a court to dismiss a modification when the modification petitioner
"has improperly removed the child from the physical custody of the person
entitled to custody or has improperly retained the child after a visit or other
temporary relinquishment of physical custody." UCCJA § 8(b), 9 U.L.A. pt.
1, at 251. At the time she removed the children from Indiana, the mother
had temporary custody of the children by court order and agreement of the
parties. See In reSettle, 556 P.2d 962, 963 (Or. 1976) (in bane), overruled by
In re Ross, 630 P.2d 353 (Or. 1981) (in bane).
271 See Ehrenzweig, Interstate Recognition, supra note 2, at 367 n.142 (citing
In re Lorenz, 241 P.2d 142, 146 (Or. 1952); Ex parte Quinn, 233 P.2d 767,
772 (Or. 1951) (dictum); Lingel v. Maudlin, 212 P.2d 751 (Or. 1949)).
272 The Oregon Supreme Court implicitly acknowledged this awkward
fact when it said that "[e]ven though father removed the child prior to the
time mother filed her suit, there is no dispute that the child was improperly
retained." Ross, 630 P.2d at 360. If there was no dispute, there should have
been: the father apparently had no notice of the Montana decree giving
custody to his ex-wife until he was arrested nearly two years later and
charged with "custodial interference" for violating it. See id. at 354-55.
273 See, e.g. Speights v. Rockwood, 451 So. 2d 1275 (La. Ct. App. 1984)
(refusing to enforce Texas custody order and exercising home state
jurisdiction although custodial mother entered Louisiana with child in
violation of a Texas restraining order); Pierce v. Pierce, 640 P.2d 899, 905
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Has the Foreign Court "Declined to Exercise jurisdiction"?

Even if the decree court both assumed jurisdiction legitimately
and still has jurisdiction "now," under UCCJA section 14 the
forum may nevertheless modify the decree if it determines that
the decree court "declined to exercise" its jurisdiction. Although
perhaps intended to apply to cases that remain "open" while not
under active consideration, this phrase can be interpreted to
allow a forum to modify any foreign decision of which it disap
proves. It need only see the foreign method of decision (perhaps
as revealed by its result) as a declination of jurisdiction.
E. E. B. v. D.A. 274 is a particularly egregious example of this
interpretive strategy. Although E.E.B. is a New Jersey case, the
story begins in Ohio, where twenty-one-year-old Doris Angle
gave birth to her daughter out of wedlock, in October, 1978.
Three days after the child's birth, Doris and the child's father sur
rendered the child for adoption to the county welfare depart
ment, and three days after that the child was placed with "pre
adoptive parents," Edwin E. Bowen and his wife. 275 Four days
later-one week after signing the surrender form, ten days after
the child's birth-Doris went to the county welfare department
with her mother and asked for her baby back. 276 The welfare
worker refused, and, on the next day, someone in the department
asked the Juvenile Court to approve the surrender. That court,
unaware that Doris had changed her mind, did so. 277
The subsequent Ohio proceedings went as swiftly as these
things ever do. Only two months elapsed before Doris Angle
found a lawyer and filed a habeas corpus petition, seeking custody
of her daughter. The Juvenile Court took three more months to
deny the writ. 278 Doris Angle's unsuccessful appeal to the Ohio
(Mont. 1982) (ordering hearing on home state of child retained in Montana
after end of visit; citation shows court's awareness that Settle was overruled
"in part"); L.F. v. G.W.F., 443 A.2d 751, 756 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1982) (declining to exercise continuing jurisdiction, citing Settle, and stating,
"We think that each case must be decided on its own facts."); Gooch v.
Gooch, 321 N.W.2d 354 (Wis. 1982) (exercising home state jurisdiction
fourteen months after custodial parent left decree state in violation of court
order).
274 446 A.2d 871 (NJ. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1210, reh 'g denied, 460
u.s. 1104 (1983).
275 !d. at 873.
276 Angle v. Children's Servs. Div., 407 N.E.2d 524, 525 (Ohio 1980).
277 !d. at 525.
278 See id.
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Court of Appeals took another four months. 279 Her further
appeal to the Ohio Supreme Court was decided about a year later,
in July, 1980. Although the court treated the question as solely
one of statutory interpretation, it was perhaps motivated also by a
desire to curb the lawlessness of Ohio county welfare offices. The
Ohio Supreme Court reversed the lower courts, holding that
Doris was "entitled to custody of her child." 280 It remanded the
case to the Juvenile Court for "proceedings consistent with this
opinion." 281 Although the Bowens urged the Ohio Supreme
Court to order, and the Juvenile Court to schedule, a best inter
ests hearing, both refused. The Juvenile Court issued the writ of
habeas corpus. 282
Had the prospective adoptive parents still been in Ohio, that
would have been the end of the matter: her daughter, then aged
twenty-one months, would have been returned to Doris Angle.
However, in October, 1979, the Bowens moved to New Jersey
with the child so that Edwin could become pastor of a church
there. 283 Rather than complying with the writ of habeas corpus,
the Bowens filed an action for custody in New Jersey six days after
the Ohio Juvenile Court had issued the writ. 284
Doris Angle's challenge to New Jersey's jurisdiction reached
the New Jersey Supreme Court in January, 1981. That court
simultaneously sent the jurisdictional question to New Jersey's
intermediate appellate court while remanding for an expedited
best interests hearing in the Court of Chancery. 285 This unusual
procedure ensured that the New Jersey Supreme Court would
give plenary consideration to the jurisdiction question only after a
New Jersey trial court had decided the merits of the case.
Not surprisingly, the Court of Chancery found it in the child's
best interests to remain with the Bowens, the only parents she
had ever known. Doris Angle neither participated in the hearing
nor challenged the finding. 286 She did, however, vigorously chalSee E. E. B., 446 A.2d at 873.
Angle, 407 N.E.2d at 527.
281 Jd.
282 E. E. B., 446 A.2d at 874.
283 The New Jersey decision mentions that the Bowens notified the
welfare department, raising the inference that they may not have notified
the Ohio courts. See id.
284 Jd.
285 Bowen v. Angle, 427 A.2d 589 (NJ. 1981).
286 E.E.B., 446 A.2d at 872.
279

280
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lenge New Jersey's right to reach the merits of the case rather
than merely enforce the Ohio decision.
Ohio was clearly the child's home state when Doris Angle filed
her habeas corpus petition. 287 The case proceeded expeditiously.
Nevertheless, driven by its concern for the child's best interests as
the Court of Chancery determined them, the New Jersey Supreme
Court affirmed the modification of Ohio's decree. It reasoned
that by refusing to hold a best interests hearing, the Juvenile
Court had "declined to exercise" its jurisdiction. 288 The New
Jersey decision relied on Ohio precedents-which it asserted the
Ohio courts had misapplied-allegedly entitling the Bowens to
such a hearing. 289 It ignored the clear meaning of the Ohio
Supreme Court's mandate and of its denial of the Bowens'
request for a hearing: that the juvenile court was required to issue
the writ forthwith. Although couched in politer terms, in effect
the New Jersey court reviewed the decision of another state's
highest court and found it in error, just as the California Court of
Appeal had done in Hopson. 290
E.E.B. is a striking case because the New Jersey Supreme Court
used the UCCJA to disregard a very recent, unquestionably valid,
judgment of a sister state. Section 14's best justification is the
need to respond to changed circumstances, yet New Jersey used it
instead to review, and reverse, another state's determination of
the best way to respond to unchanged, if tragic, facts. Once the
welfare worker sent Doris Angle away without her baby, once the
Juvenile Court denied her the speedy relief of habeas corpus, this
case could only end sadly. No court could do better than choose
between bad outcomes. The child was growing up with the
Bowens although her mother had neither surrendered her for
adoption nor been found to be unfit. 291 Neither Doris Angle nor
the Bowens had done anything wrong; the child was even more
287 At that time, her child had lived from birth with a "person acting as a
parent" in Ohio; since the child was under six months of age, this sufficed to
make Ohio the child's home state. See UCCJA § 2(5), (8)-(9), 9 U.L.A. pt. I,
at 133-34.
288 E.E.B., 446 A.2d at 877.
289 /d.
290 See In re Hopson, 168 Cal. Rptr. 345 (Ct. App. 1980); supra notes 23338 and accompanying text (discussing Hapson).
291 Indeed, the Bowens apparently never contended that Doris Angle was
unfit; they relied instead on establishing the more lenient "best interests of
the child" standard. See E.E.B., 446 A.2d at 873-74.
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blameless. Certainly returning the child to her mother, as the
Ohio Supreme Court ordered, would have been painful for the
Bowens and devastating to the child, but perhaps the court saw
no other way to bring Ohio's county welfare offices in line, to pro
tect other mothers and their babies from what amounts to little
more than kidnaping.
Whether or not one agrees with the Ohio court's balancing of
the harms, the choice was clearly committed to it. Yet the Bowens
were able to evade this choice by moving to another jurisdiction.
In New Jersey, Ohio's institutional concerns were, necessarily,
attenuated: only the child was in New Jersey; her mother and the
rogue welfare bureaucrats were not. Because of the Bowens'
move and the delays of litigation, the child had spent most of her
short life in New Jersey. 292 Principles of comity, naturally
enough, seemed much less important to the New Jersey courts
than the compelling needs of this particular New Jersey child.
4.

When Should This Court Refuse to Inquire Into a
Custody Matter? (Sections 7 and 8)

The UCCJA contains no guidance for a forum seeking to ascer
tain whether its order is likely to be respected by a foreign court.
To the extent it assumes that another state's interpretations ofthe
Act are likely to conform to its own, the forum may be deluded.
In practice, as we have seen, states often interpret the statute as
authorizing decisions that other states then judge to be improper
and disregard. 293 The difficulty is deep within the marrow of the
UCCJA: because its drafters did not recognize the inevitable
inconsistency of pursuing both flexibility and repose, the UCCJA
embraces both Ratner's stability and his flexibility goals, and so
provides no single answer in hard cases.
The UCCJA does contain, in sections 7 and 8, two provisions
that seek to guide the forum in deciding whether to decline to
exercise jurisdiction that seems otherwise proper. Section 7
reminds a court that it may dismiss a proceeding at any time upon
finding that it is an "inconvenient" forum and that another forum
is "more appropriate." 294 Although courts use this provision, in
practice dismissal on these grounds is entirely discretionary;
The child was 3 112 years old (and had been in New jersey for two
years and eight months) by the time Supreme Court made its decision.
293 See supra notes 195-292 and accompanying text.
294 UCCJA § 7, 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 233-34.
292
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appellate courts seldom reverse trial courts that conclude the
forum is not "inconvenient. " 295
Section 8 attempts to codify Ehrenzweig's "clean hands doc
trine." Although Ehrenzweig found that courts usually refused to
modify foreign orders when the petitioning party had brought the
child into the jurisdiction either " 'in defiance of a decree of a
court of competent jurisdiction of a sister state,' " 296 or " 'wrong
fully ... for the purpose of avoiding and circumventing' " a for
eign order, 297 section 8 is much narrower. It requires dismissal
only if "the petitioner, without consent of the person entitled to
custody, has improperly removed the child from the physical cus
tody of the person entitled to custody or has improperly retained
the child after a visit or other temporary relinquishment of physi
cal custody." 298 Further, it permits dismissal in only two other cir
cumstances: "[if] the petitioner for an initial decree has
wrongfully taken the child from another state or has engaged in
similar reprehensible conduct," 299 and "[i]f the petitioner has
violated any other provision of a custody decree of another
state." 300
Section 8's codification of the "clean hands doctrine" has given
rise to a very interesting phenomenon. Section 8 is almost never
cited, except by courts that are either explaining why the provi
sion does not apply to the forum, or suggesting that it does apply
to a foreign court. 301 Nevertheless, the doctrine itself is alive and
295 See, e.g., Harris v. Melnick, 552 A.2d 38 (Md. 1989) (finding no abuse
of discretion in trial court's refusal to dismiss in favor of Colorado, where
children had lived for seven years). But see Schlumpfv. Superior Court, 145
Cal. Rptr. 190 (Ct. App. 1978) (reversing trial court's exercise of
jurisdiction over child who moved away nine years before, and requiring it
to decline jurisdiction in favor of child's new home, Wyoming).
296 Ehrenzweig, Interstate Recognition, supra note 2, at 362 (quoting Ex parte
Memmi, 181 P.2d 885, 888 (Cal. Ct. App. 1947)).
297 /d. at 362 (quoting Koebrich v. Simpson, 197 P.2d 820, 821 (Cal. Dist.
Ct. App. 1948)).
298 UCCJA § 8(b), 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 251. Even then, the forum may
exercise jurisdiction if it considers that to do so would be "required in the
interest of the child." !d.
299 Jd. § 8(a).
300 /d. § 8(b).
301 See, e.g., Flannery v. Stephenson, 416 So. 2d 1034, 1039 (Ala. Civ.
App. 1982) (stating that § 8 did not apply because father abducted child
from custodial mother's relatives rather than from mother herself); In re
Leonard, 175 Cal. Rptr. 903,917 (Ct. App. 1981) (stating that§ 8(b) did not
apply, apparently because both parents engaged in wrongful conduct);
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well. Courts often refuse jurisdiction to a party who has acted
badly; they just fail to cite section 8 when they do so. 302 Instead,
they cite section 7, 303 section 14, 304 scholarly articles, 305 or the
Baird v. Baird, 374 So. 2d 60, 63 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (stating that§ 8
did not prohibit Florida from considering mother's request for modification,
although Arizona decree court found her in contempt when she refused to
return there with the child, because her original Arizona decree did not
explicitly prohibit departure from Arizona); Bullard v. Bullard, 647 P.2d
294, 301 (Haw. Ct. App. 1982) (stating that § 8(b) did not apply although
mother wrongfully retained child after end of visit because Hawaii was
decree state and § 8(b) prohibited modification of decree "of another
state"); Dobyns v. Dobyns, 650 S.W.2d 701, 707 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983)
(stating that § 8(a) did not apply because the wronged parent brought a
cross-petition for custody); People ex rei. Throneberg v. Butcher, 479
. N.Y.S.2d 762, 764 (App. Div. 1984) (suggesting that Oklahoma, where child
had been for seventeen months, "might well" decline jurisdiction under
§ 8); cf. Schoeberlein v. Rohlfing, 383 N.W.2d 386, 390-91 (Minn. Ct. App.
1986) (refusing, on other grounds, to modify Florida's decree on petition of
parent who held child in Minnesota after visit was to have ended; citing
§ 8(b) as additional support for this discretionary refusal to exercise
jurisdiction); Winkelman v. Moses, 279 N.W.2d 897, 901 (S.D. 1979)
(refusing to modify court's own decree on petition of parent who removed
child from her home in California without prior notice to her mother or her
school on grounds that California has a closer connection to the evidence,
mentioning but not relying on § 8(b)).
302 See, e.g., Kumar v. Superior Court, 652 P.2d 1003, 1011-12 (Cal.
1982) (refusing to modify New York decree in asylum state, in part because
petitioning mother moved to California without prior notice to father;
explicitly "does not reach" § 8 issue); Hafer v. Superior Court, 179 Cal.
Rptr. 132, 139 (Ct. App. 1981) (reversing assumption of "significant
contact" jurisdiction three years after child's departure, in part, to deter
abductions); Zuccaro v. Zuccaro, 407 So. 2d 389, 390 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1981) (affirming trial court's refusal to exercise jurisdiction when father
took child from mother in New York, without prior notice to her, solely to
prevent New York from becoming the "home state"); State ex rei. Laws v.
Higgins, 734 S.W.2d 274, 279 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (prohibiting trial court
from modifying Wyoming custody order because children's presence in
Missouri resulted from father's keeping them after their visit should have
ended); State ex rei. Murphy v. Boudreau, 653 P.2d 531, 533 (Okla. 1982)
(declining to exercise decree state's own continuing jurisdiction in part
because Oklahoma parent "abducted" the child from New Mexico and was
holding the child in violation of custody orders in both states); Ryan v.
Ryan, 301 N.W.2d 675, 678 (S.D. 1981) (reversing trial court's refusal to
exercise jurisdiction because father forcibly took child from mother to
Arizona before mother filed custody action in South Dakota).
303 See, e.g., Zuccaro v. Zuccaro, 407 So. 2d 389, 391 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1981).
3°4 See, e.g., Kumar v. Superior Court, 652 P.2d 1003, 1007 (Cal. 1982).
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"general principles" behind the Act. 306 In addition, many states
refuse to consider periods of time during which a child was
"wrongfully" in a party's actual custody when they assess their
own jurisdiction under sections 3 and 14. 307
According to Ehrenzweig, courts appeared to ignore the "clean
hands doctrine" in two situations: when the opposing party "had
not claimed his rights for a period and had himself violated the
prior decree," 308 and when the foreign decree deprived a now
local party of previously-granted custody "on mere ground of his
disobedience." 309 Courts interpreting the UCCJA appear to have
305 See, e.g., id. at 1007 (citing Bodenheimer, Interstate Custody, supra note
5); State ex ret. Laws v. Higgins, 734 S.W.2d 274 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (citing
Joan M. Krauskopf, Child Custody jurisdiction Under the UCCJA, 34 J. Mo. B.
383 (1978)).
306 See, e.g., Hafer v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. Rptr. 132, 138 (Ct. App.
1981); Ryan v. Ryan, 301 N.W.2d 675, 677 (S.D. 1981).
307 See, e.g., Freeman v. Freeman, 547 S.W.2d 437, 441 (Ky. 1977)
(stating that time during which child is wrongfully hidden in a state does not
count towards satisfying home state time-in-residence requirement); Curtis
v. Curtis, 574 So. 2d 24 (Miss. 1990) (ignoring twenty months' residence in
Mississippi under color of invalid temporary order); In re Nehra, 372 N.E.2d
4, 8 (N.Y. 1977) (ignoring four and one-half years); Winkelman v. Moses,
279 N.W.2d 897, 899 (S.D. 1989) (dictum) (stating that abducting parent
may not acquire home state status even after six months in state); Sams v.
Boston, 384 S.E.2d 151, 157-58 (W.Va. 1989) (ignoring three and one-half
years); cf. In re B.B.R., 566 A.2d 1032, 1042 (D.C. 1989) (Schwelb, J.,
concurring) (stating that parents should not be allowed to create
jurisdictional facts by wrongful conduct); In re Ross, 630 P.2d 353, 361 (Or.
1981) (in bane) ("It could not have been intended that unilateral removal of
the child results in the deprivation of decree state jurisdiction upon the
expiration of six months .... ").
Contra Pierce v. Pierce, 640 P.2d 899,905 (Mont. 1982) (wrongful conduct
does not affect threshold issue of whether court has jurisdiction); Nehra v.
Uhlar, 402 A.2d 264, 267-69 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div.) (six years adequate
to divest decree state of jurisdiction), cert. denied, 408 A.2d 807 (NJ. 1979).
308 Ehrenzweig, Interstate Recognition, supra note 2, at 369. Ehrenzweig
noted that
there are a number of cases in which courts have refused to
recognize or did recognize custody decrees of sister states
without apparent regard to the "clean hands" of the benefiting
parent. Close analysis, disregarding inconclusive reasoning in
the traditional terms of jurisdiction and changes of
circumstances, permits, however, classification of a large
majority of such cases under other, more realistic, equitable
considerations.

/d.
309

/d. at 370.
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re-created these two exceptions, exercising jurisdiction when
both parties have acted badly, 310 and when the foreign decree
seems "punitive." 311 Neither of these elaborations on the clean
hands doctrine has any basis in the text of section 8. 312
It appears that the courts are continuing to follow the spirit of
310

See, e.g., In re Leonard, 17 5 Cal. Rptr. 903, 917 (Ct. App. 1981)

(exercising jurisdiction although California parent had snatched child,
apparently because Georgia parent "had committed the identical act three
days before"); Houtchens v. Houtchens, 488 A.2d 726, 731 (R.I. 1985)
(exercising jurisdiction although father had twice unilaterally removed
children from Texas, apparently because mother had also abducted them
and father's "conduct stemmed from the sincere belief that [it was]
necessary to protect ... the children).
311 See, e.g., In re Lemond, 395 N.E.2d 1287, 1291 (Ind. Ct. App. 1974)
(dicta) (stating that a foreign decree designed to punish should not be given
total deference); Slidell v. Valentine, 298 N.W.2d 599, 605 (Iowa 1980)
(noting that punitive decrees are disfavored unless "just and proper under
the circumstances"); Spaulding v. Spaulding, 460 A.2d 1360, 1366-67 (Me.
1983) (defining punitive decrees as those of "a sister state [that] changes or
awards custody, without regard to the best interest of the child, solely to
punish one parent for disregarding its authority"); Holt v. District Court,
626 P.2d 1336, 1343-44 (Okla. 1981) (noting that punitive foreign orders
need not be enforced but finding order before it not punitive); Brooks v.
Brooks, 530 P.2d 547, 551 (Or. Ct. App. 1975) (deeming order granting
custody to father due to mother's interference with father's visitation rights
punitive and therefore subject to modification).
Although the text of the UCCJA contains no provision regarding punitive
decrees, the concept is discussed in the official Comment to § 13, 9 U.L.A.
pt. 1, at 277, and in two of Professor Bodenheimer's articles. See
Bodenheimer, Progress Under the UCC]A, supra note 5, at 1003-04;
Bodenheimer, Rights of Children, supra note 5, at 503-04.
312 Section 8(b) allows courts to ignore unclean hands when a child's best
interests require it, although many courts have recognized this exception
without referring to § 8. See, e.g., Kudler v. Smith, 643 P.2d 783, 785-86
(Colo. Ct. App. 1981) (modifying New York order requiring grand parental
visitation, on ground of children's best interests, although New York order
authorizing custodial father to depart with children contemplated six-week
visit rather than permanent move), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 837 (1982);
Marcrum v. Marcrum, 437 A.2d 725, 727 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1981)
(exercising "emergency" jurisdiction and ordering a hearing on abducting
father's allegations although Texas had given mother custody and earlier
asylum state, Indiana, had ordered Texas order enforced), appeal dismissed,
460 A.2d 645 (NJ. 1982); Nehra v. Uhlar, 402 A.2d 264, 268-69 (NJ. Super.
Ct. App. Div.) (requiring best interests hearing because children had been
with mother for most of their lives, although she abducted the children in
1973 from custodial father in Michigan, and father was seeking enforcement
of Michigan and New York custody decrees in his favor), cert. denied, 408
A.2d 807 (NJ. 1979).
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the "clean hands doctrine" while ignoring the letter of section 8.
Perhaps they prefer the freedom of an equitable principle to the
confines of precedent-bound statutory interpretation. Perhaps
section 8 feels to courts like a forfeiture provision. The section is
complicated and technical, and its terms often seem to conflict
with the courts' own sense of when they should, or should not,
exercise jurisdiction. When they do not ignore it entirely, courts
read section 8 narrowly, just as they tend to interpret statutes of
limitation narrowly. At the same time, they are developing flexi
ble, discretionary methods for punishing those "abductions" that
either seem unjustifiable or have become too permanent to undo.
As this review of the courts' interpretations of the UCCJA's key
provisions, sections 3, 6, 7, 8, 12, 13, 14, and 15, has demon
strated, the practice of concurrent jurisdiction continues to flour
ish. Thus, even after the UCCJA was widely adopted, in every
contested custody case the possibility that a new forum would
both take jurisdiction and reach a more favorable result remained
clearly present. This possibility continued to encourage parents
to "seize and run." Early studies of the Act's operation recog
nized this, although they tended to attribute the problem to
errors in interpretation caused by unfamiliarity with the Act. 313
Professor Bodenheimer's published exegeses of the UCCJA, 314
which have been influential with courts, exemplify rather than
remedy the statute's indeterminacy. In reviewing early cases
under the statute, she decried two errors that she claimed the
courts were making: taking jurisdiction after an "abduction," and
enforcing "punitive decrees." She completely failed to recognize
that these are two ways of looking at the same situation.
Bodenheimer's first concern was to deter unauthorized exten
sions of visits and "abductions," a term she used loosely to
include removals before any custody decree had been made, 315
and, sometimes, extended even to moves by a custodial parent
that were merely unauthorized by the decree court. In aid of that
goal, she said that the UCCJA gave the child's old home exclusive
continuing jurisdiction that persists so long as one of the parents
lives in the old state-even after a child "stays in a [new] state for
See, e.g., Bates & Holmes, supra note 5, at 77; Bodenheimer, Progress
Under the UCCJA, supra note 5, at 985.
·
314 See Bodenheimer, Interstate Custody, supra note 5; Bodenheimer,
Progress Under the UCCJA, supra note 5.
315 See Bodenheimer, Progress Under the UCCJA, supra note 5, at 989-90.
313
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six months or more as a visitor or victim of abduction," and even
if the new state has "technically" become the home state. 316
However, she was also, and equally, concerned that no other state
enforce a "punitive" decree. She defined a "punitive" decree as
one made to punish a parent for leaving the decree state with the
child, or to redress a wrongful removal. 317 Taken together,
Bodenheimer's interpretations of the UCCJA encourage the
decree state to vindicate its "continuing jurisdiction" by entering
a custody order that the asylum state is then encouraged to disre
gard as "punitive."
While the UCCJA's sponsors continued to press for more states
to adopt it, 318 and while Professor Bodenheimer continued to
explain her ideas about its proper interpretation, Congress began
to study the problem. The next section describes the process that
led Congress to enact federal law covering approximately the
same ground as the UCCJA-the Parental Kidnaping Prevention
Act (PKPA}. 319
IV.

THE PARENTAL KIDNAPING PREVENTION

A.

AcT

The Development of the PKPA

In the late 1970s, in connection with its study of comprehensive
federal criminal code reform, 32° Congress began to consider leg316 See id. at 988. This was the pronouncement that influenced the
Oregon court in Ross. See supra notes 257-73 and accompanying text
(discussing Ross). In a later article, Bodenheimer attributed this rule of
exclusive continuing jurisdiction to "state law" that, she said, both pre
existed and survived the UCCJA's enactment. See Bodenheimer, Interstate
Custody, supra note 5, at 213.
317 Bodenheimer, Progress Under the UCCJA, supra note 5, at 1003-04.
318 See, e.g., Parental Kidnaping: Hearing on H.R. 1290 Before the Subcomm. on
Crime of the House Comm. on the judiciary, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 101 (1980)
[hereafter Hearing on H. R. 1290] (American Bar Association House of

Delegates, Resolution I, App. A (Aug. 1978)) (encouraging state legislatures
to adopt the UCCJA "at the earliest opportunity").
319 Pub. L. No. 96-611 § 6-10, 94 Stat. 3568 (codified in scattered
sections of 28 and 42 U.S.C.).
320 See Peter E. Quint, The Separation of Powers Under Nixon: Reflections on
Constitutional Liberties and the Rule of Law, 1981 DuKE LJ. 1, 59 (discussing
Nixon administration bills that would have criminalized disclosure of certain
classified government information); Louis B. Schwartz, Reform of the Federal
Criminal Laws: Issues, Tactics, and Prospects, LAw & CoNTEMP. PRoss., Winter
1977, at 1, 2 (describing "awesome scope and complexity" of controversial
federal criminal law reform proposal). The original criminal code reform
bill was S. 1400, 93d Cong., lst Sess. (1973). Succeeding bills included S. 1,
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islation to deter a parent from taking her children across state
lines in defiance of a court's order or the other parent's wishes. 321
In early 1977, Senator Moss introduced a bill that would have
required states to accord full faith and credit to custody
decrees. 322 In 1978, at Senator Wallop's suggestion, similar lan
guage was added to S. 1437, the criminal code reform bill passed
by the Senate (but not the House) in 1978. 323 For the next two
years, Congress studied many bills that dealt with the "parental
kidnaping" problem. The provisions of these bills fell generally
into four categories.
One category of proposals would have made "parental kidnap
ing" a federal crime. 324 Professor Bodenheimer, 325 the American
94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); H.R. 6869, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); S.
1437, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); S. 1722, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1979); S.
1630, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
321 H.R. 762, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (would make parental
kidnaping a crime). A number of similar legislative proposals were
introduced in that same legislative session and studied in connection with
omnibus criminal code reform. See, e.g. , Legislation to Revise and Recodify
Federal Criminal Laws: Hearings on H.R. 6869 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal
justice of the House Comm. on the judiciary (pts. 1-3), 95th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess.
720, 727 (1977-1978) [hereafter Hearings on H.R. 6869] (statement of
Children's Rights, Inc.).
322 H.R. 988, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
323 See Russell M. Coombs, The "Snatched" Child is Halfway Home in
Congress, 11 FAM. L.Q 407 (1978), reprinted in Hearings on H.R. 6869, supra
note 321, at 1002-18.
324 The proper definition of "parental kidnaping" was hotly contested.
Parents and their advocates wanted Congress to treat any taking that
surprised or angered the other parent as a federal crime. See, e.g., Parental
Kidnaping Prevention Act of 1979, S. 105: joint Hearing on S. 105 Before the
Subcomm. on Criminal justice of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary and the Subcomm.
on Child and Human Development of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human
Resources, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 70, 71 (1980) [hereafter joint Hearing on S.
105] (statement of Arnold I. Miller, President, Children's Rights, Inc.)
(defining "child-snatching" as "a concealment of a child from another
person" and estimating that 70% take place before any custody order is
issued). In contrast, the Justice Department wanted to limit federal
involvement to cases in which a parent both violated a court's custody
decree and posed a serious risk of physical harm to the child. See Hearing on
H.R. 1290, supra note 318, at 81-84 (statement of Mark M. Richard, Deputy
Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division).
325 See Parental Kidnaping, 1979: Hearing on Examination of the Problem of
"Child Snatching" Before the Subcomm. on Child and Human Development of the
Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 47, 47, 5355 ( 1979) [hereafter Hearing on Child Snatching] (statement of Brigitte M.
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Bar Association, 326 a non-profit organization called Children's
Rights, Inc., 327 and individual parents 328 supported these pro
posals. Strongly opposed by Professor Russell Coombs, 329 the
Justice Department, 330 and the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(F.B.I.) 331 as unduly harsh and a misuse of scarce resources, how
ever, they never became law. Nonetheless, they left their mark on
the PKPA. The PKPA "interprets" the federal crime of Interstate
Flight to Avoid Prosecution to apply to parents subject to state
felony prosecution for kidnaping their children. 332 Congress
Bodenheimer, Professor of Law, University of California, Davis); Hearings on
H. R. 6869, supra note 321, at 2561, 2563 (statement of Brigitte M.
Bodenheimer, Professor of Law, University of California, Davis).
326 See Hearing on H.R. 1290, supra note 318, at 99-107 (statement of
Doris J. Freed, Chairperson, Comm. on Custody, and Council Member,
Family Law Section, American Bar Association, on Behalf of American Bar
Association);joint Hearing on S. 105, supra note 324, at 52-68 (statement of
Doris ]. Freed, Chairperson, Comm. on Custody, American Bar
Association).
327 See, e.g., Hearing on H.R. 1290, supra note 318, at 39-80 (testimony of
Children's Rights, Inc.); Hearings on H.R. 6869, supra note 321, at 720-31
(statement of Children's Rights, Inc.).
328 See, e.g., Parental Kidnaping Prevention Act of 1979, S. 105: Addendum to
Joint Hearing on S. 105 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal justice of the Senate Comm.
on the judiciary and the Subcomm. on Child and Human Development of the Senate
Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 309-12, 319, 32325 ( 1980) [hereafter Addendum to joint Hearing on S. 105] (letter to Elizabeth
Nichols; letters from Gerald F. Klejnot, Sr., Margaret & David Strickland);
Hearing on H.R. 1290, supra note 318, at 35-38 (prepared statement of
Marilyn W. Armstrong).
329 See joint Hearing on S. 105, supra note 324, at 143, 154 (prepared
statement of Russell M. Coombs); Coombs, supra note 323, at 415-17.
330 See Hearing on H.R. 1290, supra note 318, at 81-84 (statement of Mark
M. Richard, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division); joint
Hearing on S. 105, supra note 324, at 21-24, 47-50 (statements of Paul R.
Michel, Acting Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice); see also
Addendum to joint Hearing on S. 105, supra note 328, at 101 (additional
submission of Russell M. Coombs: letter from Assistant Attorney General
Patricia M. Wald to Representative Peter W. Rodino and attachments
(n.d.)).
331 See Hearing on H.R. 1290, supra note 318, at 84-86 (statement of
Executive Assistant Director Francis M. Mullen,Jr.);joint Hearing on S. 105,
supra note 324, at 24-27 (statement of Lee Colwell, Executive Assistant
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation).
332 See supra note 10. This approach was suggested by Children's Rights,
Inc. See joint Hearing on S. 105, supra note 324, at 77, 79 (prepared statement
of Children's Rights, Inc., presented by Arnold I. Miller, President, and Rae
Gummell, Vice President).
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intended to enlist the F.B.I.'s assistance in locating abducting par
ents, contrary to pre-PKPA practice, but to stop short of federally
prosecuting the parents. 333 The provision therefore met many of
the objections of the opponents of criminal sanctions while giving
the proponents some of what they had hoped to gain.
The second category of proposals would have required the Par
ent Locator Service to assist both official and private searches for
abducting parents. 334 The Service, ajoint federal-state effort, was
originally established to assist state welfare departments in forc
ing absent parents to support their children. The Department of
Health and Human Services opposed its use to locate abducting
parents because to do so would be expensive and make parents'
tax records, the primary source of location information, too
widely available. 335 Nevertheless, the PKPA made the Service
available for official searches. 336
The third category consisted of bills that would have amended
the diversity jurisdiction statute337 to give United States District
333 See Hearing on H.R. 1290, supra note 318, at 86, 95-99 (testimony of
Francis Mullen, Jr., Executive Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of
Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice).
334 See, e.g., S. 105, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), quoted in Hearing on Child
Snatching, supra note 325, at 3, 12-13. Senate Bill 105 would have required
assistance to "an agent or attorney of any state," "any court having
jurisdiction to make or enforce a child custody determination, or any agent
of such court," "any parent, legal guardian, attorney, or agent of a child
sought to be located," and "any agent or attorney of the United States," for
the purpose of enforcing federal criminal provisions or of "making or
enforcing a child custody determination." S. 105, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4
(1979).
These proposals were pressed by Children's Rights, Inc. See, e.g., joint
Hearing on S. 105, supra note 324, at 77, 79 (prepared statement of
Children's Rights, Inc., presented by Professor Arnold I. Miller, President,
and Rae Gummell, Vice President); Hearings on H. R. 6869, supra note 321, at
720, 725 (statement Children's Rights, Inc.). Professor Bodenheimer also
supported these proposals. See Hearings on H. R. 6869, supra note 321, at
2561, 2563 (statement of Brigitte M. Bodenheimer, Professor of Law,
University of California, Davis).
335 See Hearing on H.R. 1290, supra note 318, at 86, 89-91 (testimony of
Louis B. Hays, Deputy Director, Office of Child Support Enforcement,
Department of Health and Human Resources) (expressing concerns about
added cost of additional searches and about privacy implications of giving
searchers access to federal tax returns, the primary source of location
information).
336 See supra note 10.
337 28 U.S.C. § l332(a).
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Courts the power to enforce valid state custody orders. 338 It was
opposed by the Justice Department because it would have
"increase[d] the workload of the federal courts" and for other,
technical, reasons, 339 and it did not become law.
The final category consisted ofseveral bills developing the pro
posals of Senators Moss and Wallop to implement the Full Faith
and Credit Clause by requiring states to enforce one another's
custody decrees. This approach was endorsed by the American
Bar Association 340 and Children's Rights, Inc., 341 and it had many
academic supporters. Professor Bodenheimer thought it would
ensure that other states would enforce the properly-made decrees
of every state that had adopted the UCCJA. 342 In addition, with
out recognizing the inherent inconsistency, she thought a federal
statute could be used to close "loopholes" in the UCCJA that per
mitted parents to evade its strictures, 343 although the PKPA could
only close those loopholes by commanding courts to refuse full
faith and credit to some custody decrees authorized by the
UCCJA. Professor Coombs thought that placing the UCCJA's
provisions on jurisdiction and interstate recognition of custody
338 See H.R. 9913, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H.R. 11273, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1978); H.R. 11722, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); H.R. 325, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); see alw Hearing on H.R. 1290, supra note 318, at 9-16
(testimony of Hon. Hamilton Fish, Jr., Representative in Congress from the
25th Congressional District of the State of New York) (advocating Senate
adoption of H.R. 325).
339 See Refonn of the Federal Criminal Laws: Hearings on S. 1722 and S. 1723
Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary (pt. XIV), 96th Con g., 1st Sess. 10628,
10629-30 (1979) [hereafter Hearings on S. 1722 and 1723] (letter from
Assistant Attorney General Patricia M. Wald to Hon. Peter W. Rodino,
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary (Sept. 20, 1978); submitted by
Professor Russell Coombs).
340 See Hearing on H.R. 1290, supra note 318, at 101 (American Bar
Association House of Delegates, Resolution II, app. A (Aug. 1978)).
341 Children's Rights, Inc. believed that requiring courts to give full faith
and credit to custody decrees would produce "consistency and uniformity in
the enforcement of custody decrees." Hearings on H. R. 6869, supra note 321,
at 720, 725 (statement of Children's Rights, Inc.).
342 See Hearing on Child Snatching, supra note 325, at 50-51 (statement of
Brigitte M. Bodenheimer, Professor of Law, University of California, Davis).
Similarly, it was argued that such federal legislation would oblige all the
states to follow the provisions of the UCCJA, whether or not they had
actually adopted it. See, e.g.,joint Hearing on S. 105, supra note 324, at 55-56
(prepared statement of Doris J. Freed).
343 See Hearing on Child Snatching, supra note 325, at 51-52 (statement of
Brigitte M. Bodenheimer, Professor of Law, University of California, Davis).
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decrees within federal law would "ensure that they are inter
preted and applied by the states with ... uniformity." 344 In addi
tion, Professor Coombs, Professor Bodenheimer, and Dr. Doris
Jonas Freed all thought that the Moss/Wallop approach would
empower the victims of pre-decree abductions. If a parent took a
child away before any custody order had been made, they
believed that the remaining parent could completely protect her
custody rights by immediately obtaining a custody order; they
thought full faith and credit would require all other states to
enforce such an order. 345 Congress enacted the Moss/Wallop
approach as the main part of the PKPA. 346
Early versions of the Moss/Wallop proposals contained two
interesting variations, both ultimately rejected because they
seemed to invite relitigation rather than enforcement. The first
variation relieved states of the duty to enforce those custody
decrees found to be "inconsistent with [the enforcing state's]
strong public policy." This language was strongly opposed by
both the Justice Department347 and Professor Bodenheimer; 348
Hearings on S. 1722 and 1723, supra note 339, at 10669, 10670
(statement of Associate Professor Russell M. Coombs, School of Law,
Rutgers University, Camden, New Jersey); see also joint Hearing on S. 105,
supra note 318, at 143, 145 (prepared statement of Russell M. Coombs).
345 See Addendum to joint Hearing on S. 105, supra note 328, at 267, 272
(questions of Senator Mathias and Responses of Russell M. Coombs);
Hearing on H.R. 1290, supra note 318, at 102, 103-04 (testimony of Doris].
Freed, Chairperson, Comm. on Custody and Council Member, Family Law
Section, American Bar Association, on behalf of American Bar Association);
Hearing on Child Snatching, supra note 325, at 60, 63-64 (answers by Brigitte
M. Bodenheimer, Professor of Law, University of California, Davis to
questions by Senator Cranston following hearing in Los Angeles). The
UCCJA by itself could not always ensure such a result. See, e.g., Houtchens
v. Houtchens, 488 A.2d 726 (R.I. 1985) (awarding custody to parent who
took children without consent, prior to any custody decree, even though
UCCJA governed in both states); supra notes 201-07 and accompanying text
(discussing Houtchens).
346 See supra note 10. The PKPA was attached as a rider to a bill
providing for Medicaid coverage of pneumococcal vaccine. See Pub. L. No.
96-611, 94 Stat. 3568.
347 See, e.g., Hearings on S. 1722 and 1723, supra note 339, at 10628-35
(letter from Assistant Attorney General Patricia M. Wald to Hon. Peter W.
Rodino, Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary (Sept. 20, 1978)) (stating
that provision might be unconstitutional, would extend federal control into
state law of child custody, and would make criminal enforcement turn on a
subjective civil standard).
348 See Hearings on H. R. 6869, supra note 321, at 2561, 2562 (statement of
344
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they successfully argued that the exception would swallow the
rule. The second rejected variation relieved states of the duty to
enforce "punitive" custody decrees. Professor Bodenheimer ini
tially supported a narrow formulation of this rule, 349 but reluc
tantly withdrew her support in the face of the Justice
Department's strenuous objections. 350 Professor Coombs also
opposed this exception. 351
The PKPA was developed from the same set of beliefs and
understandings that produced the UCCJA, and by means of a
similar process of "interest group liberalism. " 352 Intended to
supplement rather than supersede the UCCJA, its provisions are
similar although not identical. It became effective on July 1,
Brigitte M. Bodenheimer, Professor of Law, University of California, Davis)
(noting that public policy "exception" would "annihilate the principle offull
faith and credit").
349 H.R. 6869, 95th Con g., l st Sess. ( 1977) would have relieved a state
from enforcing a foreign custody decision when "the primary basis for the
child custody determination was punishment of a contestant and not the
best interests of the child." Professor Bodenheimer thought that inviting
the second court to reexamine the best interests of the child "would open a
large loophole that could undermine the rule of full faith and credit to a
considerable extent." She suggested the following language as a safe
substitute: "the primary basis for a court's modification of its own prior
custody determination was the imposition of a disciplinary measure upon a
contestant." Hearings on H.R. 6869, supra note 321, at 2561, 2562-63
(statement of Brigitte M. Bodenheimer, Professor of Law, University of
California, Davis); see also Hearing on Child Snatching, supra note 325, at 47, 48
(statement of Brigitte M. Bodenheimer, Professor of Law, University of
California, Davis) (suggesting that definition of "custody determination"
specify "modifications other than punitive modifications" (emphasis added)).
350 See Hearings on S. 1722 and 1723, supra note 339, at 10628, 10630,
10632 n.1 (letter from Assistant Attorney General Patricia M. Wald to Hon.
Peter W. Rodino, Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary (Sept. 20, 1978))
(stating that provision would encourage second state to re-determine child's
best interests, would create substantive federal standard in area of
traditionally exclusive state concern, and would make criminal enforcement
turn on subjective civil standard); Hearing on Child Snatching, supra note 325,
at 60, 61 (answers of Brigitte M. Bodenheimer, University of California,
Davis to questions by Senator Cranston following hearing in Los Angeles).
351 See Hearings on S. 1722 and S. 1723, supra note 339, at 10669, 10671
(statement of Professor Russell M. Coombs, School of Law, Rutgers
University, Camden, New Jersey) (stating that exception would be a "federal
encroachment on the right of each state to determine what specific factors
would be given what weight in awarding or changing custody").
352 See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
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1981. 353 Although many courts considering interstate custody
problems since the PKPA's enactment have simply ignored the
Act, 354 many others have struggled to reconcile its commands
with those of the UCCJA. The next section examines these
courts' interpretations of the PKPA, illustrating the Act's crucial
indeterminacies.
B.

The Crucial Indeterminacies of the PKPA

If the central question for understanding the UCCJA was,
"When may a court make a custody order?," the analogous ques
tion for understanding the PKPA is, "When must a court give full
faith and credit to a custody order?" For expository purposes,
this question may usefully be broken down into two subsidiary
questions: (1) When must a court enforce a foreign custody
order?; and (2) When may a court, after an independent inquiry,
modify a foreign custody order? This section examines the state
courts' interpretations of the PKPA's answers to these two ques
tions, and the PKPA's consequent failure to "close loopholes"
and achieve the reformers' stability goals.
1.

When Must a Court Enforce a Foreign Custody Order?

Like the UCCJA, the PKPA applies to both custody and visitaPub. L. No. 96-611 § 2, 94 Stat. 3567.
See, e.g., Waller v. Richardson, 757 P.2d 1036 (Alaska 1988); Szmyd v.
Szmyd, 641 P.2d 14 (Alaska 1982); Bell v. Bell, 705 S.W.2d 891 (Ark. 1986);
Davis v. Davis, 687 S.W.2d 843 (Ark. 1985); Bakke v. District Court, 719
P.2d 313 (Colo. 1986) (en bane); E.P. v. District Court, 696 P.2d 254 (Colo.
1985) (en bane); McCarron v. District Court, 671 P.2d 953 (Colo. 1983) (en
bane); Mondy v. Mondy, 428 So. 2d 235 (Fla. 1983); Biggers v. Biggers, 650
P.2d 692 (Idaho 1982); In re Hubbard, 315 N.W.2d 75 (Iowa 1982); Bills v.
Murdock, 654 P.2d 406 (Kan. 1982); Perry v. Perry, 639 S.W.2d 780 (Ky.
1982); Wood v. Graham, 633 S.W.2d 404 (Ky. 1982); Harris v. Melnick, 552
A.2d 38 (Md. 1989); Stowers v. Humphrey, 576 So. 2d 138 (Miss. 1991);
Castleberry v. Castleberry, 541 So. 2d 457 (Miss. 1989); Roberts v. Fuhr,
523 So. 2d 20 (Miss. 1987); Walker v. Luckey, 474 So. 2d 608 (Miss. 1985);
Clarke v. Clarke, 496 A.2d 361 (N.H. 1985); Mattleman v. Bandler, 461 A.2d
561 (N.H. 1983); State ex rei. Aycock v. Mowrey, 544 N.E.2d 657 (Ohio
1989); Walling v. Walling 727 P.2d 586 (Okla. 1986); Kretzer v. Kretzer,
506 A.2d 81 (R.I. 1986); Knoth v. Knoth, 377 S.E.2d 340 (S.C. 1989);
Coppedge v. Harding, 714 P.2d 1121 (Utah 1985); Angell v. Sixth judicial
Dist., 656 P.2d 405 (Utah 1982); Duval v. Duval, 546 A.2d 1357 (Vt. 1988);
Carr v. Carr, 375 S.E.2d 190 (W. Va. 1988); Brockman v. Hegner, 317
S.E.2d 516 (W.Va. 1984); Rosics v. Heath, 746 P.2d 1284 (Wyo. 1987).
353
354
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tion orders. 355 Unlike the UCCJA, the PKPA does not distinguish
between final decrees and orders in pending cases. Because it
defines a "custody determination" to include "permanent and
temporary orders, and initial orders and modifications," 356 the
PKPA requires courts to enforce both temporary and final orders,
provided only that they are "made consistently with the provi
sions of [the PKPA] by a court of another State." 357
To be consistent with the PKPA, a custody determination must
have been made by a court with jurisdiction under its own law. 358
In this, the PKPA differs from the UCCJA, which assesses the
decree state's jurisdiction under the forum's law. 359 In actual
practice, however, the difference may be more formal than real.
Although an asylum court interpreting the PKPA may sometimes
defer to the decree state's own jurisdictional assessment, 360 more
often it will make an independent evaluation. 361 Indeed, under
the PKPA the asylum court may well decide that the decree
court's assessment of its own jurisdiction was erroneous. 362
Thus, even under the PKPA, asylum courts remain able to avoid
enforcing foreign decisions when they so choose.
To be consistent with the PKPA, a foreign decree must also be
made in one of five sets of factual situations. 363 These are based
355 Compare PKPA § 8(a), 94 Stat. 3569 (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738A(b)(2)) with UCCJA § 2(1), 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 133.
356 PKPA § 8(a), 94 Stat. 3569 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(b)(3)).
357 PKPA § 8(a), 94 Stat. 3569 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(a)).
358 See PKPA § 8(a), 94 Stat. 3570 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c)(1))

("has jurisdiction under the law of such State").
359 See supra notes 220-.21 and accompanying text.
360 See, e.g., Bahr v. Bahr, 439 N.Y.S.2d 265 (Fam. Ct. 1981) (deferring to
Connecticut's assessment of its own jurisdiction), aff'd, 458 N.Y.S.2d 247
(App. Div.), appeal denied, 454 N.E.2d 1310 (N.Y. 1983).
361 See, e.g., Murphy v .. Woerner, 748 P.2d 749 (Alaska 1988) (assessing
Kansas's jurisdiction under Kansas statute and cases); Barndt v. Barndt, 580
A.2d 320 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (assessing North Dakota's jurisdiction under
North Dakota law); Arbogast v. Arbogast, 327 S.E.2d 675 (W. Va. 1984)
(assessing Kansas's jurisdiction under Kansas statute and cases).
362 See, e.g., Pierce v. Pierce, 640 P.2d 899, 904-05 (Mont. 1982) (holding
trial court erred in telephoning Kentucky court to find out if it asserted
jurisdiction, and remanding for full hearing on whether Kentucky court has
jurisdiction under Kentucky law); Serna v. Salazar, 651 P.2d 1292, 1295
(N.M. 1982) (determining that California did not have jurisdiction under its
own law); Debra S. v. Roger S., 455 N.Y.S.2d 723, 725 (Fam. Ct. 1982)
(same).
363 See PKPA § 8(a), 94 Stat. 3570 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1738A(c)(2));
infra note 366.
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on UCCJA section 3 but differ from it in two ways. First, the
PKPA requires the forum to enforce custody determinations
made by courts with "significant contacts" jurisdiction only if the
child had no home state. Second, the PKPA adopted
Bodenheimer's concept of "continuing jurisdiction." These
deserve separate discussion.
a.

The PKPA Favors Home State jurisdiction

In early versions of the Moss/Wallop proposal, the problem of
identifying those decrees that deserved enforcement had been
solved by adopting the language of UCCJA section 3. A custody
decree was entitled to full faith and credit if it had been made by a
court with "jurisdiction under the law of such state," and if one of
the jurisdictional requirements of UCCJA section 3 were met. 364
At Professor Bodenheimer's suggestion, however, this language
was altered to close a "loophole" used by "persons who remove a
child from the home state prior to custody litigation." 365 As
enacted, the PKPA favors home state jurisdiction by requiring
courts to grant full faith and credit to custody decrees that were
made pursuant to "significant contact" jurisdiction, only if the
child had no home state. 366
See, e.g., S. 105, 96th Con g., 1st Sess. § 3(a) ( 1979).
Hearing on Child Snatching, supra note 325, at 50, 51-2 (statement of
Brigitte M. Bodenheimer, Professor of Law, University of California, Davis).
Professor Coombs agreed with Professor Bodenheimer's suggestion and
proposed the language that was eventually enacted into law. See Addendum to
joint Hearing on S. 105, supra note 328, at 267, 270 (questions of Senator
Mathias and responses of Russell M. Coombs);joint Hearing on S. 105, supra
note 324, at 143, 145 n.16 (prepared statement of Russell M. Coombs).
366 The PKPA requires that "[t]he appropriate authorities of every State
... enforce according to its terms, and ... not modify except as provided in
subsection (f) of this section, any child custody determination made
consistently with the provisions of this section by a court of another State."
PKPA § 8(a), 94 Stat. 3569 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(a)). It defines as
"consistent with the provisions of this section" only those determinations
made by a court with jurisdiction "under the law of such state," PKPA
§ 8(a), 94 Stat. 3570 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c)(1)), and where
(2) one of the following conditions is met:
364

365

(B)(i) it appears that no other State would have jurisdiction under
subparagraph (A), and (ii) it is in the best interest of the child
that a court of such State assume jurisdiction because (I) the
child and his parents, or the child and at least one
contestant, have a significant connection with such State other
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This provision is often explained by saying that the PKPA gives
the home state exclusive jurisdiction. While that is a much sim
pler and clearer explanation than the one I have just given, it is
also inaccurate. The PKPA is federal law and therefore can
neither grant nor withhold state jurisdiction; that is a matter for
state law. All the PKPA can do, and all that it does, is specify
which state decrees are entitled to enforcement under the Full
Faith and Credit Clause. The PKPA neither requires a state to
exercize jurisdiction only when its orders would be entitled to full
faith and credit 367 nor prohibits a state from enforcing (as a mat
ter of comity) a custody decree not entitled to full faith and credit.
It is in this limited sense alone that the PKPA prefers home state
over significant contacts jurisdiction.
Although courts routinely enforce initial decrees made by
courts with home state jurisdiction, 368 they occasionally refuse to
do so. The most commonly cited statutory ground is failure to
give proper notice. The PKPA requires that "reasonable notice
and opportunity to be heard" be afforded any parent, contestant,
or person with actual physical custody of a child, before a custody
order is entered. 369 If one parent disappears with the child
before any custody action has been filed, the remaining parent is
often advised to seek custody immediately. 37° Frequently, how
ever, he or she finds it difficult to serve process on, or even give
actual notice to, the absent parent. Although courts sometimes
than mere physical presence in such State, and (II) there is
available in such State substantial evidence concerning the
child's present or future care, protection, training, and
personal relationships

PKPA § 8(a), 94 Stat. 3570 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c)(2)) (emphasis
added).
367 See, e.g., Pazder v. Pazder, 556 N.Y.2d 427 (App. Div. 1990) (mem.)
(permitting father to institute action for, inter alia, custody of children who
have been living in Florida with their mother for eleven months over
mother's objection that PKPA prohibits this).
368 See, e.g., Michell v. Michell, 437 So. 2d 122 (Ala. Civ. App. 1982)
(enforcing Texas custody order because Texas had been child's home state
within six months of commencement of action although father had taken
him to Alabama eleven days before mother filed Texas proceeding).
369 PKPA § 8(a), 94 Stat. 3570 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § l738A(c)); cJ.
UCCJA § 5, 9 U.L.A. pt. I, at 212-13 ("Notice required for the exercise of
jurisdiction over a person outside this State shall be given m a manner
reasonably calculated to give actual notice .... ").
370 See supra note 345 and accompanying text.
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enforce foreign custody orders entered ex parte in such circum
stances on the ground that the absent parent was not reasonably
entitled to any notice, 371 some courts balk, especially when the
remaining parent did not act quickly. 372
b.

The PKPA Recognizes "Continuing jurisdiction"

The UCCJA requires that a court wishing to modify its own
decree apply the same jurisdictional tests it needed to apply to
enter an initial decree. 373 In contrast, the PKPA explicitly
adopted Bodenheimer's concept of "continuing jurisdiction." 374
Once a state court has made an initial custody decree that is "con
sistent" with the PKPA's standards, only that court's orders are
entitled to full faith and credit-provided that the decree court
continues to have jurisdiction under its own law and remains the
residence of either the child or any contestant. 375
Decree courts have not been reluctant to interpret the PKPA's
371 See, e.g., Siler v. Storey, 677 S.W.2d 504 (Tex. I984) (requiring
enforcement of Pennsylvania custody decree made without service on father
because he had abducted child and was hiding from process server; no
explicit PKPA analysis); cf. Elder v. Park, 7I7 P.2d II32 (N.M. I986)
(deferring to New Hampshire's jurisdiction because mother filed post
abduction action there, even though New Hampshire's ex parte temporary
order was unenforceable and New Mexico court could properly modify it to
give father summer visit with child).
372 See, e.g., Sherry Ann F. v. Bennett S., 502 N.Y.S.2d 383 (Fam. Ct.
I986) (refusing to enforce order entered without notice to father; mother
filed California action II months after father's departure with child);
Virginia E.E. v. Alberto S.P., 440 N.Y.S.2d 979 (Fam. Ct. I98I) (refusing to
enforce ex parte California custody decree dated August 8, 1977; father
disappeared with child in I975).
373 UCCJA § 3(a), 9 U.L.A. pt. I, at I43.
374 Professor Bodenheimer's articles had urged a similar interpretation
of the UCCJA. See, e.g., Bodenheimer, Progress Under the UCC}A, supra note 5,
at 984. According to Professor Foster, she was influential in persuading
Congress to enact the concept into federal law. See Foster, supra note I2, at
303 n.33.
375 Subsection (c)(2)(E) refers to "continuing jurisdiction," which
subsection (d) defines as follows: "The jurisdiction of a court of a State
which has made a child custody determination consistently with the
provisions of this section continues as long as the requirement of subsection
(c)(l) of this section continues to be met and such State remains the
residence of the child or of any contestant." PKPA § 8(a), 94 Stat. 3570-7I
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § I738A(d)). Subsection (c)(l) merely requires that
the state have jurisdiction "under the law of such State," i.e., under its own
law. PKPA § 8(a), 94 Stat. 3570 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § I738A(c)(I)).

HeinOnline -- 25 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 926 1991-1992

1992]

Tragedy of the Interstate Child

927

language as authorizing them, long after the child has moved
away, to make custody orders that they expect to be exclusively
entitled to full faith and credit. 376 After all, many courts asserted
continuing jurisdiction on the strength of the UCCJA alone. 377
Under the UCCJA, however, asylum courts were much less likely
to recognize a decree court's continuing jurisdiction than a
decree court was to assert it. 378 The PKPA seems at first glance to
have made a difference here. Asylum courts using the PKPA to
analyze the continuing jurisdiction issue usually recognize the
decree state's contin.uing jurisdiction. 379 However, asylum courts
376 See, e.g., Russo v. Myers, 588 So. 2d 887 (Ala. Civ. App. 1990) (decree
state exercising jurisdiction to modify nearly two years after custodial
mother and child moved to Florida, and enforcing modification by contempt
three years after); Robertson v. Robertson, 532 So. 2d 1014 (Ala. Civ. App.
1988) (decree state asserting continuing jurisdiction four years after
children left state); O'Daniel v. Walker, 686 S.W.2d 805 (Ark. Ct. App.
1985) (decree state exercising jurisdiction to modify three years after
custodial mother and children left state, and punishing noncompliance with
contempt four years after); Jesus A. v. Lizette A., 546 N.Y.S.2d 284 (Fam.
Ct. 1989) (asserting jurisdiction to modify its custody order seven months
after custodial mother and children moved to Puerto Rico); Hall v. Hall, No.
1401, 1991 WL 46676 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 8, 1991) (decree state asserting
jurisdiction to modify 2 1/2 years after custodial mother and child moved to
Georgia); Escudero v. Henry, 395 S.E.2d 793 (W.Va. 1990) (denying writ of
prohibition to custodial mother to prevent exercise of modification
jurisdiction nearly two years after she and the children moved to Kentucky).
But see, e.g., Ziegler v. Ziegler, 691 P.2d 773 (Idaho Ct. App. 1985)
(holding that decree state may decline to exercise continuing jurisdiction
when remaining parent has voluntarily litigated custody in child's new
home); Nielsen v. Nielsen, 4 72 So. 2d 133 (La. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that
decree state may decline to exercise continuing jurisdiction when child, who
has been living in Texas for two years, has closer connections there);
Patricia R. v. Andrew W., 467 N.Y.S.2d 322 (Fam. Ct. 1983) (holding that
decree state may decline to exercise continuing jurisdiction when children
spend the greater portion of their time in New Jersey).
377 See supra note 243 and accompanying text. Decree courts continue to
decline to exercise continuing jurisdiction to punish the remaining parent's
wrongdoing. See supra note 245. In Hafer v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. Rptr.
132 (Ct. App. 1981), for example, the mother abducted the child to Florida
in violation of a California court order. The father obtained a California
order awarding him custody, which the mother subsequently petitioned the
California court to modify. !d. at 133. The California Court of Appeal
viewed the mother's wrongful abduction as an "adequate basis to deny [her]
the California forum for unclean hands .... " !d. at 136.
378 See supra note 243-46 and accompanying text.
379 See, e.g., Murphy v. Woerner, 748 P.2d 749 (Alaska 1988) (holding
that asylum state may not modify Kansas decree three years after custodial
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sometimes deferred to decree courts under the UCCJA; perhaps
courts already inclined to defer now also cite the PKPA.
Certainly, asylum courts continue to take jurisdiction when they
deem it appropriate to do so, even if the case is still under active
consideration in the decree court. Some of the opinions in such
cases simply do not address the PKPA, 380 deal with it cursorily, 381
or conclude that it does not apply. 382 However, some of these
mother and children moved there); Via v. Johnston, 521 So. 2d 1324 (Ala.
Civ. App. 1987) (holding that asylum state must enforce Indiana
modification made over a year after custodial parent and child left state);
Souza v. Superior Court, 238 Cal. Rptr. 892 (Ct. App. 1987) (holding that
asylum state must enforce Hawaii modification made more than three years
after custodial parent and child left state); Bahr v. Bahr, 439 N.Y.S.2d 265
(Fam. Ct. 1981) (holding that asylum state must defer to Connecticut
exercise of continuing jurisdiction although child and custodial parent had
been living in New York for more than six months); State ex rei. Cooper v.
Hamilton, 688 S.W.2d 821 (Tenn. 1985) (holding that asylum state must
enforce 1980 Indiana modification made after custodial parent and child
moved to Tennessee); Rush v. Stansbury, 668 S.W.2d 690 (Tex. 1984)
(holding that asylum state must enforce Tennessee modification made seven
months after custodial father brought children to live with him in Texas); In
re S.A.V., 798 S.W.2d 293 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that asylum state
may not modify decree six months after custodial parent left decree state);
Lundell v. Clawson, 697 S.W.2d 836 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that
asylum state must enforce Minnesota modification made after custodial
mother and child had moved to Texas with Minnesota court's permission);
Arbogast v. Arbogast, 327 S.E.2d 675 (W.Va. 1984) (holding that asylum
state must enforce Kansas modification made eight months after custodial
parent and child left state).
380 See, e.g., Mace v. Mace, 341 N.W.2d 307 (Neb. 1983) (asylum state
refusing to enforce decree state's modification without analyzing effect of
PKPA); Rosics v. Heath, 746 P.2d 1284 (Wyo. 1987) (same).
381 See, e.g., Perez v. Perez, 561 A.2d 907, 9ll & n.6 (Conn. 1989)
(relying principally on UCCJA and noting that PKPA was modeled on
UCCJA and contains similar language); Quenzer v. Quenzer, 653 P.2d 295,
30 l (Wyo. 1982) (concluding, without analysis, that continuing jurisdiction
was "not applicable" to a Texas custodial modification entered three years
after custodial mother left Texas with child, although father had
continuously remained a Texas resident), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1041 (1983).
382 See, e.g., State ex rei. Department of Human Services v. Avinger, 720
P.2d 290, 292 (N.M. 1986) (holding that New Mexico may conduct abuse
and neglect hearing although custodial mother still resides in Texas because
PKPA does not apply to such proceedings); Williams v. Knott, 690 S.W.2d
605, 608-09 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that Texas may consider
mother's petition to terminate father's parental rights although custody
dispute between them is pending in Oklahoma because PKPA and UCCJA
do not apply). But see State ex rei. Kasper v. Kasper, 792 P.2d 118, 118 (Utah
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cases do rely on interpretations of the PKPA's language. 383 The
PKPA sets forth three prerequisites for continuing jurisdiction:
(1) the initial decree must have been made "consistently with the
provisions of this section"; (2) the decree state's own jurisdic
tional requirements must "continue[] to be met"; and (3) the
decree state must "remain the residence of the child or of any
contestant." 384 Courts using the PKPA to repudiate another
state's continuing jurisdiction usually employ interpretive strate
gies that find defects in the first two of these.
In re Thorensen 385 is a good example of the first interpretive
strategy, that is, deciding that the foreign decree was not made
"consistently with the provisions of this section." The Thorsen
sens lived in Florida and their child was born there. About two
years later, the mother filed for a divorce in Florida; in December,
1979, a Florida court gave her permanent custody of the child.
The parents later filed countercharges against one another in the
Florida court; while that matter was pending, the mother moved
out of state in violation of an order requiring her to obtain court
permission. In response, the Florida court transferred the child's
custody to a state agency. Nearly five years later, in 1985, the
father located the mother and child in Washington. To assist him
in bringing the child back to Florida, die Florida court gave the
father custody. This order was entered without prior notice to
the mother, although her whereabouts were known.
The Washington court not only refused to enforce the change
of custody, it decided that any subsequent Florida orders, even if
Ct. App. 1990) (holding that PKPA applies to neglect hearings and that
Utah must defer to decree state's continuing jurisdiction).
383 See, e.g., Ex parte Blanton, 463 So. 2d 162 (Ala. 1985) (refusing to
enforce Louisiana modification entered after custodial mother left state with
children); Snow v. Snow, 369 N.W.2d 581 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (refusing
to enforce South Dakota modification entered on father's petition filed after
custodial mother left state with children); Serna v. Salazar, 651 P.2d 1292
(N.M. 1982) (refusing to enforce California modification entered on father's
motion filed two years after custodial mother moved to New Mexico with
children); Debra S. v. RogerS., 455 N.Y.S.2d 723 (Fam. Ct. 1982) (refusing
to enforce California modification entered on mother's default, three years
after custodial mother moved to New York with child); In re Thorensen, 730
P.2d 1380 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987) (refusing to enforce Florida modification
entered after custodial mother left state with children).
384 PKPA § 8(a), 94 Stat. 3570 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(d)).
385 730 P.2d 1380 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987).
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properly-noticed, would not be entitled to full faith and credit. 386
Although Florida had continuously been the father's residence,
the Washington court concluded that Florida's continuing juris
diction had ended because its latest order was not "consistent"
with the PKPA. 387 The court was apparently motivated to reach
this result by its fear that Florida might not give proper weight to
the mother's allegations of abuse, which the Washington court
had found to be substantiated. 388
Serna v. Salazar 389 is a good example of the second interpretive
strategy, that is, determining that the decree state's jurisdictional
requirements have not "continue[d] to be met." 390 Shortly after
the couple's 1977 California divorce gave the mother custody, she
moved with the child to New Mexico. In October, 1980, the
father asked the California court to give him a month's summer
visit with the child, which it did. In May, 1981, however, before
the first such visit could take place, the mother asked a New Mex
ico court to modify the California order. She alleged that the
father was a drug addict and an alcoholic. The New Mexico trial
court dismissed the action in deference to California's continuing
jurisdiction, but the New Mexico Supreme Court reversed. Rely
ing on a California case, it held that California no longer had
jurisdiction under its own law. Therefore, the supreme court rea
soned, New Mexico could exercise jurisdiction as the child's new
home state. 391 The fact that a California court had, seven months
before, entered an order intended to take effect in the summer of
1981 was deemed of "no relevance. " 392
386 See id. at 1385; if. supra notes 3 71-72 and accompanying text (noting
courts' tendency to refuse to enforce ex parte orders of which absent parent
had inadequate notice).
387 See 730 P.2d at 1383-84.
388 See id. at 1382; if. Snow v. Snow, 369 N.W.2d 581 (Minn. Ct. App.
1985) (deciding that decree state 1ostjurisdiction because its entry of ex parte
change of custody violated both UCCJA and PKPA).
389 651 P.2d 1292 (N.M. 1982).
390 See id. at 1295 (quoting PKPA § 8(a), 94 Stat. 357 (codified at 28
U.S.C. § 1738A(d))); see also Pierce v. Pierce, 640 P.2d 899 (Mont. 1982)
(remanding for factual inquiry into Kentucky's continuing jurisdiction
although Kentucky had asserted, and was exercising, jurisdiction to modify);
Debra S. v. RogerS., 455 N.Y.S.2d 723 (Fam. Ct. 1982) (refusing to enforce
modification very recently entered in decree state).
391 651 P.2d at 1294-95.
392 /d. at 1295.
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When May a Court, After an Independent Inquiry,
Modify a Foreign Custody Order?

Like the UCCJA, the PKPA permits courts to modify even con
cededly valid foreign custody orders in two situations: (1) if "the
other state no longer has jurisdiction," 393 and (2) if the decree
court has "declined to exercise" itsjurisdiction. 394 The first pro
vision, which has already been discussed, 395 gives rise to contin
ual uncertainty over whether a decree court's modification will be
enforced elsewhere. Moreover, even when a litigant persuades an
asylum state to recognize the decree state's order, her victory may
be pyrrhic.
Gordon v. Gordon 396 is a good example of this. After the Ohio
divorce court gave custody to the mother, she moved with the
child to Georgia. Later, when the Ohio court modified its order
to give the father custody, he tried to enforce the modification in
Georgia. He was successful on appeal-but the case was
remanded for a hearing to determine whether Ohio still had juris
diction. 397 If it did not, the appellate court indicated that Georgia
might properly exercise jurisdiction over the case to restore cus
tody to the mother. 398
E. E. B. v. D.A. 399 is a good example of one strategy for inter
preting away the "declined to exercise its jurisdiction" provision.
In E. E. B., the PKPA was no barrier to New Jersey's modification
of a very recent Ohio decision. The court's conclusion that Ohio
had declined to exercise its jurisdiction when it failed to hold a
best interests hearing served to authorize modification under the
PKPA precisely as it did under the UCCJA. 400
This tendency of asylum courts to exercise jurisdiction when
393 PKPA § 8(a), 94 Stat. 3571 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(f)(2)); cf.
UCCJA § 14(a), 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 292 ("it appears to a court of this State
that the court which rendered the decree does not now have jurisdiction").
394 PKPA § 8(a), 94 Stat. 3571 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(f)(2)); cf.
UCCJA § 14(a)(1), 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 292.
395 See supra notes 373-92 and accompanying text (discussing "continuing
jurisdiction" under PKPA).
396 363 S.E.2d 353 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987).
397 /d. at 355.
398 The Georgia court was critical of the Ohio modification, calling it
"home cooking." See id.
399 446 A.2d 871 (NJ. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1210, reh'g denied, 460
u.s. 1104 (1983).
400 See supra notes 274-92 and accompanying text (discussing holdings
that decree court declined to exercise jurisdiction under UCCJA).
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they fear the decree court may reach the wrong result seems not
to have gone unnoticed by the state courts. Anticipating such
intervention, decree courts have experimented with ways to retain
power over departing or absent litigants. They sometimes issue
orders explicitly "retaining jurisdiction" over a party who is or
may be moving to another state. Asylum courts routinely disre
gard these orders, 401 as they do agreements between the parties
providing for continuing jurisdiction in the decree court. 402
Decree courts also sometimes craft orders intended to coerce an
out-of-state party into obeying their custody orders, with mixed
results. 403
Because the PKPA has not significantly reduced the UCCJA's
indeterminacy, parents and their lawyers have searched for other
ways to settle the jurisdictional question. Two relatively recent
Supreme Court opinions arose in that context. They concern two
strategies for coping with the inadequacies of the statutory
401 See, e.g., Snow v. Snow, 369 N.W.2d 581 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985)
(disregarding South Dakota retention of jurisdiction by refusing to enforce
its modification); cf. Rumbolo v. Phelps, 759 S.W.2d 894, 896 (Mo. Ct. App.
1988) (holding that if trial court order claiming "continuing jurisdiction"
was meant to retainjurisdiction regardless of future events, it was error, but
if it was meant only to assert a determination to exercise jurisdiction to
extent allowed by law, order's correctness is notjusticiable because it turns
on future facts).
402 See, e.g. Olson v. Olson, 494 A.2d 737 (Md. Ct. App. 1985) (asylum
court refusing to abide by parties' settlement agreement stipulation that
custody would be determined by Rhode Island courts). Of course, a decree
court's decision to decline to exercise continuing jurisdiction is always
accepted. See, e.g., Berry v. Berry, 466 So. 2d 138, 140 (Ala. Civ. App. 1985)
(accepting decree state of North Carolina's determination that it lacked
continuing jurisdiction). So, too, may be a party's admission that continuing
jurisdiction has been lost. See Quenzer v. Quenzer, 653 P.2d 295 (Wyo.
1982) (asylum court relying in part on party's concession, in earlier Oregon
custody action, that decree state of Texas had lost jurisdiction to modify
when custodial mother and child moved away), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1041
(1983).
403 See, e.g., Kioukis v. Kioukis, 440 A.2d 894, 895, 899 (Conn. 1981)
(error to require escrow of all further child support payments until mother
complied with modified visitation order); Bullard v. Bullard, 64 7 P.2d 294
(Haw. Ct. App. 1982) (requiring father who had frustrated mother's
visitation when he had custody to post $2,500 bond before being permitted
visitation); Roberts v. Fuhr, 523 So. 2d 20,23-24 (Miss. 1987) (neexeat bond
used to secure compliance with custody and visitation orders; bond forfeited
when father retained child in Illinois instead of returning him to Mississippi
for visit).
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schemes-self-help and invoking the jurisdiction of the federal
courts. The next section examines those cases.
V.

THE SUPREME COURT CASES

Two recent Supreme Court cases poignantly typify many other
casualties of the PKPA's and UCCJA's indeterminacies. 404 Taken
together, these cases also cut off any reasonable hope that the
federal courts will try to impose uniform interpretations on either
the UCCJA or the PKPA. 405
A.

Automatic Interstate Rendition for Parental "Kidnaping":
California v. Superior Court (Smolin)

For the Supreme Court, California v. Superior Court (Smolin) 406
was an extradition case, plain and simple. Richard Smolin and his
father, Gerard Smolin, had done something in Louisiana that
Louisiana claimed was a crime. Let them, therefore, be tried in
Louisiana. The Smolins argued that they had merely been
enforcing a valid California custody judgment when they took
Richard's children from a school bus stop in Louisiana and
brought them back to California; as legal custodians, they argued,
they could not be guilty of kidnaping. Fine, responded the
Supreme Court: tell that story in Louisiana. Whether or not the
Smolins' arguments were correct-and the Court was willing to
grant that they were-"under the Extradition Act, it [was] for the
Louisiana courts to do justice in this case, not the California
courts." 407
The Smolins had argued in the Supreme Court that there was
only one way to resolve whether Richard had legal custody of his
children when he took them back to California: their way. Rich
ard's 1981 California custody order was valid because California
clearly had "continuing jurisdiction" under the UCCJA and the
See Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174 (1988); California v.
Superior Court (Smolin), 482 U.S. 400 (1987); infra text accompanying
notes 405-29.
405 Certiorari remains a theoretical possibility for litigants claiming that
either the PKPA or the UCCJA is "repugnant to the Constitution, treaties,
or laws of the United States .... " 28 U.S.C. § 1257. The Court has shown
no disposition to get into such matters, however.
406 482 U.S. 400 (1987).
407 /d. at 412 (citing Extradition Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3182).
404
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PKPA. 408 The prosecution's contention that the 1981 Texas
judgment giving the children's mother custody was valid was
"quite simply, dead wrong." 409 The Smolins had wanted to con
vince the Supreme Court, as they had convinced the California
court, 410 that their custody claim was so strong that, in effect,
Louisiana had not charged them "substantially" with a crime at
all.
The Smolins' strategy thus required them to obscure what was,
perhaps, their most compelling ground for relief. In truth, their
California judgment was plainly valid-in California. Elsewhere,
it was open to question. There is some evidence that the Smolins
themselves understood this: they used self-help, after all, instead
of attempting to litigate the issues in Louisiana. But on another
level, they seem to have been lured by the UCCJA's and the
PKPA's appearance of uniformity into assuming that a validly ren
dered California judgment would be enforced elsewhere if only
the statutes were "properly applied." This assumption plainly
underlay their claim, in the Supreme Court, that the father was
"really" the legal custodian of his children.
As we have seen, however, under the PKPA and the UCCJA,
each state has the opportunity, perhaps even the duty, to reassess
the decree state's jurisdiction before enforcing a foreign decree.
Louisiana might well prefer the mother's 1981 Texas custody
decree over the father's 1981 California decree. To see how this
might happen, we must examine the facts carefully.
When Richard and Judith Smolin were divorced in 1978, Cali
fornia was indisputably the children's home state. 411 The Califor
nia court gave Judith custody of their two small children subject
to Richard's rights of "reasonable visitation." Judith married
James Pope in August, 1979. In November, 1979, the Popes
moved to Oregon, taking the children with them, and neglecting
408 Brief of Real Parties in Interest at 34-35, California v. Superior Court
(Smolin), 482 U.S. 400 (1987) (No. 86-381).
409 /d. at 34 n.16.
410 See People v. Superior Court (Smolin), 716 P.2d 991 (Cal. 1986) (en
bane), rev 'd sub nom. California v. Superior Court (Smolin), 482 U.S. 400
(1987).
411 They had married, lived together, and had their children, in
California. Joint Appendix at 61, California v. Superior Court (Smolin), 482
U.S. 400 (1987) (No. 86-381) (Smolin v. Smolin, No. E 001135
(unpublished) (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 25, 1986)) [hereafter Joint Appendix]; see
UCCJA § 3(a)(l), 9 U.L.A. pt. I, at 143.
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first to tell Richard that they were going. Two months later, in
January, 1980, the Popes moved with the children to Texas. 412
In September, 1980, after she and the children had been in
Texas for eight months, Judith began a proceeding in Texas seek
ing recognition and enforcement of the California judgment
granting her sole custody. Richard was served, but did not
appear. Instead, in October, 1980, he filed an action in California
seeking joint custody by modification of the 1978 order. Judith
was served, but she did not appear. Apparently, neither Judith
nor Richard informed either the California or the Texas court
about the proceedings pending in the other state. 413
The California case proceeded more expeditiously: Richard was
made the children's joint custodian on October 27, 1980. Judith
did nothing to comply with the new California order, apparently
on the advice of counsel. 414 In January, 1981, Richard therefore
asked the California court to find her in contempt and grant him
sole custody. On February 27, 1981, to punish Judith for dis
obeying its earlier visitation orders, the California court gave
Richard sole custody of his children, and terminated his duty to
pay child support. 415
Meanwhile, on February 13, 1981, the Texas court issued a
decree recognizing and enforcing the 1978 California decree that
had given Judith sole custody of the children. Relying on the
Texas decree, Judith did not comply with the most recent Califor
nia decree. Nor did Richard seek to enforce it; instead, he merely
stopped paying child support. 416
·
In March, 1981, the Popes moved to Louisiana with the chil
dren, again without telling Richard. He did not learn their exact
whereabouts until October, 1982. After that, Richard spoke with
his children by telephone and sent them gifts, but he did not
make any serious effort to enforce the 1981 California decree giv
ing him sole custody until after February, 1984. That February,
the Popes served Richard with notice of their Louisiana proceed
ing to have the children adopted by James Pope. In response,
Richard and his father went to Louisiana, took the children from a
Joint Appendix, supra note 411, at 62.
/d. at 63-64.
414 Her Texas attorney told Richard's attorney that, in his opinion, the
1980 California joint custody order was not enforceable in Texas because
California lacked jurisdiction to make such an order. /d.
415 /d. at 64-65, 96-98.
416 /d. at 64-65.
412
413
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school bus stop, and brought them back to California. 417
Richard Smolin's claim to be the legal custodian of his children
when he removed them from Louisiana depended on the validity
of the October, 1980, California order giving him joint cus
tody.418 From the California courts' perspective, California could
change custody because it still had "continuing jurisdiction." A
Louisiana court, however, might well have taken a different view.
It could have determined that California should have dismissed
Richard's October, 1980, petition for modification under UCCJA
section 6 because Judith's request to enforce the original Califor
nia custody decree was already pending in Texas. 419 If Califor
nia's exercise of modification jurisdiction was therefore not
"substantially in accordance with this Act," under UCCJA section
13, no state need recognize and enforce the modified order.4 20
Nor would the modification be entitled to full faith and credit
under the PKPA, because California had lacked jurisdiction under
its own law. 421 Thus, the Smolins' guilt or innocence might well
turn on whether California's view of its own order would be
accepted or not.
As we have seen, decree states often assert continuing jurisdic
tion although the children are living in an asylum state that
believes it has thereby gained home state jurisdiction. The
Supreme Court's decision in Smolin means that self-help is never
safe, even for a parent armed with a facially valid custody decree.
Whether or not any state's assertion of child custody jurisdiction
is likely to be respected elsewhere, this case makes it determina
tive of rights within that state, and a possible basis for criminal
charges.
417 /d. at 65-66.
418 After Richard brought his children back

to California, the February,
1981, order giving him sole custody was held to have been punitive and
unenforceable, because the court had entered it solely to punish Judith
Pope and without hearing any evidence about the children's needs. !d. at
64-65, 96-98.
419 See VCCJA § 6, 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 219-20. Arguably, a proceeding for
recognition and enforcement of a foreign order under § 13 is a "proceeding
concerning the custody of the child[ren]" under § 6. See VCCJA § 13, 9
U.L.A. pt. 1, at 276.
420 9 U.L.A. pl. 1, at 276; see supra text accompanying notes 223-30.
421 See PKPA § 8(a), 94 Stat. 3570-71 (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738A(c)(l), (d)); supra text accompanying notes 389-92.
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Federal Courts' Lack ofjurisdiction to Enforce the PKPA:
Thompson v. Thompson

The facts of Thompson v. Thompson 422 were relatively uncompli
cated. In December, 1980, a California divorce court awarded
Susan Thompson custody of her son pending a full investigation
and hearing, to facilitate her move to Louisiana. Three months
after the move, she asked the Louisiana court to enforce this
order, and it did so in April, 1981. Susan had alleged that David
Thompson had frightened and endangered their child with his
hostile and erratic behavior; the Louisiana court was apparently
exercising emergency jurisdiction. 423 Meanwhile, in California
the investigation continued. In June, 1981, the California court
awarded David full custody of the child. According to David, the
California investigation covered the same allegations made in
Louisiana and found them "meritless." 424
Faced with two recent, and conflicting, custody decisions, David
could have asked the Louisiana court either to enforce Califor
nia's decision or to reassess its own jurisdiction and dismiss its
case. But he thought this would waste time and money, because
the California judge had already, unsuccessfully, made the same
arguments and requests by telephone. 425 He therefore promptly
asked the local federal district court to enjoin enforcement of the
Louisiana decree. 426 The district court's refusal was affirmed on
appeal. 427 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and closed the
doors of the federal courts to these cases.
In Thompson, the Supreme Court held that the PKPA does not
imply a private right of action in federal court to determine the
validity of conflicting state custody decrees. The Court rejected
the pleas of the petitioner and amici that, unless state court deci
sions could be appealed to federal court, the state courts would
not give the PKPA either consistent interpretation or unbiased
484 u.s. 174 (1988).
423 See
PKPA § 8(a), 94 Stat. 3570 (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738A(c)(2)(C)(ii)) (emergency jurisdiction); UCCJA § 3(a)(3)(ii), 9
U.L.A. pt. 1, at 144 (same); Joint Appendix, supra note 411, at 24-28
(Louisiana pleadings).
424 Brief for Petitioner at 18, Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174
(1988) (No. 86-964).
425 !d. at 18-19.
426 484 U.S. at 178.
427 Thompson v. Thompson, 798 F.2d 1547 (9th Cir. 1986), aff'd, 484
u.s. 174 (1988).
422
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application. 428 Relying on Congress's refusal to amend the diver
sity statute and other legislative history, 429 the Court concluded
that Congress had not intended to institute such extraordinary
federal supervision of state courts. 430
The parties in both Thompson and Smolin seemed to share with
the Court an unspoken assumption that there are "correct" statu
tory answers for child custody jurisdiction disputes; they differed
only as to which court should impose the answer. Yet, as we have
seen, the statutes are indeterminate at almost every pressure
point, susceptible of many equally valid interpretations. At least
since its decision in May v. Anderson, 431 the Supreme Court has
been blamed for creating or exacerbating the problem of the
interstate child, although in fact its role there was merely to clar
ify a dilemma inherent in our federalism. Perhaps these two deci
sions should be seen in that light as well. They can only be
accused of making things worse if "correct" interpretations of the
UCCJA and the PKPA are possible. Given the actual state of
affairs, perhaps all they have done is to clarify our view of a disas
ter the Court had no part in creating and no power to remedy.
VI.

CRITIQUE OF THE REFORMS AND

Two

PROPOSALS FOR

FURTHER REFORM

A.

Critique

Although the UCCJA and the PKPA were developed after care
ful study and wide consultation, and were adopted with great
optimism, they have not succeeded in abolishing jurisdictional
competition in interstate custody cases. Indeed, they have been
428 Compare Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 9-11, Thompson v.
Thompson, 484 U.S. 174 ( 1988) (No. 86-964); Brief for the People of the
States of California, Hawaii, Nevada, and Texas, et al. as Amici Curiae at 14,
Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174 (1988) (No. 86-964); Motion for
Leave to File Brief Amici Curiae and Brief of Amici Curiae Sacramento
County, California, et al., In Support of Petitioner at 7-10, Thompson v.
Thompson, 484 U.S. 174 (1988) (No. 86-964); and Motion for Leave to File
Brief Amici Curiae and Brief of Women's Legal Defense Fund, et al., In
Support of the Petitioner at 8-11, Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 17 4
(1988) (No. 86-964) with Thompson, 484 U.S. at 187 (declining to indulge a
"presumption" that "the States are either unable or unwilling to enforce the
provisions of the [PKPA]").
429 See 484 U.S. at 183-87; supra notes 337-39.
430 484 U.S. at 186.
431 345 u.s. 528 (1953).
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spectacularly unsuccessful, and have exacerbated the problem of
the interstate child instead of resolving it. These statutes are so
complicated that litigating any jurisdictional question takes an
inordinate amount of time. In the worst cases, a recalcitrant party
in possession of the children can use the delay to find yet another
forum; in such a case, the passage of time alone will have
strengthened her case and weakened her opponent's. 432 Even in
the best cases the delay prolongs the uncertainty, and increases
the expense, oflitigation. 433 Before these reforms, at least, courts
were able to resolve jurisdictional issues in custody cases with rel
ative promptness.
These delays might be seen as the deplorable but necessary
cost of instituting a new system. According to this view, once the
appellate courts had settled a few disputed issues, we could
expect the delays to diminish sharply. While this might be a valid
way of looking at the situation if the statutes produced predict
able and certain answers to jurisdictional issues, sadly they do
not.
Putting aside their rationales for the moment, and looking only
at the pattern made by their results, the cases under the UCCJA
and the PKPA are remarkably similar to the cases that preceded
the Acts. They display the same patterns Professor Ehrenzweig
found in the 1950s. 434 Courts today seldom enforce foreign cus
tody orders unless, after independently inquiring into the facts,
they find no material change of circumstances. Courts still mod
ify foreign orders if they think that the court that made the award
lacked sufficient connection with the child to do so or that there
has been an intervening change of circumstances. Courts still
enforce foreign orders against a party who has acted "wrong432 Compare Nehra v. Uhlar, 372 N.E.2d 4, 8 (N.Y. 1977) (enforcing
Michigan order granting custody to father although mother and children
had been away for 4 1/2 years, because she had abducted them) with Nehra v.
Uhlar, 402 A.2d 264 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div.) (requiring best interests
hearing because children had been with mother for most of their lives,
although both Michigan and New York had awarded father custody and
mother had not complied with either decree), cert. denied, 408 A.2d 807 (N.J.
1979).
433 See, e.g., Davis v. Davis, 687 S.W.2d 843 (Ark. 1985) (eighteen months
spent on jurisdiction without reaching merits); In re B.B.R., 566 A.2d 1032
(D.C. 1989) (four years of litigation); Archambault v. Archambault, 555
N.E.2d 201 (Mass. 1990) (eight years of litigation).
434 See supra notes 72-85 and accompanying text (discussing Ehrenzweig's
observations).
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fully" (as they define wrongfulness, rather than as UCCJA section
8 defines it), unless to do so would harm the child. Even then, in
order to decide whether or not the child would be harmed, they
inquire into the merits of the case. Instead of transforming the
courts' practice, these statutes have transformed only the dis
course used to conduct and explain the practice, leaving the
underlying dynamics substantially unchanged.
Many courts use the interpretive strategies discussed above; 435
many others (perhaps baffied by the UCCJA's complexity) achieve
like results with less attention to the niceties of statutory interpre
tation.436 Certainly, not every interstate case is characterized by
such use of the UCCJA. In many instances, courts use the UCCJA
as its proponents hoped they would use it: to assure that the court
that has the best access to relevant evidence resolves custody mat
ters, and to discourage parties from using the courts of one state
to trump the courts of another. Even in such cases, however,
courts generally defer to foreign decrees only after inquiring into
the case's merits. For this reason, the interpretive strategies dis
cussed above are not aberrations; it would be a mistake to dis
count them as "errors" in interpreting the UCCJA. The statute
lends itself to such interpretation, as the Oregon Supreme Court
explained, 437 because it balances the rules and principles con
straining jurisdiction with others expanding it if "necessary" to
the "best interests" of a child.
If the reforms have not succeeded, it is worth asking why not.
One possible answer is that the statutes defectively execute a basi
cally sound plan. There is some evidence for this view. The
UCCJA embeds the highly indeterminate, fact-intensive, "best
interests of the child" standard in every jurisdictional determina
tion and in the rules governing forum non conveniens and clean
hands. 438 This virtually ensures that in every interstate custody
435 See supra part IIIB.
436 See, e.g., Peery v. Peery, 453 So. 2d 635 (La. 1984) (refusing to enforce
California order in case that was pending when Louisiana proceeding
commenced, but not discussing§§ 6 or 13, and remanding for new factual
hearing but requiring consideration of California record).
437 See In re Ross, 630 P.2d 353 (Or. 1981) (in bane); In reSettle, 556 P.2d
962 (Or. 1976), overruled by In re Ross, 630 P.2d 353 (Or. 1981) (in bane).
438 UCCJA §§ 3(a)(2) ("A court of this State ... has jurisdiction to make
a child custody determination ... if (2) it is in the best interest of the child
that a court of this State assume jurisdiction .... "), 6 (inquiry as to whether
the court of another state was "exercising jurisdiction substantially in
conformity with this Act" can, by considering § 3(a)(2), become a best
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matter each court will consider the children's best interests-that
is, the merits of the case-in deciding whether to exercise juris
diction or to defer to another court's decision-making. Whenever
the forum, after examining the merits, comes to a conclusion that
differs from the decree court's decision, it is bound to be strongly
tempted to remedy what it perceives as a wrong, by asserting and
exercising jurisdiction.
The PKPA's differences from the UCCJA-its privileging of
home state jurisdiction and its adoption of continuing jurisdic
tion-might seem to limit the forum's threshold inquiry. In prac
tice, however, the PKPA makes little difference. It requires the
forum to assess the decree state's jurisdiction in order to decide
whether a child custody decree is entitled to enforcement. 439
Moreover, it requires the forum to determine both its own juris
diction and the decree state's jurisdiction in order to decide
whether it may modify the decree. 440 Each of these inquiries
sends the forum to the UCCJA and thereby requires one or more
best-interests determinations.
If the UCCJA and the PKPA are failing because of drafting mis
takes, it should be possible to write a statute that would succeed.
If, however, these statutes are failing because the problem is
insoluble, the only sensible response is radical simplification, to
eliminate unproductive delays and transaction costs. The follow
ing two sections explore these possibilities.
interests inquiry), 7(c) ("In determining if it is an inconvenient forum, the
court shall consider if it is in the interest of the child that another state
assume jurisdiction."); 8(b) ("Unless required in the interest of the child,
the court shall not exercise its jurisdiction .... "), 12 (inquiry as to whether
a decree was "rendered by a court ... which had jurisdiction under section
3" can, by considering § 3(a)(2), become a best interests inquiry), 13
(inquiry as to whether the court of another state "had assumed jurisdiction
under statutory provisions substantially in accordance with this Act" or "was
made under factual circumstances meeting the jurisdictional standards of
the Act" can, by considering § 3(a)(2), become a best interests inquiry),
14(a) (inquiry as to whether the court of another state "does not now have
jurisdiction under jurisdictional prerequisites substantially in accordance
with this Act" can, by considering § 3(a)(2), become a best interests
inquiry), 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 143, 219-20, 233, 251, 274, 276, 292.
439 See PKPA § 8(a), 94 Stat. 3570-71
(codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738A(c)(l), (d)).
440 See PKPA § 8(a), 94 Stat. 3571 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § l738A(f)).

HeinOnline -- 25 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 941 1991-1992

942

University of California, Davis
B.

[Vol. 25:845

First Reform Proposal

To be effective, any legislative solution must control the core of
the problem of the interstate child. To do so, it must centralize
decision-making, limit the free movement of parents and chil
dren, substitute a rule for the best interests ideal, or use some
combination of these strategies. My preference is for centralizing
decision-making, because of the genuine risks to civil liberties
inherent in other approaches.
While it would certainly be easier to persuade Congress to
amend the PKPA than to convince fifty state legislatures to adopt
uniform revisions of the UCCJA, the dynamics of the problem
and our experience under the existing statutes together suggest
that the easier course could not possibly be effective. Congress
lacks the power to limit state jurisdiction directly; all it can do is
require that full faith and credit be given to specified judgments.
Any federal statute that refers to state law to specify which judg
ments were entitled to full faith and credit would import the
UCCJA's weaknesses, just as the present PKPA does. Moreover,
even a new statute establishing entirely independent criteria for
full faith and credit would not solve the problem. At present, the
states are enforcing too few foreign custody decrees, not too
many. Tightening the criteria for enforcement could only exacer
bate the problem. Meanwhile, the UCCJA would continue to
empower the states to enter nonconforming custody orders that
would be valid where made and that perhaps would receive com
ity elsewhere. Revising the PKPA might alter the results in indi
vidual cases, but it could not change the overall pattern described
by Ehrenzweig. 441
My proposal is therefore that every state enact a Revised Uni
form Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (RUCCJA). 442 This proposal
adapts Ehrenzweig's guardianship court idea, because I believe it
is more important to be able to tell unambiguously which court
has jurisdiction than to search for the "best" court. Nearly twenty
years' experience under the UCCJA has taught that no matter
how good a decree court's access to evidence, an asylum court
that disagrees with the result will still relitigate the dispositive
issues. To counter this tendency, jurisdiction to make a custody
441 See Ehrenzweig, Interstate Recognition, supra note 2, at 349-57; supra
notes 72-85 and accompanying text.
442 The complete text of the proposed RUCCJA appears in the
Appendix.
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decision must not be in dispute and custody decisions must be
clearly entitled to enforcement outside the state in which they
were made. Because a state without power over either the child
or the losing party is unable directly to enforce its own custody
decision, enforcement of the decision by other courts must not
appear discretionary.
Let one court, in the child's home state, have the exclusive
power to make an initial decree. Let the decree court then retain
exclusive power to modify its decision for any period it chooses,
but no longer than five years. After that time, the decree court
may modify its earlier decision only if it remains the child's home
state. Otherwise, the new home state gains exclusive power to
modify the custody determination. In genuine emergencies, any
court where the child is found may enter a temporary order, to
stabilize the situation. However, to prevent the exercise of such
emergency jurisdiction from expanding into an exercise of
broader jurisdiction, a temporary order should expire swiftly and
not be renewable. The goal is for the temporary order to remain
in effect no longer than is necessary for the child's home state or
the state with continuing jurisdiction to grant supervening relief.
This proposal could be implemented by repealing the UCCJA's
statements of principle supporting flexibility, 443 its definitions, 444
its jurisdictional provisions, 445 and its provisions codifying forum
non conveniens 446 and clean hands. 447 The other sections of the
statute should be retained. For clarity and consistency, the
PKPA's definitions 448 should be substituted for the UCCJA definiUCCJA § 1(a)(2)-(3), (6), 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 124.
UCCJA § 2, 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 133.
445 UCCJA §§ 3, 6, 13, 14, 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 143-44, 219-20, 276, 292.
446 UCCJA § 7, 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 233-34.
447 UCCJA § 8, 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 251.
448 PKPA § 8(a) provides:
As used in this section, the term(1) "child" means a person under the age of eighteen;
(2) "contestant" means a person, including a parent, who
claims a right to custody or visitation of a child;
(3) "custody determination" means a judgment, decree, or
other order of a court providing for the custody or visitation of a
child, and includes permanent and temporary orders; and initial
orders and modifications;
(4) "home State" means the State in which, immediately
preceding the time involved, the child lived with his parents, a
parent, or a person acting as parent, for at least six consecutive
months, and in the case of a child less than six months old, the
443

444
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tions, and a definition of "initial custody determination" should
be added. 449 New jurisdictional provisions giving exclusive juris
diction to one single state at a time, and commanding enforce
ment of that state's decisions, should be added. 450 The repealed
statements of principle should not be revised, because to do so
would undermine the revised statute's new bias toward certainty.
State in which the child lived from birth with any of such
persons. Periods of temporary absence of any of such persons
are counted as part of the six-month or other period;
(5) "modification" and "modify" refer to a custody
determination which modifies, replaces, supersedes, or
otherwise is made subsequent to, a prior custody determination
concerning the same child, whether made by the same court or
not;
(6) "person acting as a parent" means a person, other than a
parent, who has physical custody of a child and who has either
been awarded custody by a court or claims a right to custody;
(7) "physical custody" means actual possession and control
of a child; and
(8) "State" means a State of the United States, the District of
Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or a territory or
possession of the United States.
94 Stat. 3569-70 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(b)).
449 The following provision should be added to the end of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738A(b) and enacted as part of the RUCCJA: "(9) 'initial custody
determination' means the first custody determination made with respect to
this child by any state."
450 The following provision should be substituted for UCCJA § 3:
§ 3. Ourisdiction]
(a) An initial child custody determination may be made by a
court in this state only if this state is the home state of the child
on the date of the commencement of the proceeding or had been
the child's home state within six months before that date.
(b) Every custody determination shall specify how long the
court's jurisdiction over the child shall last. A court may specify
any period of time up to and including five years. Except as
provided in section 3 (e), if a custody determination of this or any
state fails to specify how long the court's jurisdiction over the
child shall last, the court's jurisdiction shall be deemed to expire
one year after the date the child custody determination was
entered.
(c) (1) During the period specified in section 3(b), a court in
this state may modify any custody determination made in this
state.
(2) A court in this state may modify any other custody
determination if this state is the child's home state on the date of
the commencement of the modification proceeding or had been
the child's home state within six months before the
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Nor should sections 7 and 8 be rewritten rather than repealed;
courts are fully capable of assessing and implementing equitable
principles without legislative guidance. This proposal could be
implemented without revising the PKPA, or that statute could be
amended to conform. 451
If it were to be enacted in every state, this proposed RUCCJA
would diminish jurisdictional competition sharply, because it
unambiguously selects one court at a time as the exclusive forum
for each custody dispute. Because it achieves this by elevating
Ratner's certainty goals over his flexibility goals, however, I fear
not even a single state will enact it. Moreover, even if it were
adopted, I predict that sometimes courts would evade it.
The UCCJA took its concern for justice in the individual case
from existing custody law, where the concern is a fundamental
precept. Neither courts nor legislatures seem at all disposed to
give it up. In this they may reflect society's values. Many profes
sionals have been convinced by Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit that
since decision-makers can make at best rough judgments about
what individual children need and how to provide it, the better
part of wisdom is to make custody decisions swiftly and then stick
by them. 452 Yet even those who agree in principle find it hard to
commencement of the modification proceeding, provided that
the period specified in section 3(b) has expired.
(d) Except as provided in section 3(c), a court in this state
shall enforce, and may not modify, any custody determination
that was made by a court of this or any state during the period
that court retained jurisdiction according to the provisions of
section 3(b).
(e) Notwithstanding the foregoing, a court of this state may
make a temporary custody order with respect to a child who is
physically present within this state and either has been
abandoned or needs emergency protection from actual
mistreatment or abuse. Such a temporary order may remain in
effect for no more than six weeks and may not be renewed under
any circumstances. A court's jurisdiction to make or modify such
a temporary custody order expires with the order.
451 A conforming amendment would repeal PKPA § 8(a), 94 Stat. 3570
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c)(2)(B)-(D)), and revise PKPA § 8(a), 94
Stat. 3570-71 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(d)) to read as follows (revision
in italics): "The jurisdiction of a court of a state that has made a child
custody determination consistently with the provisions of this section
continues for one year after entry of such determination, or for such longer period (up
to and including five years) as the determination itself specifies."
452 GoLDSTEIN, FREUD & SoLNIT, supra note 45, at 99-101.
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put these precepts into practice when they believe an earlier cus
tody decision was wrong. Ordinary parents and citizens find the
advice even harder to accept. Although this proposed RUCCJA
does not close the doors of the courthouse entirely-it merely
limits custody litigants to one forum at a time-its enactment
would sometimes require a local child to be returned to a foreign
custodian against the advice of all local experts. I wonder if we
can reasonably expect our state legislatures to command this
result. Even if they were to do so, I wonder if we could reason
ably expect our courts to obey.
C.

Second Reform Proposal

To say that we cannot expect our courts and legislatures to
accept my proposal, or any proposal that similarly chooses juris
dictional certainty over flexibility, is to admit that we cannot solve
the problem of the interstate child without sacrificing values
equally important to us. If that is so, criticizing the UCCJA and
the PKPA for preserving the very difficulties they were intended
to cure would be foolish. Such criticism would lose sight of the
dynamic underlying both the courts' interpretations of these stat
utes and their pre-reformjurisprudence. Any federal system that
commits custody decisions to sovereign states, that permits par
ents and children to move freely among the states, and that
decides custody according to indeterminate precepts and then
permits modification of initial decisions according to equally
indeterminate standards, will inevitably produce some version of
the problem of the interstate child. 453 The problem of the inter
state child is not resolvable by the UCCJA, the PKPA, the pro
posed RUCCJA, or by any other measures, unless our society is
willing to choose certainty over flexibility, and to absorb the
attendant costs.
If it is not, we would do well to repeal both the UCCJA and the
PKPA. Repeal would permit the courts to go directly to their
search for justice in the individual case without wasting time
interpreting these complicated statutes. If it feels unseemly to
have no statutory rule at all, we could ask Congress to enact Brai
nerd Currie's proposal that "no judgment shall preclude the
courts of a state having legitimate interest in the matter from
making whatever custodial decree is required, in their judgment
453

See supra part lA.
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and discretion, for the welfare of the child. " 454 That would at
least give the parties fair warning of the shoals ahead.
CONCLUSION

With hindsight it seems clear that the UCCJA should never
have been expected to guide courts to predictable and consistent
solutions of interstate custody disputes. Contrary to its propo
nents' claims, the UCCJA did not choose certainty over flexibility;
indeed, by embracing both it ensured that flexibility would pre
vail. Choosing certainty would require courts to close their doors
to custody disputes concerning some children with substantial
connections to the forums' own locale, and to do so regularly,
systematically, and in the face of allegations that the children's
well-being was· thereby endangered. The high value we place. on
protecting children ensures that our courts have never voluntarily
done this, and that they might not even if they were unambigu
ously commanded to do so. If our society lacks the resolve to
make this command, or to carry it out, then the "problem of the
interstate child" was misnamed. It should have been called "the
tragedy455 of the interstate child." If we can understand a prob
lem but cannot solve it without making matters worse, all that is
left is pity and terror.
454
455

Currie, supm note 116, at 115.
See MARTHA C. NussBAUM, THE

FRAGILITY OF GooDNESS
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APPENDIX
PROPOSED REVISED UNIFORM CHILD CusTODY juRISDICTION AcT

(Proposed Revisions in Italics)
§ 1.

[Purposes of Act; Construction of Provisions]
(a) The general purposes of this Act are to:
( 1) avoid jurisdictional competition and conflict with courts
of other states in matters of child custody which have in the past
resulted in the shifting of children from state to state with harmful
effects on their well-being;
(2) [repealed];
(3) [repealed];

(4) discourage continuing controversies over child custody
in the interest of greater stability of home environment and of
secure family relationships for the child;
(5) deter abductions and other unilateral removals of chil
dren undertaken to obtain custody awards;
( 6) [repealed];

(7) facilitate the enforcement of custody decrees of other
states;
(8) promote and expand the exchange of information and
other forms of mutual assistance between the courts of this state
and those of other states concerned with the same child; and
(9) make uniform the law of those states which enact it.
(b) This Act shall be construed to promote the general pur
poses stated in this section.
§ 2. [Definitions]
As used in this Act:
(a) "child" means a person under the age of eighteen;
(b) "contestant" means a person, including a parent, who claims a right
to custody or visitation of a child;
(c) ''custody determination '' means a judgment, decree, or other order of
a court providing for the custody or visitation of a child, and includes per
manent and temporary orders, and initial orders and modifications;
(d) "home state" means the state in which, immediately preceding the
time involved, the child lived with his or her parents, a parent, or a person
acting as parent, for at least six consecutive months, and in the case of a
child less than six months old, the state in which the child lived from birth
with any of such persons. Periods of temporary absence of any of such per
sons are counted as part of the six-month or other period;
(e) "modification" and "modify" refer to a custody determination which
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modifies, replaces, supersedes, or otherwise is made subsequent to, a prior
custody determination concerning the same child, whether made by the same
court or not;
(f) ''person acting as a parent" means a person, other than a parent,
who has physical custody of a child and who has either been awarded custody
by a court or claims a right to custody;
(g) ''physical custody" means actual possession and control of a child;
(h) "state" means a state of the United States, the District of Columbia,
the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or a territory or possession of the United
States; and
( i) "initial custody determination" means the first custody determination
made with respect to this child by any state.
§ 3. [Jurisdiction]
(a) An initial child custody determination may be made by a court in this
state only if this state is the home state of the child on the date of the com
mencement of the proceeding or had been the child's home state within six
months before that date.
(b) Every custody determination shall specify how long the court :S juris
diction over the child shall last. A court may specify any period of time up to
and including five years. Except as provided in section 3(e), if a custody
determination of this or any state fails to specify how long the court :S juris
diction over the child shall last, the court's jurisdiction shall be deemed to
expire one year after the date the child custody determination was entered.
(c) ( 1) During the period specified in section 3( b), a court in this state
may modify any custody determination made in this state.
( 2) A court in this state may modify any other custody determination
if this state is the child's home state on the date of the commencement of the
modification proceeding or had been the childs home state within six months
before the commencement of the modification proceeding, provided that the
period specified in section .3(b) has expired.
(d) Except as provided in section 3(c), a court in this state shall enforce,
and may not modify, any custody determination that was made by a court of
this or any state during the period that court retained jurisdiction according
to the provisions of section 3( b).
(e) Notwithstanding the foregoing, a court of this state may make a tem
porary custody order with respect to a child who is physically present within
this state and either has been abandoned or needs emergency protection from
actual mistreatment or abuse. Such a temporary order may remain in effect
for no more than six weeks and may not be renewed under any circumstances.
A courts jurisdiction to make or modify such a temporary custody order
expires with the order.
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[Notice and Opportunity to be Heard]
Before making a decree under this Act, reasonable notice and
opportunity to be heard shall be given to the contestants, any par
ent whose parental rights have not been previously terminated,
and any person who has physical custody of the child. If any of
these persons is outside this state, notice and opportunity to be
heard shall be given pursuant to section 5.
§ 5. [Notice to Persons Outside this State; Submission to
Jurisdiction]
(a) Notice required for the exercise of jurisdiction over a per
son outside this state shall be given in a manner reasonably calcu
lated to give actual notice, and may be:
(1) by personal delivery outside this state in the manner pre
scribed for service of process within this state;
(2) in the manner prescribed by the law of the place in which
the service is made for service of process in that place in an action
in any of its courts of general jurisdiction;
(3) by any form of mail addressed to the person to be served
and requesting a receipt; or
(4) as directed by the court [including publication, if other
means of notification are ineffective];
(b) Notice under this section shall be served, mailed, or deliv
ered, [or last published] at least [10, 20] days before any hearing
in this state.
(c) Proof of service outside this state may be made by affidavit
of the individual who made the service, or in the manner pre
scribed by the law of this state, the order pursuant to which the
service is made, or the law of the place in which the service is
made. If service is by mail, proof may be a receipt signed by the
addressee or other evidence of delivery to the addressee.
(d) Notice is not required if a person submits to the jurisdic
tion of the court.
§ 6. [Simultaneous Proceedings in Other States] [Repealed; see
section 3.]
§ 7. [Inconvenient Forum] [Repealed.]
§ 8. [Jurisdiction Declined by Reason of Conduct] [Repealed.]
§ 9. [Information under Oath to be Submitted to the Court]
(a) Every party in a custody proceeding in his or her first plead
ing or in an affidavit attached to that pleading shall give informa
tion under oath as to the child's present address, the places where
the child has lived within the last 5 years, and the names and pres-
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ent addresses of the persons with whom the child has lived during
that period. In this pleading or affidavit every party shall further
declare under oath whether:
( 1) he or she has participated (as a party, witness, or in any
other capacity) in any other litigation concerning the custody of
the same child in this or any other state;
(2) he or she has information of any custody proceeding con
cerning the child pending in a court of this or any other state; and
(3) he or she knows of any person not a party to the proceed
ings who has physical custody of the child or claims to have cus
tody or visitation rights with respect to the child.
(b) If the declaration as to any of the above items is in the
affirmative the declarant shall give additional information under
oath as required by the court. The court may examine the parties
under oath as to details of the information furnished and as to
other matters pertinent to the court's jurisdiction and the disposi
tion of the case.
(c) Each party has a continuing duty to inform the court of any
custody proceeding concerning the child in this or any other state
of which he or she obtained information during this proceeding.
§ 10. [Additional Parties]
If the court learns from information furnished by the parties
pursuant to section 9 or from other sources that a person not a
party to the custody proceeding has physical custody of the child
or claims to have custody or visitation rights with respect to the
child, it shall order that person to be joined as a party and to be
duly notified of the pendency of the proceeding and of his or her
joinder as a party. If the person joined as a party is outside this
state he or she shall be served with process or otherwise notified in
accordance with section 5.
§ 11. [Appearance of Parties and the Child]
[(a) The court may order any party to the proceeding who is in
this state to appear personally before the court. If that party has
physical custody of the child the court may order that he or she
appear personally with the child.]
(b) If a party to the proceeding whose presence is desired by
the court is outside this state with or without the child the court
may order that the notice given under section 5 include a state
ment directing that party to appear personally with or without the
child and declaring that failure to appear may result in a decision
adverse to that party.
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(c) If a party to the proceeding who is outside this state is
directed to appear under subsection (b) or desires to appear per
sonally before the court with or without the child, the court may
require another party to pay to the clerk of the court travel and
other necessary expenses of the party so appearing and of the
child if this is just and proper under the circumstances.
§ 12. [Binding Force and Res judicata Effect of Custody Decree]
A custody decree rendered by a court of this state which had
jurisdiction under section 3 binds all parties who have been
served in this state or notified in accordance with section 5 or who
have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court, and who have
been given an opportunity to be heard. As to these parties the
custody decree is conclusive as to all issues of law and fact
decided and as to the custody determination made unless and
until that determination is modified pursuant to law, including
the provisions of this Act.
§ 13. [Recognition of Out-of-State Custody Decrees] [Repealed;
see section 3.]
§ 14. [Modification of Custody Decree of Another State]
[Repealed; see section 3.]
§ 15. [Filing and Enforcement of Custody Decree of Another
State]
(a) A certified copy of a custody decree of another state may be
filed in the office of the clerk of any [District Court, Family Court]
of this state. The clerk shall treat the decree in the same manner
as a custody decree of the [District Court, Family Court] of this
state. A custody decree so filed has the same effect and shall be
enforced in like manner as a custody decree rendered by a court
of this state.
(b) A person violating a custody decree of another state which
makes it necessary to enforce the decree in this state may be
required to pay necessary travel and other expenses, including
attorneys' fees, incurred by the party entitled to the custody or his
or her witnesses.
§ 16. [Registry of Out-of-State Custody Decrees and
Proceedings]
The clerk of each [District Court, Family Court] shall maintain
a registry in which he or she shall enter the following:
(1) certified copies of custody decrees of other states
received for filing;
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(2) communications as to the pendency of custody proceed
ings in other states;
(3) communications concerning a finding of inconvenient
forum by ·a court of another state; and
(4) other communications or documents concerning custody
proceedings in another state which may affect the jurisdiction of a
court of this state or the disposition to be made by it in a custody
proceeding.
§ 17. [Certified Copies of Custody Decree]
The Clerk of the [District Court, Family Court] of this state, at
the request of the court of another state or at the request of any
person who is affected by or has a legitimate interest in a custody
decree, shall certify an~ forward a copy of the decree to that court
or person.
§ 18. [Taking Testimony in Another State]
In addition to other procedural devices available to a party, any
party to the proceeding or a guardian ad litem or other represen
tative of the child may adduce testimony of witnesses, including
parties and the child, by deposition or otherwise, in another state.
The court on its own motion may direct that the testimony of a
person be taken in another state and may prescribe the manner in
which and the terms upon which the testimony shall be taken.
§ 19. [Hearings and Studies in Another State; Orders to
Appear]
(a) A court of this state may request the appropriate court of
another state to hold a hearing to adduce evidence, to order a
party to produce or give evidence under other procedures of that
state, or to have social studies made with respect to the custody of
a child involved in proceedings pending in the court of this state;
and to forward to the court of this state certified copies of the
transcript of the record of the hearing, the evidence otherwise
adduced, or any social studies prepared in compliance with the
request. The cost of the services may be assessed against the par
ties or, if necessary, ordered paid by the [county, state].
(b) A court of this state may request the appropriate court of
another state to order a party to custody proceedings pending in
the court of this state to appear in the proceedings, and if that
party has physical custody of the child, to appear with the child.
The request may state that travel and other necessary expenses of
the party and of the child whose appearance is desired will be
assessed against another party or will otherwise be paid.
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[Assistance to Courts of Other States]
(a) Upon request of the court of another state the courts of this
state which are competent to hear custody matters may order a
person in this state to appear at a hearing to adduce evidence or
to produce or give evidence under other procedures available in
this state [or may order social studies to be made for use in a
custody proceeding in another state]. A certified copy of the tran
script of the record of the hearing or the evidence otherwise
adduced [and any social studies prepared] shall be forwarded by
the clerk of the court to the requesting court.
(b) A person within this state may voluntarily give his or her tes
timony or statement in this state for use in a custody proceeding
outside this state.
(c) Upon request of the court of another state a competent
court of this state may order a person in this state to appear alone
or with the child in a custody proceeding in another state. The
court may condition compliance with the request upon assurance
by the other state that state travel and other necessary expenses
will be advanced or reimbursed.
§ 21. [Preservation of Documents for Use in Other States]
In any custody proceeding in this state the court shall preserve
the pleadings, orders and decrees, any record that has been made
of its hearings, social studies, and other pertinent documents
until the child reaches [18, 21] years of age. Upon appropriate
request of the court of another state the court shall forward to the
other court certified copies of any or all of such documents.
§ 22. [Request for Court Records of Another State]
If a custody decree has been rendered in another state concern
ing a child involved in a custody proceeding pending in a court of
this state, the court of this state upon taking jurisdiction of the
case shall request of the court of the other state a certified copy of
the transcript of any court record and other documents men
tioned in section 21.
§ 23. [International Application]
The general policies of this Act extend to the international
area. The provisions of this Act relating to the recognition and
enforcement of custody decrees of other states apply to custody
decrees and decrees involving legal institutions similar in nature
to custody institutions rendered by appropriate authorities of
other nations if reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard
were given to all affected persons.
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[Priority]
Upon the request of a party to a custody proceeding which
raises a question of existence or exercise ofjurisdiction under this
Act the case shall be given calendar priority and handled
expeditiously.]
§ 25. [Severability]
If any provision of this Act or the application thereof to any
person or circumstance is held invalid, its invalidity does not
affect other provisions or applications of the Act which can be
given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to
this end the provisions of this Act are severable.
§ 26. [Short Title]
This Act may be cited as the Revised Unifonn Child Custody juris
diction Act.
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